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Vulnerable and/or intimidated court users are able to give evidence with the assistance of 
special measures. This thesis examines the role of equality in the provision of such measures 
to those giving evidence in Crown Court trials. I adopt Keith Hawkins’ conceptual 
framework of surround, field and frames to analyse the multitude of factors relevant to 
understanding its role. The standard of equality I invoke is that which underpinned the initial 
development of special measures for non-defendant witnesses. This is used to assess whether 
the law remains committed to equal treatment despite the unequal provision of special 
measures between vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant and non-defendant witnesses. 
Furthermore, using findings from interviews undertaken with 18 criminal practitioners, I 
consider the role that the principle of equality appears to play in the use of special measures. I 
conclude that the principle of equality is not consistently upheld in the provision of special 
measures in law and practice. Barriers to its more prominent role include the way, and the 
socio-political context in which, special measures law developed; the legal field in which 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Some participants in criminal trials (whether the alleged victim, a witness, or the accused) are 
vulnerable because of their age, a mental health condition or a learning disability. Others are 
intimidated by the court process. It is vital that when such individuals give evidence they are 
adequately supported by the courts to do so to the best of their ability. Special measures were 
introduced to this end. They are ‘a range of measures that can be used to facilitate the 
gathering and giving of evidence’
1
 by adjusting the trial setting and the mediums through 
which evidence can be received. This thesis explores whether the provision of these measures 
fosters equality between all vulnerable and/or intimidated participants in Crown Court trials. 
Under the current law the legal provision and practical availability of these special measures 
varies depending upon whether the witness giving evidence is a non-defendant (a witness for 
the prosecution or defence) or a defendant. The provisions for defendants are much less 
extensive than those for non-defendants. This means that vulnerable and/or intimidated 
individuals who are accused of a crime receive less support by way of special measures when 
giving evidence in their defence than would similarly vulnerable and/or intimidated 
prosecution or defence witnesses testifying in the same trial. Curen
2
 highlights the absurdity 
of this: 
A person’s vulnerability should not be ignored when they become a defendant. 
Just as accessibility considerations, such as ramps for wheelchair users, would be 
made available to a defendant who uses a wheelchair, so [too should] special 
                                                          
1
 See http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/special_measures/. 
2
 Curen was the deputy CEO of the charity RESPOND, which aims to support individuals with learning 
disabilities. See http://www.respond.org.uk/who-we-are/. 
2 
 
measures that improve understanding of the criminal justice [system] and what is 
being asked of them.
3
 
A bizarre effect of the unequal provision of special measures between these groups has also 
been pointed out by Hoyano and Rafferty:  
[A] person with communicative difficulties testifying for the prosecution would 
automatically be eligible for an intermediary [a type of special measure explained 
in section 1.2 below], but if she then appeared in another trial as the defendant, 




The prevalence of vulnerability among the general population renders the differential 
provision of special measures an important issue to explore. It is estimated that over 1 million 
people have learning disabilities in England;
5
 that 1 in 6 people have symptoms of a common 
mental disorder;
6
 and that almost 1 in 5 people aged 16 and over in the UK show symptoms 
of anxiety or depression.
7
 Moreover, in 2004 10% of children had a clinically diagnosed 
mental disorder,
8
 and it is estimated that 10% of children and young people have a speech, 
language or communication need which is likely to be long term or persistent.
9
 These figures 
support the claim that many of those involved in criminal trials, including the accused, will 
suffer from some sort of vulnerability. The treatment of the vulnerable in court matters; 
Honourable Justice Green stating that ‘how the courts treat those who are exposed and weak 
is a barometer of our moral worth as a society’.
10
 
                                                          
3
 Richard Curen, ‘Vulnerable Adults and the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales: Some Proposals 
for Reform’ (2005) Criminal Lawyer 3, 4. 
4
 Laura Hoyano and Angela Rafferty, ‘Rationing Defence Intermediaries under the April 2016 Criminal Practice 
Direction’ [2017] Criminal Law Review 93, 94. The authors’ information was provided by Joyce Plotnikoff on 6 
October 2016. 
5
 Eric Emerson and others, ‘People with Learning Disabilities in England 2011’ (Department of Health 2012) 2. 
6
 Sheila McManus and others (eds), Mental Health and Wellbeing in England: Adult Psychiatric Morbidity 
Survey 2014 (Leeds: NHS Digital 2016) 44. 
7
 Office for National Statistics, Personal Well-being in the UK: 2015-2016 (Statistical Bulletin, ONS 2016) 14.  
8
 Hazel Green and others, Mental Health of Children and Young People in Great Britain, 2004: Summary 
Report (National Statistics 2005) 8. 
9
 I CAN, Speech, Language and Communication in Secondary Aged Pupils (I CAN Talk Series, Issue 10 2011) 
7. 
10
 Quoted in Jacqueline Wheatcroft, ‘Witness Assistance and Familiarisation in England and Wales: The Right 
to Challenge’ (2017) 21(1/2) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 158, 158. 
3 
 
The differential provision of special measures is of further significance given the status of 
equality as a basic and fundamental principle of liberal democracy.
11
 Dworkin expresses this 
as treating people as equals, by ensuring that we have equal concern and respect for all
12
 and 
treat people accordingly. If special measures are a mechanism through which equality of 
opportunity to give evidence for vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses is sought (which in 
section 3.3 I show to be true) then it is vital to assess whether the restrictive provision of 
special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants giving evidence is defensible. 
This requires an evaluation of the relevance of any differences between defendants and non-
defendants which might justify this disparate provision.  
This is of yet further significance when one has regard to the importance of the law’s internal 
consistency in its treatment of vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. If such non-
defendant witnesses are provided with special measures support to help them to give 
evidence, then the law should ensure that vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses 
also receive adequate support to do so. This is the normative position adopted throughout this 
thesis: that the law should be consistent in its treatment of and assistance to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users who can and do give evidence in Crown Court trials. 
1.2. Key terms 
Special measures are contained within the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
(YJCEA) 1999.
13
 Adjustments to the trial include the removal of barristers’ and judges’ wigs 
and gowns; the clearance of the public gallery (save for a member of the press) while the 
witness gives evidence; and the provision of a screen to segregate a witness giving evidence 
in court from view of the public gallery and defendant(s). Alterations to the medium through 
                                                          
11
 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press 2000). 
12
 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1977) 370. See also Ronald 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (first printed 1985, Clarendon Press 1986) 207-13. 
13
 See YJCEA, s 23-30.  
4 
 
which evidence is given come in the form of the live link, which enables witnesses to give 
evidence from outside of the courtroom while still being seen and heard in court via a large 
television screen. Alternatively (or additionally) a witness can use pre-recorded witness 
testimony (evidence in chief and cross-examination) which is played at the trial in the 
absence of the witness. Furthermore, a witness may use an intermediary to enhance their 
effective communication throughout the evidence giving process and can also use 
communication aids, such as prompt cards, alphabet charts and drawings, to the same effect.  
In order to use special measures, a witness or defendant must be considered vulnerable and/or 
intimidated. For the purpose of invoking special measures, vulnerability is defined with 
reference to young age and/or the existence of physical, mental or learning difficulties or 
disabilities.
14
 Intimidation is an umbrella term for various factors (for example religion) 




Similarly to Jacobson et al, the term ‘court user’ in this thesis comprises non-defendant 
witnesses for the defence, defendants, and all witnesses for the prosecution.
16
 Alleged victims 
are subsumed in the category of prosecution witnesses unless otherwise stated. Prosecution 
and defence non-defendant witnesses (herein referred to collectively as non-defendant 
witnesses) are considered together in the initial chapters, with defendants separately, 
mirroring the categories contained in the 1999 Act. 
1.3. Ambit of the research 
The restriction of this thesis to Crown Court trials serves to limit its direct relevance to 
criminal proceedings more broadly, since over 90% of all criminal cases are dealt with in the 
                                                          
14
 See YJCEA, s 16 and s 33A. See sections 3.2.1. (p45-46) and 4.2.3. (p114) respectively. 
15
 See YJCEA, s 17. See section 3.2.2. (p46-47). 
16
 Jessica Jacobson, Gillian Hunter and Amy Kirby, Inside Crown Court: Personal Experiences and Questions 





 This leaves just 10% of court business in the hands of the Crown Court. 
According to the latest CPS figures, 71.9% of prosecutions brought
18
 in the Crown Court 
conclude in the defendant pleading guilty, meaning that there is no trial.
19
 Although CPS 
statistics do not include prosecutions brought by other agencies, these sources combined 
clearly highlight two things. First that a very small percentage of criminal work is heard in 
the Crown Court, and second that the proportion of those cases which are contested is even 
smaller. However, like Roberts and Zuckerman,
20
 I reject the inference that caseload statistics 
render considerations of Crown Court trials unimportant. For the three main reasons outlined 
below, the narrow focus of my thesis is justified. 
First, despite the relatively low number of cases that are tried in the Crown Court, the option 
to be tried there is available on a much greater scale. For instance, all accused persons 
entering a guilty plea in the Crown Court could instead plead not guilty and stand trial there. 
Similarly, defendants charged with indictable ‘either way’ offences
21
 choosing to be tried in 
the magistrates’ court could instead have opted for a Crown Court trial.
22
 There is, then, at 
least the potential for the Crown Court to host a much bigger proportion of trials than it 
currently does. Second, regardless of the court in which the case will ultimately be tried (if at 
all), Roberts and Zuckerman highlight that evidence laws are relevant to the preparation of all 
cases, all decisions to prosecute or discontinue, and may also influence an accused’s plea 
decision.
23
 Thus, the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court 
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users may be an important factor in these pre-trial decisions. These issues combined make a 
consideration of practices in Crown Court trials markedly more significant than their 
relatively low occurrence may, at first glance, suggest. 
Third, the Crown Court is where the most serious offences are tried. This is relevant in light 
of Roberts and Zuckerman’s suggestion that it is in the Crown Court that evidence laws 
receive the most sustained attention because of the gravity of the charges against the 
accused.
24
 It is thus in this setting that the provision of special measures should be the subject 
of closest scrutiny. Furthermore, the availability of special measures under the YJCEA is, in 
some instances, tied to the offence to which the charges relate. For example, serious sexual 
offences are tried in the Crown Court, and for the alleged victims of these crimes special 
measures provisions are automatically available.
25
 In addition, special measures are available 
to some court users when they are ‘in fear or distress in connection with testifying in the 
proceedings’.
26
 This is arguably more likely to be the case in the context of Crown Court 
trials because it is probable that the seriousness of the offences tried, combined with the 
daunting environment of the Crown Court,
27
 will increase the fear or distress experienced by 
those required to give evidence. Therefore, it is in the Crown Court that special measures are 
more likely to be needed, and are presumably more likely to be invoked. 
A final explanatory note relates to child defendants. Most of them will stand trial in the 
Youth Court. Only children charged with an offence which is punishable by more than 14 
years’ imprisonment if committed by an adult will be tried in the Crown Court.
28
 The focus in 
this thesis on Crown Court trials means that these are the only circumstances in which the use 
of special measures by child defendants is considered in this work. 
                                                          
24
 ibid 43. 
25
 YJCEA, s 17(4). 
26
 YJCEA, s 17. 
27
 See section 3.3.2. (p50) for a fuller discussion of the nature of the courtroom.  
28
 As per the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, s 24. 
7 
 
1.4. The principle of equality 
It is important to be clear what is meant by equality. The underlying presumption adopted in 
this thesis is that if there is no convincing reason for unequal distribution, the only option 
which remains is that of equal distribution.
29
 In the context of this thesis, therefore, the 
distribution relates to the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court 
users giving evidence in Crown Court trials.  
Equality is a highly contested concept.
30
 It is not the aim of this thesis to explore in detail the 
precise differences and merits of the various conceptions of equality, and to then apply them 
to the special measures context. Instead, this thesis evaluates the law of special measures 
according to the notion of equality upon which this law was developed: one of procedural 
equality of opportunity (see section 3.4). It also falls outside the scope of this thesis to 
investigate whether this conception of equality was the best version upon which to base the 
provision of special measures.  
This thesis explores the law’s commitment to its own ‘principle of equality’ in the provision 
of special measures to different vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. The normative 
claim underpinning such an exploration is that the law should be internally consistent in the 
protection and provision of assistance to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users.
31
 The first 
step in assessing this in relation to the law of special measures is to identify the differences 
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between defendants and non-defendants which result from their structural positions in the 
criminal trial. The second step is to consider whether these differences provide a sufficient 
basis from which to justify the restrictive provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses.  
The thesis then goes beyond this normative enquiry to look at the role that equality appears 
play in practice in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court 
users giving evidence in Crown Court trials. This is examined through a small exploratory 
study involving interviews with a sample of the legal profession (see Chapter 2). This 
provides an insight into whether the legal profession is internally consistent in its application 
of the available law for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users in practice.  
1.5. Research questions 
The primary research question (RQ) answered in this thesis is: 
 What role does equality play in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users giving evidence in Crown Court trials? 
In order to address this research question, I posed a series of subsidiary research questions. 
Tackling these contributes to the answer of the primary research question. These subsidiary 
research questions are as follows: 
 RQ1: To what extent was the development of the law of special measures for 
vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses underpinned by a concern for 
equality? 
 RQ2: Was the exclusion of vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses from 
special measures consistent with the law’s commitment to the equality principle?  
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 RQ3: To what extent did (and does) a commitment to the equality principle, and a 
desire to achieve internal coherence in the law, guide the development of the law of 
special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses?  
 RQ4: How frequently are special measures invoked in practice as per my respondents’ 
experiences? 
 RQ5: Are there any barriers to the role of equality in the uptake of special measures 
among vulnerable and/or intimidated court users as per my respondents’ experiences? 
 RQ6: If so, why do these barriers exist?  
The research undertaken in order to answer these questions has been analysed using 
Hawkins’ conceptual framework of surround, field and frames. The next section of this 
chapter outlines what this framework is, what it does, and why it is utilised in this doctoral 
thesis.  
1.6. Conceptual framework: Hawkins’ surround, field and frame  
Hawkins’ conceptual framework
32
 is used in this thesis to clearly delineate the different 
factors which are relevant when situating the role of equality in the provision of special 
measures in its wider context. It provides a language to use throughout my analysis. In 
addition, and on a more substantive level, Hawkins’ framework is a tool which provides a 
comprehensible way to link together the different layers of analysis in my thesis. This section 
provides an overview of Hawkins’ framework and how it is applicable in this project on 
special measures.  
Hawkins identifies that ‘legal decisions … are not made in a vacuum, but in a broader context 
of demands and expectations arising from the environment in which the decision-maker lives 
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 Hawkins’ framework conceptually splits macro and micro level forces into 
three areas: surround, field and frame. These ‘areas’ do not have a simple one-way and/or 
linear relationship. Instead, each level can and does influence each of the others; the layers 
are in ‘mutual interaction’.
34
 This means that the surround, field and frame interrelate and 
may sometimes overlap.  
The application of this framework in this thesis is helpful to understanding why the law has 
developed in the ways that it has and the role that equality has played in this. The reality is 
complex and the use of Hawkins’ framework as a heuristic device helps to make sense of the 
various factors which are at play in the provision of special measures both in law and 
practice. Such factors include, inter alia: politics; public pressure and expectation; the 
economic recession and resulting cuts to public spending (particularly with regards to legal 
aid); the conditions in which lawyers work; the processes to which criminal practitioners 
must conform within their particular profession; the knowledge and awareness of those 
working within the criminal justice system about vulnerability and special measures use; and 
their attitudes and beliefs about special measures and different court users. The influence of 
each of these on each other is more easily explored through the use of Hawkins’ framework 
as this facilitates an examination of the relationship between the various layers at play. 
This particular framework was selected due to the similar nature of the research undertaken. 
Hawkins focused on decision-making by the prosecution with regards to health and safety 
breaches. This thesis examines prosecutorial/defence decision-making with regards to special 
measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. Furthermore, the way in which 
Hawkins found decision-makers framed their decisions maps neatly on to my findings with 
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regards to the legal profession and special measures. This is made more evident in the brief 
overview of the three concepts – surround, field and frames – which follows.  
1.6.1. Surround 
The surround is the social, political and economic environment within which decisions are 
made. There are several elements of the surround which are considered to be influential to the 
law of special measures in this thesis. These include the changing political climate 
surrounding the treatment of defendants and victims in the criminal justice system; the 
economic recession and its impacts on funding to those working within the criminal justice 
system; the development of academic knowledge and a more general concern for the 
treatment of the disabled and mentally unwell; and technological advances which have 
enabled the creation of measures such as the live link and pre-recorded evidence. Hawkins 
notes that the surround is not static since ‘political and economic forces may shift’.
35
 An 
appreciation of this can help to understand why laws continually develop and the approach to 
a particular issue may change over time. 
1.6.2. Field 
The decision field is set within the social surround. It is the ‘legally and organisationally 
defined setting in which decisions are made’.
36
 For the purposes of this thesis, the decision 
field is the criminal justice system, and more specifically the parts of it relating to Crown 
Court trials. The statutes and appellate decisions; organisation of the system (as defined by 
the Criminal Procedure Rules, for example, or the codes of practice); resources (including 
case load pressures and legal aid fees); the structure of the legal profession; and the ideology 
inherent within the profession are all of relevance to a consideration of contextual decision-
making about special measures. 
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The decision-making frame is the final strand of Hawkins’ framework. A frame is ‘a structure 
of knowledge, experience, values, and meaning that decision-makers employ in deciding’.
37
 
The way a criminal practitioner frames special measures decisions will affect the outcome of 
their decision. For example, a particular way of framing the situation and the available 
options can alter a criminal practitioner’s view on whether special measures are needed, 
useful, deserved and worth applying for on behalf of a witness or client. Hawkins identified 
four frames – instrumental, organisational, symbolic and legal. These are adopted in this 
thesis, and their meaning is further expanded and adapted in Chapters 6 and 7.  
In summary, Hawkins’ framework is used as an analytical device which helps to organise and 
analyse the various factors at play in the development of the law of special measures and in 
criminal practitioners’ special measures decisions. It is through doing this that an 
appreciation and understanding of the role in which equality plays, and the commitment to 
this principle in law and practice, is ascertained. The surround, field and frame are in a 
symbiotic relationship. This means that changes in the surround can result in changes in the 
way practitioners frame decisions and the organisation of the legal system, just as the way the 
profession frame decisions can affect the organisation of the legal field and vice versa. This is 
demonstrated throughout this thesis and summarised in the conclusion. 
1.7. Thesis plan 
In the next chapter of this thesis I discuss the way that this research project was designed. 
This includes an exploration of the methods adopted and how these are appropriate to 
answering the research questions. Chapter 3 moves on to look at the role of equality in the 
development of the law of special measures up to the enactment of the YJCEA. This starts by 
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highlighting the notion of equality which underpinned the development of special measures 
for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. It then goes on to assess whether 
the exclusion of such defendants from special measures in the YJCEA was justified 
according to the principle of equality which is inherent within this area of the law. In 
considering these questions, the chapter begins to lay the foundations for Hawkins’ 
framework to be used by depicting the organisation of the legal field around the legal 
provisions in existence and how they came to be enacted. 
Chapter 4 explores the extent to which the initial concern for equality has influenced the 
development of the law of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
witnesses. This is primarily conducted through an analysis of case law and the Parliamentary 
debates around the enactment of new provisions for defendant special measures. This 
provides a further insight into the way in which the legal field is organised. The chapter also 
begins to explore how the way the legal profession frames special measures issues can 
influence the law of special measures, and how this, in turn, can result in bigger changes in 
the surround through legislative intervention. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
law’s commitment to equality in the current provision of special measures in law. 
The first part of Chapter 5 commences with an insight into the frequency with which special 
measures are used by vulnerable and/or intimidated court users as per my respondents’ 
experiences. The majority of this chapter, along with Chapters 6 and 7, focus on an 
identification and exploration of the barriers to special measures use that my respondents 
identified, and a consideration of why they exist. This part of the thesis relies heavily on 
Hawkins’ conceptual framework. It draws on the context in which the law of special 
measures has developed (the surround) and the way that this has shaped the organisation of 
the legal field to understand why the law seems to operate in this way. Furthermore, it 
requires the application of Hawkins’ various frame devices to the attitudes and approach of 
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criminal practitioners. These layers of analysis are linked together to show how these 
different factors interact and may affect the role that equality plays in the socio-legal 
provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users.  
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter of this thesis. Here, the role that the principle of equality 
plays in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users giving 
evidence in Crown Court trials is summarised. It is concluded that the principle of equality is 
not upheld between all vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant and non-defendant witnesses. 
This means that the law of special measures lacks integrity, since it does not consistently 
protect and support vulnerable and/or intimidated court. The only context in which the non-
provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants is considered 
justified is in relation to those which require evidence to be obtained from defendants pre-
trial. Otherwise, there should be equal provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users, so that the law embodies internal consistency in its commitment to 
the principle of equality. The thesis ends with a presentation of various options for reform 
which could improve the law’s consistency in the provision of special measures to the 
vulnerable and/or intimidated who are required to give evidence in Crown Court trials. These 
are continued judicial reform, ‘piggybacking’ on a current political issue that is likely to be 
the subject of Parliamentary debate and legislation, and targeting the legal field. 
1.8. Conclusion 
It is a fundamental principle of liberal democracy that people should be treated as equals 
absent a good reason for doing otherwise. That the law should demonstrate internal 
consistency in its treatment of individuals before it is just as axiomatic. My thesis is that 
examining the legal and practical provision of special measures in light of these principles is 
illuminating and highlights areas in need of reform.  
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In this chapter I have sketched out how this thesis is developed in what follows. I have also 
introduced Keith Hawkins’ conceptual framework which is adopted in this thesis. This, as 
discussed, helps to organise the various aspects which are relevant to understanding the 
development and provision of the law of special measures both in law and practice, and the 
commitment to equality in this. 
In the next chapter I examine the design of this project and the methods that were adopted. I 
demonstrate how this research has been designed to ensure that the questions are addressed in 
a way that is appropriate to determining the role that equality plays in the provision of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. Furthermore, the reflective account of 
the research process highlights issues encountered throughout the course of the research and 
the actions taken to overcome them. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN 
AND METHODS 
 
2.1. Introduction  
In this chapter I outline the research design of this project and the methods adopted. I provide 
a justification for the methods chosen and show why they were appropriate to answer my 
research questions. I also discuss the way I obtained access to the legal profession and how I 
selected the sample of criminal practitioners involved in my research. The majority of the 
chapter delineates the research process, involving a discussion of my actions before, during 
and after the interviews, in terms of preparation, data analysis and writing up. The final 
sections of the chapter acknowledge the ethical challenges I faced and how they were 
overcome, as well as highlighting potential criticisms of this study and the approach taken. 
2.2. Research Design 
Examining the commitment to the principle of equality in the provision of special measures 
to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users in England and Wales requires analysis at both 
the legal and socio-legal levels. This thesis was thus designed using a qualitative approach, 
which enables a consideration of both the ‘law in books’ and the ‘law in action’. It seeks to 
understand the reasons underlying the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users and the context of the law’s development. It also seeks to develop an 
understanding of how the law works – what the processes are for securing special measures 
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for a vulnerable and/or intimidated court user and why they are this way. These are aims 
which Hennink et al categorise as most suited to a qualitative research design.
1
 
Ritchie highlights that qualitative research can be used to explore a new or underdeveloped 
subject matter in order to begin to build knowledge around it.
2
 This made it the most 
appropriate approach in this thesis since the use of special measures by all vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users, in particular such defendant and non-defendant defence witnesses, is 
a phenomenon that is little known about. Therefore, by conducting an exploratory, qualitative 
enquiry, I was able to start to uncover ‘what exists,’ through ‘unpack[ing]’ how the law 
operates as per the experience of the respondents.
3
  
Although qualitative findings rarely provide a measure of frequency in the way that 
quantitative methods can, what they do provide is an ‘insight into a phenomenon and the 
extent to which it is present or absent’
4
 by ‘engag[ing] law’s subjects on the ground’.
5
 By 
using qualitative methods, this thesis begins to highlight some reasons why the law might 
operate in the way the respondents reported by exploring ‘what lies behind, or underpins, a 
decision, attitude, behaviour or other phenomena’.
6
 This research, therefore, begins to 
‘develop theories with both descriptive and explanatory power’.
7
 A quantitative approach was 
inappropriate since identifying the relevant issues at play is a necessary prerequisite to 
attempting to quantify their prevalence.  
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Baldwin’s typology of research conducted in the criminal courts indicates that my study 
serves two main purposes. It begins to ‘demythologize’ practices around special measures; 
identifying that ‘the procedures adopted in the criminal courts fall short of what one would 
expect from reading the standard legal texts’.
8
 It also looks to the pre-trial ‘shaping’ of cases, 
recognising that to ‘understand decisions taken within the criminal courts, the influence of 
pre-trial decision-making needs to be considered’.
9
 All importantly, by engaging with my 
research questions in this way, the research design adopted fosters a ‘context-specific’ 
understanding
10
 of the law.  
2.3. Methods 
In the same way that the research design is driven by the research questions asked in this 
thesis, there exists an equally vital link between the questions asked and the methods adopted 
to answer them. In order to establish the role that the principle of equality has played in the 
development of special measures, an analysis of secondary data sources such as statutes, case 
law, policy documents and Hansard records was appropriate.
11
 Addressing how the principle 
of equality operates in practice involves examining the attitudes and experiences of 
practitioners and means that use was also made of the interview method.
12
 Each of these 
methods is outlined in more detail below. 
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2.3.1. Desk-based research 
Documentary research ‘involves the study of existing documents … to understand their 
substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings’.
13
 Such documents can include 
legislation and case law and are categorised as primary legal sources.
14
 This is referred to in 
this thesis as the doctrinal element of the desk-based analysis. 
The doctrinal analysis in this thesis primarily focuses on ascertaining what the law is and how 
it has developed. The primary sources of doctrine relied on are provisions contained in the 
YJCEA relating to special measures and the competency of witnesses. Appellate decisions of 
the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords/Supreme Court are also 
analysed, along with those of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in order to 
ascertain the role of the courts in the development of defendant special measures. It is 
through a consideration of the judicial reasoning in these cases that the role that the principle 
of equality has played in the development of the law is understood.  
In addition, the Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Practice Directions of England and 
Wales are considered, which issue further guidance on the provision of special measures and 
the related procedures.
15
 In order to assist the doctrinal analysis, other documentary sources 
were also studied. These included ‘Best Practice’ documents, produced by and for agents 
within the criminal justice system (for example The Advocate’s Gateway toolkits
16
), which 
highlight the common conceptions of and procedures for best practice.  
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It was not simply a doctrinal analysis of the law that was sought in this project. The social, 
economic and political context in which the law of special measures was enacted and 
operates was also considered.
17
 This contributes to understanding why the law has developed 
in the ways pinpointed through the doctrinal analysis described above and any effect that this 
has on the role of equality in the provision of special measures. While some of the reasons for 
the development of special measures provisions are legal (and thus identifiable through 
purely doctrinal analyses) a more contextual analysis identifies other social, economic and 
political influences. Thus, a documentary analysis was carried out of various policy 
documents, political documents, and through an extensive review of the existing literature. 
Hawkins’ conceptual framework was then used to organise and link the various layers of this 
analysis together to create a fuller picture of the context in which the law has evolved and the 
possible effects of this on its current state.
18
 
The desk-based research was ongoing in the sense that the process of gathering and analysing 
new, updated and amended documentary and doctrinal sources took place throughout the 
study. It was iterative in that I analysed some documents on multiple occasions as my 
perspective changed and my understanding of the law deepened throughout the research 
project. 
2.3.2. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
Statistics on the use of special measures in Crown Court trials are not collected centrally by 
the Ministry of Justice or locally by individual court centres. Studies have examined the use 
of special measures by vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant prosecution witnesses 
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and various attitudes towards them,
19
 but there has been no attempt to mirror this research 
with regards to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants
20
 and there is only very limited data 
available on non-defendant defence witnesses.
21
 Accordingly, I undertook a small-scale, 
empirical study to gain an insight into how special measures are used in practice for all 
vulnerable and/or intimidated court users in Crown Court trials. This enabled me to identify 
and explore various factors which may affect their use and the realisation of equality within 
this.  
This small-scale empirical study was conducted through interviews with 18 members of the 
legal profession. The data collated from them highlights many practical and conceptual 
barriers which seem to affect the frequency with which special measures are invoked. It was 
through these interviews that the reasons for the existence of various barriers to the equal use 
of special measures (outside of their legal provision) were uncovered. Identifying and 
evaluating the actual and perceived differences between various vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users that the respondents considered relevant has enabled a richer, three-
dimensional exploration of the overarching research question of what role the principle of 
equality plays in the provision of special measures. 
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Interviews were the appropriate method for these purposes as they enable the collation of 
‘empirical knowledge of a subject’s typical experiences’.
22
 In this instance, this was their 
experiences of the application for and use of special measures in Crown Court trials. The 
interviews were semi-structured. I used an interview guide
23
 recording a series of questions 
that I tried to ask all respondents to ensure a basic level of consistency between each 
interview, whilst also pursuing the points made by respondents which were of potential 
interest and value.
24
 The data collected provides an indication of my respondents’ 
experiences of the frequency of applications and the subsequent use of special measures. It 
also provides insights into their experiences of how, when, and why special measures were 
(or were not) invoked.  
Similarly to Jennifer Temkin’s research on prosecuting and defending rape, this research does 
not ‘aim or claim’ to be quantitatively representative.
25
 Despite this, it is ‘sufficient to reveal 
a number of important issues’
26
 about the use of the special measures by vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users in Crown Court trials. In much the same way as Garland and 
McEwan’s research on the operation of the overriding objective
27
 in criminal trials, the 
interviews that have been conducted for this research provide a mere ‘snapshot of … 
practitioners’ experiences’
28
 of the use of special measures, which highlight areas of potential 
significance. The findings from this research, therefore, are not generalisable to all court 
centres and those working within them. Nevertheless, such an ‘exploratory study’
29
 does 
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provide valuable insights into some of the factors which may be affecting the use of special 
measures by vulnerable and/or intimidated court users in practice.  
2.3.2.1. Sample 
The sample was drawn from two cities in England and comprised eight barristers (four of 
whom also sat as part-time judges, called recorders), five trial judges, and five solicitors. 
These cities were selected on a practical basis, as they were the two in which I had contacts 
from networking at events previously. Since this research sought to gain an insight into the 
experiences of the legal profession in relation to the law of special measures, and I was not 
attempting to produce statistically generalisable findings,
30
 it was not important that the 
sample was demographically representative of the entire legal profession. This was reflected 
in the variety of sampling techniques used to obtain my sample.  
Primarily, my sample was a convenience sample. This involves taking ‘a selection of the 
most accessible subjects’.
31
 While the principal method was one of convenience, it did also 
feature an element of purposiveness, and a very small element of snow-balling. Purposive 
sampling enabled me to keep the goals of the research in mind when selecting respondents,
32
 
‘so as to maximise the richness of information obtained pertinent to the research question’.
33
 
Thus, in constructing my sample, I chose a variety of ‘purposive selection criteria’, which 
indicated the ‘constituencies [that] need[ed] to be represented and with what level of 
diversity’.
34
 These included respondents: 
 from different parts of the legal profession (eg solicitors and barristers) 
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 with a variety of backgrounds in prosecution/defence work 
 with a range of post-qualified experiences (PQE) 
Snowball sampling was used in a minority of cases, where ‘participants propose[d] other 
participants who ha[d] … the experience or characteristics relevant to the research’.
35
 The 
specific demographics of the sample are set out in Table 2.1. The left hand column indicates 
the identifier that is used for each respondent throughout this thesis. They are descriptive of 
the part of the legal profession to which the respondent belongs. This is so that following 
direct quotes or paraphrasing of their views the respondents’ roles can be quickly identified 
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Although the findings from this research are not statistically generalisable to the entire legal 
profession or to practices in all Crown Court trials, Lewis and Ritchie highlight that there are 
 
Table 2.1: Respondents’ characteristics 




PQE Age Gender 
B1 Barrister 50/50 22 40-50 M 
B2 Barrister 80/20 14 30-40 F 
B3 Barrister 40/60 20 40-50 M 
B4 Barrister 40/60 21 40-50 F 
R1 Barrister / Recorder 85/15 35 50-60 M 
R2 Barrister / Recorder 80/20 13 30-40 F 
R3 Barrister / Recorder 50/50 18 40-50 F 
R4 Barrister / Recorder 50/50 19 40-50 M 
J1 Judge  38 60+ M 
J2 Judge  39 60+ M 
J3 Judge  33 50-60 M 
J4 Judge  35 60+ M 
J5 Judge  37 60+ F 
DS1 Defence Solicitor 0/100 15 30-40 M 
DS2 Defence Solicitor 0/100 34 40-50 M 
DS3 Defence Solicitor 0/100 18 40-50 M 
PS1 Prosecution Solicitor 100/0 9 30-40 M 
PS2 Prosecution Solicitor 100/0 6 30-40 F 
26 
 
different types of generalisation. They state that qualitative research findings should not be 
held to the same standards as quantitative research findings.
36
 Instead, representational 
generalisation is ‘the extent to which findings can be inferred to the parent population that 
was sampled’ and involves making inferences about the content or range of views and 
experiences and the circumstances that shape and influence them.
37
  
In my fieldwork, I encouraged the respondents to share their direct experiences of special 
measures used in trials in which they had participated as well as times they were aware of 
colleagues using special measures in trials when they themselves had not been directly 
involved. Given the respondents’ collective PQE of over 400 years, adopting this approach 
has enabled me to gain an insight into practices surrounding special measures which goes 
well beyond the personal working lives of the 18 criminal practitioners I interviewed. This 
further validates the findings from this study. Furthermore, I would argue that the insights 
gained into the use of special measures and various barriers to their use can, cautiously, be 




Members of the legal profession are ‘elites’. A person can be categorised as elite with regards 
to their ‘social position relative to the researcher … or relative to the average citizen’; both of 
which are applicable where the legal profession is concerned.
39
 Odendahl and Shaw note that 
access to elite populations is difficult and ‘typically requires extensive preparation, 
homework and creativity on the part of the researcher, as well as the right credentials and 
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 I accessed the vast majority
41
 of my sample through two gate-keepers; a legal 
gatekeeper and an academic gatekeeper. These were a recorder from a barristers’ chambers 
and a colleague from Birmingham Law School with established links to the legal profession. 
Gatekeepers provide ‘entry point[s] into a specific community’ and have ‘“inside” 
information’ which helps to identify who would be most appropriate to interview.
42
 While 
this method of recruitment has obvious benefits when attempting to penetrate a community of 
elite professionals, it also places limits on the extent of a researcher’s control over sample 
selection. In light of this, Harvey notes the importance of ‘pursuing multiple avenues for 
gaining access to circumvent the danger of only speaking to people from within a particular 
social network’.
43
 I have minimised this risk by having two independent gatekeepers and by 
providing them with a list of purposive selection criteria. 
A further benefit arising from the use of gatekeepers is that they ‘help … to access the 
community through introductions’.
44
 The fact that my respondents were either approached by 
one of their colleagues from within the legal profession or by an external contact with whom 
they had worked closely in the past helped to establish my credentials as a competent 
researcher. In essence, I had been ‘vouched for’ by the gatekeepers, resulting in respondents 
perceiving me positively.  
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2.4. Research process  
2.4.1. Pre-interviews: preparation  
I commenced my PhD studies in October 2013. In the initial months, I conducted a literature 
review as well as beginning to analyse policy documents, the legislation and relevant case 
law. This helped me to gain a firm understanding of what the law of special measures is and 
how it has developed. Alongside this, I sought to make contacts within the legal profession. 
In March 2014 I met with the Resident Judge at Birmingham Crown Court to discuss 
observing trials featuring special measures use by those giving evidence. I also made contact 
with my legal gatekeeper. I was able to attend several trials in which special measures were 
used. In addition, I contacted one of the court centres trialling a special measure which 
enables pre-recorded cross-examination (s 28 YJCEA).
45
 I was permitted to observe two such 
hearings in the early stages of the pilot scheme.  
Attending court regularly in these early months of my doctoral studies enhanced my 
understanding of Crown Court proceedings. Through ad hoc encounters with members of the 
legal profession, I was able to informally share and test my emerging ideas with them, while 
also gaining exposure to their views. Collectively, these experiences enabled me to 
familiarise myself with the legal terminology, referred to by Kvale as ‘master[ing] the 
technical language’.
46
 This was useful for the development and expansion of my substantive 
knowledge. The experience of interacting with the legal profession also served to increase my 
confidence and ability to do so effectively prior to the commencement of my interviews. 
The legal gatekeeper was an invaluable contact in these early stages of my research. As well 
as securing my access to trials involving special measures, they were able to confirm and 
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explain parts of the procedure with which I was unfamiliar. When interviewing an elite, a 
researcher needs to be ‘well-prepared … [and] have a thorough knowledge of [their] whole 
field of research’.
47
 Furthermore, ‘the more professional and well informed you appear to 
your interviewee, the more likely you are to gain his/her respect and with it the whole tone of 
the interview will be improved’.
48
 Checking procedural information with the gatekeeper 
helped me to ensure I was adequately prepared for the interviews. For example, I had asked 
the legal gatekeeper if I could attend a Plea and Case Management Hearing (PCMH), where I 
had assumed that special measures applications would be orally made and contested. I 
learned from the legal gatekeeper that special measures applications are made on paper, 
ahead of the PCMH, and that they are rarely contested.
49
 This enabled me to tailor my 
interviews accordingly.  
The legal gatekeeper also assisted with the formulation of interview questions. I first prepared 
an interview guide with the assistance of my supervisors, before meeting with the gatekeeper 
to discuss the appropriateness of the questions I was proposing. This enabled me to avoid 
phrasing questions in a way which might have seemed misconceived to the respondents.
50
 
This was important to avoid the respondents feeling as though their time was being wasted by 
an inexperienced doctoral researcher. To this end, I also conducted a pilot interview with the 
legal gatekeeper. This helped me to identify questions which may not have worked well in 
the interview setting and to amend them accordingly. Furthermore, it was an opportunity to 
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practice my interview technique, which increased both my confidence and competence before 
the fieldwork commenced. 
Once the interview guide was completed and ethical clearance had been secured from the 
University of Birmingham, I began to make contact with my respondents. My legal and 
academic gatekeepers approached potential respondents who matched (as closely as possible) 
the purposive selection criteria stipulated. Following their verbal agreement with the 
gatekeeper to participate their names and contact details were passed on to me. I then emailed 
them individually to confirm their willingness to take part in the research and to arrange a 
convenient time and place to conduct the interview. Attached to the email were a research 
summary, a consent form, and a respondent questionnaire.
51
 This questionnaire enabled the 
collation of information about their professional background prior to the interview. Copies of 
this paperwork can be found in the appendices. 
2.4.2. Interviews 
The interviews took place between November 2014 and April 2015. I slightly adapted my 
interview guide depending upon the part of the profession to which the respondent belonged. 
For example, I rephrased some of the questions if the respondent was a barrister versus a 
solicitor, or if their background was one of defence, prosecution, or a mixture of both. This 
meant that the questions were appropriate for each respondent in my diverse sample. The 
majority of the interviews took place in chambers. Those with solicitors, however, took place 
in coffee shops as they did not have adequate facilities to host the interviews in their firms. 
The interviews were scheduled to last for one hour – the shortest was 42 minutes and the 
longest was 1 hour 55 minutes. They were all recorded using a password protected electronic 
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device and I also took intermittent notes. Fully informed consent
52
 was obtained from all 
respondents prior to the interview starting. 
I dressed smartly and was always punctual for arranged interviews in order to demonstrate 
my professionalism.
53
 The existence of a tripartite relationship between me, the gatekeeper, 
and the respondents they had recruited on my behalf meant that a familiarity with the 
gatekeeper was an area of common ground shared with the respondents. Richards identifies 
the interviewer establishing common interests with interviewees as important to building 
rapport.
54
 While I organised and distributed the relevant documents to the respondent for the 
interview and set up my recorder, conversation between the respondent and I often centred on 
how we each knew the gatekeeper and how they had come to be involved in the project. This 
created a relaxed atmosphere in the lead up to the interview starting.  
Throughout each interview I was friendly but assertive, having initially set out the areas the 
interviews would cover
55
 and how long it would take. A careful balance was maintained 
between demonstrating a sufficient level of knowledge about the areas of law under 
discussion to establish some credibility with the respondents
56
 and possessing a ‘deliberate 
naiveté’ by remaining open to new and unexpected insights.
57
 McDowell’s reflections on her 
strategies of self-presentation seem apt to demonstrate my own approach, as I manoeuvred 
between the personas of ‘whizz kid’ and ‘naïve laywoman’ throughout the interview.
58
 At the 
start of the interview, the respondents were given a brief outline of the areas of the law for 
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 I explained that these were for their reference as there was no expectation that 
they could remember the legal provisions verbatim. This sought to make the respondents feel 
more at ease, as well as, I think, contributing to their perception of me as a credible and well-
organised researcher.  
To an extent, and as is appropriate in semi-structured interviewing, I ‘let the interviewee 
teach [me] what the problem, the question and the situation is’.
60
 I did this by ensuring that 
the questions asked were mostly open ended, to provide respondents ample opportunity to 
engage in in-depth discussions.
61
 This was the most desirable approach since it allowed for a 
degree of flexibility in the flow of the conversation while retaining a degree of interviewer 
control. This willingness to digress from the interview guide enabled me to clarify and enrich 
my understanding,
62
 whilst eliciting specific examples of the respondents’ experiences, and 
not just general opinions.
63
 Such a ‘relatively fluid’ approach was desirable in this 
exploratory research project, as it allowed the research to unfold and develop as I learned 
more about the field.
64
 
The respondents were unlikely to feel inferior to me as the researcher.
65
 This was for several 
reasons, including, inter alia, their elite position as members of the legal profession, the fact 
that I am not professionally qualified, and that I am a young (at the time of the interviews I 
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was 23/24 years old), female, doctoral researcher.
66
 According to Brinkman and Kvale, the 
absence of interviewee inferiority makes it possible to challenge respondents’ statements.
67
 
The type of knowledge generated in an elite interview can therefore be ‘that [which] has been 
found to be valid through conversational and dialectical questioning’.
68
 Having established a 
good rapport with the respondents, I felt comfortable challenging inconsistencies I had 
perceived in their responses. This was done in two ways.  
First, I proved my own knowledge to the respondents, and on occasion revealed my own 
views about matters in discussion, to prompt further justification from respondents. This led 
to the generation of much richer and more detailed data. Second, throughout this dialogue 
with respondents, I took the opportunity to ‘cross-check sources’.
69
 I did this by referring to 
some general views obtained in previous interviews
70
 to which current respondents could 
agree, disagree and/or expand upon. These techniques were very useful in developing the 
responses of those interviewed as well as enhancing my own understanding of the practices 
experienced in Crown Court trials. This approach thus added to the respondents’ perception 
of me as a credible researcher, whilst doubling as a process of ‘member checking’ or 




The fluidity fostered within interviews was also adopted between interviews. I transcribed the 
interviews myself throughout the fieldwork process and kept a research journal of my 
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observations. On the basis of these reflections, the interview guide was adapted for future 
respondents as new information was obtained and my perspective changed. This resulted in 
my ‘simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis’, which enabled me to pursue 
emerging interests and themes.
72
 Charmaz suggests that self-transcription is the best way to 
study your data from the start
73
 by noting points of interest and adapting the interview guide 
in light of such. Kvale describes this as a process of ‘getting wiser’ in exploratory studies; 
where new understandings and discoveries are used and explored in the remaining interviews 
by adapting the interview guide accordingly.
74
 These techniques were adopted throughout my 
fieldwork and were the key to its success. For example, prior to my interviews, I had 
expected that the respondents would reveal that, despite the seemingly unequal statutory 
provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users, in practice they 
were invoked on a more equal basis in criminal trials. I learned early on that, as per my 
respondents’ experience, this was not the case. It was, therefore, vital that I embraced this 
fluid approach to my interviews.
75
  
The interviews seem to have been a positive experience for many of the respondents 
involved. I believe that the conversational nature of the interview as well as my willingness to 
challenge their views contributed to this. The respondents showed that they had ‘obtain[ed] 
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new insights into their life situation’,
76
 as is demonstrated from the two quotes below. B3 
reflected on the interview following its conclusion, stating: 
[The interview] has actually been quite informative because it’s a very useful stone to 
look under. We are sort of stuck on hamster wheels in a sense and although we do, all of 
us, like to think that on a good day we are really good at our jobs … I take particular 
pride in getting immersed in whatever case I’m doing and looking after the people I 
represent … but actually, I have to say that, I’ve not applied my mind to many of the 
things you’ve said; particularly with special measures on the defence side. …It’s a really 
good thing to consider. Thank you. 
 
Similarly, DS1 said: 
It is though, having discussed it, something [the availability of special measures] I 
perhaps ought to give more thought to generally. If I think I have a particularly 
vulnerable defendant, should I be trying to get special measures? …it’s given me some 
food for thought. 
 
2.4.3. Post-interviews: analysis  
I followed up each interview with a brief ‘thank you’ email. Having reflected on the 
interview, a small number of respondents replied to this with further information or 
comments that they wished to add to our discussion. With their consent, I added this to their 
interview transcript (noting that it was from further email correspondence). Some of the 
respondents also offered to approach their colleagues to ask if they too would participate in 
my research. This is further evidence to suggest that they found the interview to be a positive 
experience.  
I transcribed the interviews within two working days of each being conducted. I anonymised 
them instantaneously, replacing respondents’ names with the appropriate identifier, and 
removing any references to specific court centres, colleagues, and names of clients or 
witnesses. Once the interviews had been transcribed, I deleted the recordings.   
Following the conclusion of all of the interviews, I conducted a thematic analysis of the 
complete data set. Clark and Braun highlight that this method of analysis is one which 
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‘provid[es] a systematic approach for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns – themes – 
across a dataset … not tied to a particular theory’.
77
 In my project, it was used as a 
‘contextualist’ method; exploring ‘the ways individuals make meaning of their experiences, 
and, in turn, the ways the broader social context impinges on those meanings’.
78
 I was able, 
therefore, to analyse the respondents’ experiences, and to consider how they approached and 
framed particular situations, whether considerations of equality affected these decisions, and 
if so, whether they did so consistently. This was then set alongside the seeming influence that 
the legal system and the wider political, economic and social context had on their 
experiences. This all drew heavily upon, and fitted well into, my conceptual framework using 
Hawkins’ concepts of surround, field and frames.
79
  
The NVivo computer program was used to code, organise, manage, and store the data.
80
 
Coding is the process of reviewing the data and ‘giving labels to component parts that seem 
to be of potential theoretical significance’.
81
 It brings together data that is indicative of 
similar actions, ideas or processes,
82
 segregating patterned responses into themes.
83
 Bryman 
notes that coding is in a ‘constant state of potential revision and fluidity’ since the codes and 
the data within them are subject to continual comparison against other codes.
84
 
I adopted an inductive approach to identifying themes. This means that the coding was ‘data-
driven’, whereby the codes are identified from within the data itself.
85
 Coding the data 
‘without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame’ has thus ensured there is a strong 
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link between the themes and the data. 
86
 I combined semantic and latent levels of thematic 
coding.
87
 Semantic coding begins with an examination of the explicit or surface meanings of 
the data.
88
 Latent level analysis goes beyond this, to explore ‘underlying ideas, assumptions 
and conceptions’.
89
 Initially, when beginning the analysis of the first few transcripts, I 
adopted a semantic approach. This enabled me to focus on what the respondents said and the 
surface meanings of such, which increased my familiarity with the data. This type of analysis 
was useful to collate descriptive information regarding the frequency with which each 
respondent had experienced particular special measures being used, and by whom. I 
combined this with latent level coding in order to examine any insights into why special 
measures were invoked for some vulnerable court users and not others, by looking beyond 
what the respondents said and delving deeper in order to theorise about what may be driving 
such practices. 
As advocated by Braun and Clark, I continually coded and re-coded my data, identifying 
themes and trends and exploring any relationships between them. This was in pursuit of the 
production of a ‘thematic map’; within which the themes should ‘capture the contours of the 
coded data’ and ‘accurately reflect the meanings evident in the data as a whole’.
90
 On 
occasion, some of the data did not fit with the themes identified. To deal with this ‘deviant 
case analysis’ was used to further analyse such outliers.
91
 This ensured that important 
nuances were not overlooked when developing my research findings.  
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2.5. Ethical challenges 
Due to the use of gatekeepers in obtaining the sample, the anonymity of respondents could 
not be guaranteed. This is because the gatekeepers knew who had participated and may thus 
be able to attribute comments quoted in this thesis to the individual respondents using the 
information in Table 2.1. It is also possible that the respondents themselves could figure out 
who else has (or may have) participated in the research in the same way. This risk was 
discussed with the respondents prior to the interview. I have still tried to protect their 
identities as much as possible. For example, I have not attributed comments or views to 
named participants
92
 and have removed other identifying details from their transcripts such as 
the names of cases, clients, and other criminal practitioners with whom they have worked.  
As noted by Braun and Clark, when doing qualitative research, ethics are more complicated 
and the situation is ‘potentially more uncertain, complex and nuanced … partly because of 
the fluidity of qualitative research designs’.
93
 On occasion, the respondents would probe me 
on who else I had interviewed. I dealt with this by reminding them that, just as their identity 
would be kept confidential, so would the identity of other participants. Other questions that 
respondents asked included which other chambers or firms I would be interviewing people 
from. I decided that to share this information with the respondents would risk the 
identification of other participants or at least the arousal of suspicion as to who else was 
involved in the project. For this reason, I declined to disclose the information and instead 
would typically respond in one of two ways. I either said I had not finished recruiting yet 
(and asked if they had any suggestions for where to seek further respondents), or told them 
that I could not remember off the top of my head, and politely reminded them that even if I 
could, I could not share the information with them so as to minimise the identifiability of the 
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other respondents. These responses were accepted and demonstrated my commitment to the 
promise to be discrete with regards to research participation.  
Earlier in the chapter, I noted that I checked the validity of the conclusions reached from 
early interviews by ‘cross-checking’ them with respondents later in the fieldwork process. In 
doing so, I was careful to remain ethically sensitive, and not breach the promised 
confidentiality of the participants involved. I made sure that the views I shared were general 
and not specifically attributed to any individual respondent or particular part of the legal 
profession, but rather to an anonymous majority. Furthermore, I was careful not to tell the 
respondents how many others had been interviewed. Instead, I kept things vague by saying, 
for example, ‘I have done quite a few interviews now, and it seems that a rather common 
view of the live link provision is that …’ I avoided the alternative approach, of saying, for 
example ‘a defence barrister I interviewed last week said that…’ because I felt that this 
heightened the risk that this hypothetical defence barrister could be identified. 
2.6. Potential criticisms of the research design 
2.6.1. Limitations of interview data 
Despite the distinct advantages of using semi-structured interviews for this project, it is a 
method which is not without criticism. Miller and Glassner state that, while knowledge of the 
social world beyond the interview interaction can be obtained,
94
 there are fears that 
respondents may be ‘concerned to bring the occasion off in a way that demonstrates his or her 
competence as a member of whatever community is invoked by the interview topic’.
95
 It is 
clear from previous studies that what respondents say they do in interview is not always 
consistent with what they actually do in reality. For example, in Newman’s study of defence 
                                                          
94
 Jody Miller and Barry Glassner, ‘Interviews and Focus Groups’ in David Silverman (ed), Qualitative 
Research (3
rd
 edn, SAGE Publications 2011) 132. 
95
 Robert Dingwall, ‘Accounts, Interviews and Observations’ in Gale Miller and Roger Dingwall, Context and 
Method in Qualitative Research (SAGE Publications 1997) 59. 
40 
 
lawyers he first observed the lawyer’s practices before interviewing them.
96
 Despite having 
conducted the period of observation with their knowledge, the lawyers still claimed when 
questioned in interview to behave in ways quite different to those that Newman had himself 
observed.
97
 The risk that my respondents behave differently to the way they presented to me 
in interview seems particularly acute in my research for two reasons.  
First, I did not conduct a period of observation in my study. I had initially planned to do so, 
but later decided that this would not be a realistic endeavour. Since applications for special 
measures are made on paper ahead of the trial and due to the time constraints inherent in 
doctoral study, it would have been very difficult to observe the special measures process from 
start to finish in a Crown Court trial.
98
 The absence of ethnography in my research, therefore, 
means I have no observation data against which to test the validity of the responses elicited in 
interview. The second reason that the risk of dishonest or inaccurate answers from 
respondents may be problematic in this project arises from the involvement of the legal 
gatekeeper. This may have affected the interviews because the respondents could still have 
felt in some way accountable to the legal gatekeeper (who was often senior to the respondents 
that they had recruited). Given the likelihood that the legal gatekeeper could probably, if they 
desired, work out who had said what in the interviews (as discussed in section 2.5), this may 
have affected the answers that some respondents chose to give. 
Despite these concerns, I would argue that the nature of the insights I obtained goes some 
way to affirming their validity. The interviews showed, as is discussed in section 5.2, that the 
respondents rarely apply for special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
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and non-defendant defence witnesses. Many respondents also revealed their lack of 
awareness that such measures are available in law to these court users. It seems unlikely that 
a respondent would falsely claim in interview not to know and use the law (when they 
arguably ought to), when actually, in practice, they do invoke the provisions that they 
claimed not to know existed. Furthermore, by demonstrating my commitment to maintaining 
confidentiality when probed by respondents, I hope to have abated any respondents’ potential 
concern regarding the disclosure by me of their responses to the gatekeeper and any potential 
repercussions. 
Where the issue of ‘why’ the special measures are not invoked is concerned, the validity of 
the respondents’ comments is perhaps more problematic. As is discussed in later chapters of 
this thesis, however, my findings often reflect and complement those from pre-existing 
studies. Furthermore, I have presented various findings from these interviews at The 
Advocate’s Gateway conference and the Socio-Legal Studies Association conference. Both 
of these conferences were well attended by criminal practitioners, and the feedback I received 
was positive. This is not to suggest that all of the respondents have provided entirely accurate 
accounts in their interviews. However, the combination of the above factors gives me the 
confidence that, provided the findings from my research are interpreted in the context of 
lawyers’ working conditions and are not overstated, they are both valid and defensible. 
2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the design of this research project and the methods adopted to 
ensure that this thesis answers the research questions set out in Chapter 1. This is a qualitative 
research project, combining documentary analysis with 18 semi-structured interviews with 
members of the legal profession. The empirical element should be viewed as providing an 
insight into the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users in 
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practice, in the absence of the availability of more widely collected data. Despite the small 
sample, this chapter has provided reasons for why the findings of this project should be 
regarded as significant.  
The next chapter begins to explore the development of the law of special measures. The 
conception of equality that underpinned the development of special measures for vulnerable 
and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses is uncovered. The remainder of Chapter 3 then 
assesses whether the exclusion of defendant witnesses from the initial special measures 
provision consistently upheld this principle of equality. This is done by exploring the 
differences between vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants and non-defendants and 
assessing whether these justify the differential provision of special measures.
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CHAPTER 3: SPECIAL 
MEASURES DEVELOPMENT (UP 
TO YJCEA 1999) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I focus on the development of the law of special measures up to the point of 
the enactment of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJCEA) 1999. I first look at 
the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses to 
determine the nature of the principle of equality that underpinned these provisions. I then turn 
to consider the exclusion of vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses from this 
legislation to assess whether their exclusion was in keeping with the law’s commitment to the 
equality principle on which the 1999 Act was built. This involves identifying the differences 
between the defendant and non-defendant witness cohorts and evaluating their relevance in 
relation to special measures. This enables a conclusion to be reached about whether the 
exclusion of defendants from the 1999 special measures scheme renders the law of special 
measures internally incoherent. The final section of this chapter outlines the potential 
consequences, both in principle and practice, of the exclusion of vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses from the provision of special measures in Crown Court 
trials.  
Before all of this commences, the first section of this chapter provides an outline of the 
current eligibility for special measures for non-defendant witnesses as per the YJCEA.  
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3.2. Non-defendant witnesses: eligibility 
Special measures are available to vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses 
under the YJCEA 1999. This legislation was enacted following Speaking up for Justice, a 
report considering the treatment of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses in the criminal 
justice system.
1
 The measures, as outlined in section 1.2, include screens
2
, the removal of 
wigs and gowns
3









 and the assistance of an intermediary
8
 and/or communication aids.
9
 The broad 
purpose of these special measures is to facilitate best evidence (referred to in the Act as the 
most ‘complete, coherent and accurate evidence’
10
) from a vulnerable and/or intimidated 
witness. 
The 1999 statutory special measures scheme was applicable to all non-defendant witnesses, 
whether for the prosecution or defence, including the complainant. All defendant witnesses 
were excluded.
11
 The reasons for this are discussed later in this chapter (section 3.5) and the 
development of the law for defendant witnesses is the subject of Chapter 4. With regards to 
non-defendant witnesses, section 16 and section 17 of the YJCEA define respectively 
‘vulnerability’ and ‘intimidation’ for the purposes of the Act.  
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3.2.1. Vulnerable witnesses 
Eligibility for special measures based on vulnerability differs according to the age of the 
witness. Children, ie those under 18
12
 at the time they are required to give evidence, 
automatically qualify for special measures since the sole criterion for their eligibility is age.
13
 
For adult witnesses, eligibility for special measures is dependent on the court considering that 
the quality of their evidence is likely to be diminished.
14
 This can be for three reasons: that 
they are suffering from a mental disorder as per the Mental Health Act 1983;
15
 a significant 
impairment of intelligence or social functioning;
16
 or a physical disability or disorder.
17
 
The full range of special measures is available to witnesses qualifying under any of the above 
criteria.
18
 The Act is clear that decisions about whether a witness should have special 
measures, and which ones, should take the witness’ views into account.
19
 That said, for child 
witnesses in sexual or violent cases, the primary rule is that any relevant recording is 
admitted under section 27 as evidence in chief, and further evidence elicited from the witness 
through cross-examination is done via the live link.
20
 However, if the child witness wishes to 
give evidence in an alternative way, the court may permit this so long as it will not result in 
the diminution of the witness’ evidence.
21
 Usually, this requires screens to be used instead
22
 
but this can be further challenged by a witness who wishes to give evidence in court 
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 Decisions to eschew the primary rule should be decided on the basis of the 
witness’ wishes and the factors contained in section 21(4C); such as the witness’ age and 
maturity and the nature and alleged circumstances to which the proceedings relate. In 
summary, although there remains a presumption that evidence from a child complainant of 
particular offences is received in a particular way, subject to quality safeguards this is now 
rebuttable. 
3.2.2. Intimidated witnesses 
Intimidated witnesses are those whose quality of evidence is likely to be diminished due to 
their fear or distress in connection with testifying in the proceedings.
24
 In determining this, 
the nature and circumstances of the offence to which the proceedings relate;
25
 the age of the 
witness;
26
 and the behaviour of the accused or their supporters towards the witness are 
relevant factors.
27
 Furthermore, the witness’ social and cultural background; ethnic origins; 
domestic and employment circumstances; religious beliefs; or political opinions are 
considered.
28
 Finally, a complainant of a sexual offence who is required to give evidence is 
automatically eligible for special measures assistance unless they do not wish to use them.
29
 
For witnesses who qualify for special measures under section 17, all measures are available 
with the exception of provisions for intermediaries and communication aids.
30
 This is because 
these latter measures are designed to facilitate the communication of those who are 
vulnerable. 
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3.3. Motivations underpinning special measures development 
Special measures were not an entirely new creation when the current statutory scheme was 
enacted in 1999. Already in existence were statutory provisions for the court to be closed to 
the public while children give evidence;
31
 for some children to be cross-examined by live 
link;
32
 and for pre-recorded evidence to be admitted as their evidence in chief.
33
 Furthermore, 
the judiciary had authorised the use of screens by some witnesses in criminal trials.
34
 Thus, in 
part, the YJCEA codified the existing law and made it more accessible through the 
‘standardisation of language and approach’.
35
 The 1999 Act also expanded both the range of 
special measures and to whom they are available. To understand why special measures were 
initially enacted and have developed, it is necessary to look back to the late 1980s. This was 
when the rules of evidence were first amended to allow vulnerable witnesses, historically 
excluded from the criminal process, to give evidence, and the mediums through which they 
could give it were first expanded. It is through this examination that the extent to which 
equality influenced the development of special measures law is uncovered.  
3.3.1. Corroboration and competency 
Spencer notes that the rules of evidence in the 1980s ‘conspire[d] to ensure that child 
witnesses either went unheard, or if they were heard, were disbelieved’.
36
 The competency 
and corroboration rules were particularly problematic in this regard. Witnesses were required 
to give evidence under oath, and to do so they needed to understand the nature of the oath. 
The Court of Appeal stated that this required that the witness had: 
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[A] sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion, and the added 
responsibility to tell the truth … over and above the duty to tell the truth which is 




If a child witness surpassed this hurdle, they could give sworn evidence. The common law 
then presented further obstacles. A judicial warning to the jury was required to the effect that 
it is ‘dangerous’ to convict on a child’s sworn, but uncorroborated, evidence.
38
 This meant 
that for a sound prosecution case involving a child’s evidence it was often necessary that 
there were multiple sources of admissible evidence.  
If a witness was not considered as sufficiently mature to understand the nature of the oath, 
then they could only give their evidence unsworn.
39
 Convictions solely based on unsworn 
evidence were prohibited.
40
 The unsworn evidence of one child could not corroborate the 
unsworn evidence of another child. The combination of these rules presented serious barriers 
to prosecuting those alleged to have offended against children. This came to be seen as 
problematic, especially in the light of an increasing number of high profile child abuse cases 
in which the defendant was acquitted or even not prosecuted.
41
 Thus, following a Home 
Office paper reviewing existing psychological research on children’s evidence and its 
reliability,
42
 Parliament amended the legislative provisions to repeal the rule that unsworn 
evidence must be corroborated.
43
 They also abolished the need for a judicial warning about 
the supposed dangers of sworn, uncorroborated evidence.
44
 These amendments were the first 
to alter the way that children, and their evidence, were received in court. 
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3.3.2. The Pigot Report (1989) 
An appetite for adaptations to be made to trial processes developed.
45
 In 1988 an advisory 
group was set up, headed by HHJ Pigot, to consider the use of video recordings as a method 
of obtaining evidence from children and other vulnerable witnesses. The Pigot Report 
attributed the desire for adaptations to be made to criminal trial proceedings to emerging 
evidence indicating that cases of child abuse were increasing in both severity and 
frequency.
46
 Research conducted by the NSPCC in the mid-1980s
47
 indicated that known 
cases of sexual abuse had increased eight-fold and the number of children registered with 
serious or fatal injuries as a result of physical abuse had doubled.
48
 The NSPCC also found 
that prosecutions were planned in only 9% of the physical abuse cases and 28% of the sexual 
abuse cases that they had trailed throughout their research.
49
  
The NSPCC explained these low prosecution figures to the Pigot committee as evidence of 
the ‘unwillingness by the children to give evidence and an unwillingness by parents to put 
their children through a traumatic court experience’.
50
 This assumes that the children in these 
cases were competent to testify. Although the corroboration requirement for unsworn 
evidence had already been abolished, the burden of proof was on the party calling a witness 
to demonstrate that, if they were younger than 14, the witness understood the oath and 
importance of telling the truth sufficiently well to give sworn evidence.
51
 Whether evidence 
was sworn or not remained relevant to the weight the jury might attach to it. The case of 
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 was particularly damaging for the perceived capability of child witnesses to give 
even unsworn evidence. The Court of Appeal ruled that relying on evidence of a five year old 
was ‘ridiculous’.
53
 This resulted in ‘the abandonment of prosecutions for a large number of 
serious violent and sexual offences against children’.
54
 The Pigot committee thus 
recommended that the competency requirement was abandoned, and that relevant 
understandable evidence from all witnesses should be heard where possible.
55
 
If a child was competent to testify, then an additional set of barriers to securing the 
conviction of those committing offences against children still existed. This is what Spencer 
described as the ‘adversarial package’:
56
 the combination of rules necessitating a witness 
giving evidence orally, in open court, in the presence of the defendant. As highlighted by 
McEwan, problems are clearly evident where victims and witnesses ‘cannot or will not give 
evidence’ due to their vulnerabilities not being catered for by the system.
57
 Criminal 
courtrooms were intentionally designed to be grand and somewhat intimidating 
environments.
58
 In Crown Court trials, the presence of the judge, several lawyers, members 
of the press and public, the jury and the defendant can mean that the very notion of publically 
giving oral evidence is challenging.
59
 Caution should be exercised when labelling a 
complainant a victim prior to the conviction of an individual because it may be deemed to 
‘inappropriately prejudge the outcome of the prosecution case’.
60
 That said it is of course true 
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that many alleged victims will, in fact, be victims in the lay sense of the word (ie they will 
actually be the victim of a crime).
61
 As a result, recalling past traumatic events in evidence is 
likely to be particularly distressing for such individuals, irrespective of the environment in 
which this is done. The combination of these issues relating to a witness’ experience in court 
can be referred to as ‘secondary victimisation’.
62
 
In response to these problems, the Pigot committee highlighted that ‘quite radical changes are 
… required if the courts are to treat children in a humane and acceptable way’.
63
 It advised 
that video-recorded evidence in chief should be permitted in criminal trials in addition to the 
existing provision for evidence by live link. It also recommended a series of other courtroom 
adaptations to better accommodate child victims/witnesses. These included pre-recording 
cross-examination in a preliminary hearing and admitting it as video evidence, and possibly 
an ‘interlocutor’ (now known as an intermediary) to relay questions between counsel and a 
very young child. The Advisory Group recommended that the measures be available to 
witnesses of violent offences under the age of 14, and to witnesses of sexual offences under 
the age of 17.
64
 
The Advisory Group also recommended that video recorded evidence be made available to 
adult ‘vulnerable’ witnesses who ‘would be likely to suffer an unusual and unreasonable 
degree of mental stress if required to give evidence in open court’.
65
 They stated that the test 
for vulnerability should ‘have regard to the age, physical and mental condition of the witness, 
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the nature and seriousness of the offence charged and of the evidence which the witness was 
to give’.
66
 Furthermore, they recommended a rebuttable presumption that alleged victims of 
sexual offences are vulnerable witnesses.
67
 
It is evident from these recommendations that the Advisory Group was driven by concerns 
relating to the well-being and humane treatment of young and vulnerable witnesses. In part, 
these issues were considered to emanate from the failure of the criminal justice system to 
bring to justice those who offended against such individuals. They also related to, and were 
intrinsically linked with, their treatment in criminal trial proceedings. The Advisory Group 
recognised that to remedy these issues required the differential treatment of disadvantaged 
(children and vulnerable adult) witnesses. For witnesses of all ages and abilities to be 
afforded humane treatment, some would need additional assistance at trial. Though not 
referred to explicitly, this embodies the sentiment of equality as espoused by Aristotle, 
achieved by treating ‘like people in a like manner, and different cases differently’.
68
 This 
conception of equality involves a principle of equity,
69
 to achieve a standard of equal 
treatment through justified differential treatment. In the special measures context, the 
disadvantaged position in which children found themselves under the then law justified their 
differential treatment through the provision of special measures. I discuss this notion of 
equality further in section 3.4 
The influence of developments in the surround – ‘the broad setting in which decision-making 
activity takes place’
70
 – on the adaption of criminal procedures is evident in this context. For 
example, awareness grew of the prevalence of particular offences against children and the 
difficulties faced by these children if they were required to give evidence in court. The social 
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and political dissatisfaction with the treatment of children arising from this increased 
awareness and the assumed failure of the criminal justice system to convict those offending 
against children affected the agenda and the debates within the legal field. This sparked 
challenges to assumptions about children’s evidence and its perceived unreliability which 
were affecting CPS decisions to prosecute and judicial decisions regarding witness 
competence. Alongside these developments, technological advances in the surround, which 
enabled video evidence to be developed, strengthened the case that evidence could be 
obtained from children via an alternative method to the traditional in-court approach. 
3.3.3. Post-Pigot 
Following the publication of the Pigot Report, section 32A was inserted into the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988
71
 to permit video recorded evidence to be admitted as a child’s evidence-in-
chief. Furthermore, Pigot’s advice in relation to the competency of witnesses was acted upon 
through the insertion of section 33A into the Criminal Justice Act.
72
 This allowed children’s 
evidence to be unsworn and admitted at the judge’s discretion regardless of the child’s age. 
The other recommendations, for example that existing measures be made available to 
vulnerable adult witnesses, were not acted on immediately. Neither were the 
recommendations for pre-recorded cross-examination or ‘interlocutors’.  
The Home Office did, however, commission research into the difficulties of witnesses with 
learning difficulties.
73
 Similarly to child witnesses, learning disabled witnesses were also 
subjected to arbitrary competency rules. For example, in order to give sworn evidence, a 
witness must understand the oath.
74
 If they did not, they were unable to give evidence at all, 
since (unlike for children) there was no provision to allow adult witnesses to give unsworn 
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evidence. Sanders et al. noted that these competency rules negatively affected decisions to 
prosecute
75
 and also that, at trial, cases were prone to collapse due to the judge ruling key 
witnesses suffering from learning disabilities as incompetent.
76
  
Sanders et al also found that ‘many of the [common law] measures that ha[d] been introduced 
to make court appearances less terrifying for children [were] sometimes appropriate for adults 
with learning difficulties’.
77
 These measures included the removal of wigs and gowns, the 
presence of a support person for the duration of a witness giving evidence, and the use of 
screens. Though the provisions for live link and video-recorded evidence were only 
statutorily available to child witnesses, the researchers also viewed these as ‘potentially a 
useful means for many people with learning disabilities to give evidence’
78
 in addition to 
those recommended by the Pigot committee which had not yet been enacted.
79
 Sanders et al 
made no explicit references to equality in their report. Its sentiment, however, remained 
apparent in the acknowledgement that adaptations to criminal proceedings would assist 
disadvantaged adults to participate, in the same way that they had helped child witnesses. The 




As well as an increase in knowledge regarding various disabilities, research had also been 
conducted regarding other categories of witnesses. For example, research on the different 
types of intimidation to which some witnesses were subjected and its potential effects was 
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 Offences punishing the intimidation of witnesses were legislated for in 1994.
82
 
Furthermore, an understanding of the particular difficulties encountered in court by rape 
complainants began to develop.
83
 Hawkins’ work provides us with a useful way to 
conceptualise these developments.
84
 Knowledge in the surround grew about the difficulties 
and capabilities of those with learning disabilities, rape victims and intimidated witnesses in 
the criminal justice system. This expansion of knowledge began to transform the way that 
those working and researching in the legal field viewed these categories of witnesses, in the 
same way that it had for children. This all contributed to heightened dissatisfaction with 
treatment of individuals in, and often their exclusion from, criminal trials. 
3.3.4. Speaking up for Justice (1998) 
The ‘New’ Labour government in 1997 set up an interdepartmental Working Group to further 
address these concerns. The Group was to assess the treatment of ‘vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses’ throughout the criminal justice system, including at trial. The terms of reference 
from the government to the Working Group specified that it should consider, inter alia, the 
treatment of ‘witnesses’ and their ability to give best evidence.
85
 The categories of witnesses 
that should be included were not specified. The Working Group proceeded on the basis that 
its recommendations would apply to all non-defendant witnesses, excluding only the 
defendant.
86
 The reasons offered for this in their Speaking up for Justice Report are discussed 
later in the chapter in section 3.5. With regard to non-defendant witnesses, the Working 
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Group noted four main areas of concern. These were rape trials, disabled witnesses, learning 
disabled witnesses and intimidated witnesses.
87
  
The role of equality with regard to non-defendant witnesses was more apparent at this 
juncture. The report highlighted the potential relevance of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995. This Act set out the requirement that ‘reasonable steps are taken to change policies or 
procedures which make it impossible or unreasonable for disabled people to use a service’.
88
 
Under this Act, disabled people were considered as those with ‘a physical or mental 
impairment’.
89
 The Working Group’s reference to the Disability Discrimination Act in their 
report demonstrates that the criminal trial, and specifically the ability to give evidence in it, 
was considered to potentially fall within the remit of this legislation. McLeod et al confirm 
this, stating that ‘as a government agency, [Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service] is 
bound by the Act, so courts must provide the same service to a disabled person as they would 
to a non-disabled person’.
90
 The arbitrary competency rules and lack of support to disabled 
victims and potential witnesses would thus fall short of the Act’s requirements.  
In order to remain compliant with Disability Discrimination Act, therefore, it seems that the 
provision of special measures was considered to constitute a ‘reasonable step’ that enabled 
disabled people to give evidence. Though not couched in the language of equality, the 
requirement that adaptations are made to normal proceedings to assist those with disabilities 
embodies a principle of equality. That is to say that it highlights the need to treat materially 
different people (in this context the disabled) differently in order to achieve equality of 
opportunity. 
                                                          
87
 ibid 1.2-1.5. 
88
 ibid 1.20. 
89
 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, s 1(1). 
90
 Rosie McLeod and others, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning Disabilities 
and Limited Mental Capacity Report 1: Overview and Recommendations (Ministry of Justice Research Series 
8/10, Ministry of Justice 2010) 6. 
57 
 
The debates surrounding special measures for non-defendant witnesses were to an extent, 
therefore, premised on equality. This is further evident from the Working Group’s declaration 
that ‘failure to recognise and compensate for inequalities between witnesses seems both 
inhumane (when this results in stress or trauma for the witness) and unjust’.
91
 This was the 
only direct reference to (in)equality in the report, but it highlights the important role that 
equality played in the debate.  
The Working Group was clearly indicating that to treat all witnesses as if they are the same, 
and to fail to eliminate inequalities between them, may result in the inhumane treatment of 
those left disadvantaged. Furthermore, that sustained inequality can also affect the ability of 
particular witnesses to give their best evidence. To remedy these issues, young and otherwise 
vulnerable witnesses (ie disabled witnesses, rape victims or intimidated witnesses) may 
require additional assistance. The notion of equality to which the Working Group, and others, 
aspired was universally accepted without challenge. The provision of a variety of special 
measures was recognised as meeting this end.  
3.3.5. Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (1999) 
The YJCEA enacted many of the recommendations from Speaking up for Justice. The 
competency rules were amended further. Under section 53, all witnesses regardless of age are 
to be presumed competent. The Act also specifies that in determining competency (if it is 
doubted by a party to the proceedings or the court) the availability of special measures should 
be considered.
92
 This means that special measures can tip the balance in favour of judging a 
witness to be competent.  
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This is important because victims and prosecution witnesses are considered as ‘gate-keepers 
to the mobilisation of criminal justice agencies’
93
 due to the systemic reliance on their 
voluntary reporting of crime and their assistance in securing convictions where it is 
required.
94
 Lord Mackenzie highlighted this through a football match analogy, stating that 
‘we can send off a jury member or two, replace counsel or even the judge, but without the 
witness the game has to be abandoned’.
95
 Enabling more witnesses (particularly those for the 
prosecution) to be competent to testify at trial, therefore, marked a significant development to 
enabling convictions. 
The YJCEA also enacted the full range of special measures discussed in the Pigot Report, 
following further support for them in the Speaking up for Justice Report. This meant the 
introduction of provisions for intermediaries and pre-recorded cross-examination, commonly 
referred to as the ‘full-Pigot’ scheme.
96
 In addition, new categories of witness to whom 
special measures are available were created. These included intimidated witnesses and 
vulnerable adult witnesses, the definitions of which were discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter.  
The prevalence of vulnerability and/or intimidation among prosecution witnesses has become 
ever more apparent in recent years. A Victim Support study highlights that people with 
learning disabilities are almost three and a half times more likely to suffer serious violence, 
and approximately 1.5 times more likely to be a victim of theft.
97
 In 2014/15 the police 
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recorded 2,508 disability hate crimes,
98
 and it is estimated that the true figure is an annual 
average of 70,000.
99
 Children were reported to be the victim in 844,000 crimes (not including 
sexual offences) in 2014-15, and it is estimated that approximately 13 in 100 of those aged 
10-15 were the victim of at least one crime.
100
 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
complainants of a sexual offence are automatically categorised as intimidated witnesses.
101
 
This is significant in terms of the number of witnesses potentially eligible for special 
measures, since estimates from the Crime Survey of England and Wales (formerly the British 
Crime Survey) data indicate that there are 473,000 victims of sexual offences per year.
102
 
Furthermore, Hamlyn et al. found that approximately 70% of witnesses participating in an 
early study on whether special measures were ‘working’ felt intimidated.
103
 
Since the enactment of the YJCEA, the role that special measures play in realising equality in 
criminal trials has become more apparent. A developing body of law requiring equal 
treatment has resulted in an explicit acknowledgement of the contribution special measures 
make to this end. For example, the Judicial College Equal Treatment Bench Book highlights 
the need to adapt normal trial procedures to facilitate the effective participation of all.
104
 The 





 Disability is defined under the Equalities Act as a ‘physical 
or mental impairment’.
107
 Furthermore, and similarly to the Disability Discrimination Act,
108
 
                                                          
98
 Hannah Corcoran, Debroah Lader and Kevin Smith, Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15 (Statistical 
Bulletin 05/15, Home Office 2015) 4. 
99
 ibid 21. 
100
 Office for National Statistics, Crime in England and Wales: Year Ending Mar 2016 (ONS July 2016) 8. 
101
 Although they can still opt-out of special measures use despite this, see YJCEA, s 19(3)(a). 
102
 Ministry of Justice, Home Office and the Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Sexual Offending in 
England and Wales: Statistics Bulletin (MOJ, HO, ONS 2013) Table 2.2, 13.  
103
 Becky Hamlyn and others, Are Special Measures Working? Evidence from surveys of vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses (Home Office Research Study 283, Home Office 2004) 19. 
104
 Hallet LJ, Equal Treatment Bench Book, Children and Vulnerable Adults (Judicial College 2013, with 2015 
amendments) 5-2, [35] (Equal Treatment Bench Book). 
105
 Equalities Act 2010, s 5. 
106
 Equalities Act 2010, s 6. 
107
 Equalities Act 2010, s 6(1)(a). 
108
 This was repealed and replaced by the Equalities Act 2010. 
60 
 
it requires that ‘reasonable adjustments’ are made to existing processes to accommodate those 
with disabilities who would otherwise be ‘put at a substantial disadvantage … in comparison 
with persons who are not disabled’.
109
 The adaptations suggested in the Equal Treatment 
Bench Book to meet these demands are special measures. The definition of disability under 
the Equalities Act directly overlaps the eligibility criteria for special measures, making them 
a suitable tool to assist those in need.  
A similar reliance on special measures in this regard can be seen in a paper by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission. It focuses specifically on disability, identifying special 
measures as ‘steps that can be taken, provisions or adjustments to ensure equal access in court 
for giving evidence’.
110
 Furthermore, the adjustment of criminal proceedings is also required 
under Article 13 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). It 
states that ‘effective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with 
others’ should be ensured ‘… through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate 
accommodations, in order to facilitate their role as … witnesses’.
111
 Special measures equate 
to such ‘procedural and age-appropriate accommodations’. As discussed, they can be invoked 
to help affect changes necessary to ensure equal access to justice for those with disabilities, in 
keeping with the Convention’s requirements. Indeed, Australian academics have celebrated 
the benefits of the intermediary scheme in England and Wales as ‘a promising approach’ to 
the ‘significant problem’ of compliance with disability legislation where witnesses with 
intellectual disabilities are concerned.
112
 Thus, although special measures may not have been 
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borne out of explicit concerns for equality, it is evident from their role in giving effect to the 
demands of equality legislation that they are (and always were) underpinned by it. 
3.4. Summary of the principle of equality  
As discussed in section 1.4, this thesis is not seeking to assess whether the notion of equality 
which underpins the law of non-defendant witness special measures is the best ‘version’ of 
equality to which to subscribe. Instead, the purpose of the first part of this chapter was to 
show that a concern for equality has underpinned the law’s development and to conceptualise 
it. What will be explored later in this thesis is whether the disparate provision of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses versus non-defendant 
witnesses is justified according to the law’s own standard. In other words, does the law 
demonstrate internal inconsistency in its commitment to its own standard of equality? 
The principle of equality underpinning the development of non-defendant witness special 
measures is premised on the belief that people are ‘entitled to equal consideration and that 
differential treatment requires justification in terms of relevant differences between them or 
in the circumstances’.
113
 In other words, all people should be treated with ‘equal respect’ and 
‘equal concern’.
114
 The differential treatment of vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant 
witnesses versus ‘normal’ non-defendant witnesses, to assist them to give evidence, is thus 
justified on the basis of the differences between them. Guest helps to unpack this approach 
from Dworkin’s work, showing how treating people ‘as equals’ requires sensitivity as to the 
differences between people, for example, as to the differences between ‘a handicapped person 
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as to someone who was not handicapped’.
115
 To put it another way, ‘[e]qual consideration for 
all may demand very unequal treatment in favour of the disadvantaged’.
116
 
The law of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses 
embodies this notion of equality. It is a principle of procedural equality – ensuring that the 
laws of evidence provide each witness with an equal opportunity to give evidence in court to 
the best of their ability.
117
 As I have shown, special measures, by design, give additional 
support to the disadvantaged (young, those suffering from mental health problems or learning 
disabilities, or those who are intimidated). It is the law’s commitment to this principle of 
equality which is used as the standard from which to judge the provision of special measures 
to all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users both in law and practice in the remainder of 
this thesis. My thesis is that the law should be consistent in its approach to assisting 
vulnerable and/or intimidated court users to give evidence, and thus coherent in its approach 
to ensuring procedural equality of opportunity.  
This thesis is limited to considering equality of opportunity rather than the quality of 
evidence that is elicited as a result of special measures use (equality of outcome). An entirely 
different question is whether the special measures granted are actually effective in facilitating 
best evidence from such witnesses. Some studies have been conducted into the effectiveness 
of special measures at delivering their aims rendering largely positive results.
118
 For the 
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purposes of this thesis it is assumed that special measures succeed at improving the quality of 
evidence. 
This chapter now turns to consider the denial of special measures to defendant witnesses 
under the original YJCEA scheme. I consider whether, according to the principle of equality 
which underpinned the development of the law for non-defendant witnesses, the exclusion of 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses from eligibility for special measures can 
be justified. This involves an evaluation of the reasons offered in the Speaking up for Justice 
Report for the exclusion of defendants to assess whether they are convincing.  
3.5. Exclusion of defendants from YJCEA 
As highlighted previously in this chapter, defendants were (and remain) excluded from the 
original special measures scheme under the YJCEA.
119
 Academic (and judicial – see Chapter 
4) commentary reveals unease with this exclusion. Birch stated that ‘it really is something of 
a farce’ that vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses can benefit from special measures and 
the accused cannot.
120
 In addition, Hoyano stated: 
If we value the presumption of innocence, and the premise that the search for 
truth demands that witnesses must give their best evidence and are fairly tested in 
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cross-examination, then the case for withholding special measures from children 




Hoyano was also seemingly unpersuaded by the Working Group’s justifications for the 
exclusion of defendants from special measures,
122
 given that she still argued that the case for 
their exclusion needed to be made. McEwan also expressed dissatisfaction with the reasons 
provided by the Working Group for the exclusion of defendants, noting that ‘much of the 
research evidence used to support the introduction of special measures highlights the negative 
impact of stress and delay on the quality of children’s evidence per se’.
123
 In other words, the 
evidence highlights that the difficulties special measures address are encountered by child 
defendants as well as non-defendant child witnesses. Despite this, Hoyano and Keenan note 
that ‘a certain insouciance’ surrounded explanations offered for why defendants do not need 
special measures
124




Soon after the implementation of the YJCEA Birch claimed that the ‘Government has been 
told, time and time again, that this [the non-provision of video-link/live link to defendants] is 
unacceptable, but has so far not budged’.
126
 Furthermore, Lord Justice Auld highlighted in his 
review of the criminal courts that the ‘lack of corresponding provision … [of special 
measures to defendants was] a disparity that concerns many judges’.
127
 Doak has suggested 
that the exclusion of the accused from special measures was, and would remain ‘a 
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contentious issue, having already been subject to an array of criticism’.
128
 This was echoed by 
Hoyano, who noted that ‘the government built several perilous traps for itself’ in the YJCEA, 
including ‘the denial of [special measures] to vulnerable defendants’.
129
 Furthermore, Burton 
et al noted that it was ‘anticipated that the exclusion of defendants from a special measures 
regime might contravene the guarantees of a fair trial in Article 6’.
130
  
The ‘asymmetry’ in the provision of special measures to vulnerable court users remains a 
‘cause for concern’.
131
 More recent commentary, despite the developments to the law 
(discussed in Chapter 4), continues to look unfavourably upon the restrictive provision of 
special measures to defendants. Ellison and Munro highlight that ‘as a matter of equality of 
arms within the trial environment, it is simply unfair to afford [special measures] to the 
complainant but not the defendant’.
132
 Further, that the special measures scheme ‘create[s] an 
imbalance in the procedures by which competing accounts are provided’.
133
 Research from 
the Prison Reform Trust and the Bradley Report has recommended that the provision of 
special measures to vulnerable court users is made ‘equitable in law’.
134
 Interestingly, a 
different approach to special measures law in Scotland and Northern Ireland is taken to that 
in the YJCEA, to include the provision of special measures to vulnerable defendants.
135
 It is 
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against the backdrop of this wide-ranging critique that this chapter looks afresh at the validity 
of the Working Group’s reasons for the denial of special measures to defendants. This is the 
first in-depth, systematic review of the justifications that it provided. 
3.5.1. Speaking up for Justice 
The Working Group devoted just one paragraph of its 273 page report to justifying its 
decision to exclude defendants from consideration for special measures:  
[T]he Working Group’s considerations and recommendations apply to both 
prosecution and defence witnesses (paragraph 1.13). However, the Group 
considered whether the measures should also be available to defendants who may 
give evidence in court and so act as defence witness. As recognised in paragraph 
3.2 above, the law already provides for special procedures to be adopted when 
interviewing vulnerable suspects. Also the defendant is afforded considerable 
safeguards in the proceedings as a whole so as to ensure a fair trial. For example, 
a defendant has a right to legal representation which the witness does not and the 
defendant has a right to choose whether or not to give evidence as s/he cannot be 
compelled to do so. Also, many of the measures considered in Chapters 8 and 9 
below are designed to shield a vulnerable or intimidated witness from the 
defendant (e.g. live CCTV links, screens and the use of video-recorded evidence 
in chief and pre-trial cross-examination) and so would not be applicable in the 
case of the defendant witness. This is recognised in the existing child evidence 
provisions which do not apply to defendants. In these circumstances, the Working 
Group concluded that the defendant should be excluded from the definition of a 




Taking these in turn, the first reason the Working Group gave for excluding defendants was 
that special procedures were already in existence for interviewing vulnerable suspects.
137
 The 
second was that ‘considerable safeguards in the proceedings as a whole … ensure a fair trial’ 
for defendants.
138
 The final reason offered was that, by design, special measures shield 
vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses from the defendant, meaning that their use by 
defendants would not be required.
139
 These reasons were not offered independently of one 
another, but instead put forward as a collective justification for the exclusion of defendants 
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from special measures. In providing these reasons, the Working Group highlighted 
differences between defendants and non-defendants which it considered to justify their 
differential treatment. In effect, therefore, the Working Group had applied a principle of 
equality and concluded that differential treatment of court users was justified on the basis of 
these differences. Under this approach, therefore, the Working Group presumably viewed the 
law as internally consistent in its commitment to the equality principle. 
In assessing the validity of the differences between defendants and non-defendants in relation 
to the provision of special measures, there are two distinct but related issues with which to 
contend. The first is whether the reasons offered by the Working Group were sufficiently 
convincing to justify the non-provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendants when their abilities are compared with those of ‘normal’ defendants. The second 
is whether the differences between defendants and non-defendants can justify the non-
provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants as compared to 
vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. It is unclear whether the Working 
Group considered these distinctions. The exclusion of defendants with regards to both of 
these issues is examined in the remainder of this chapter.  
3.5.1.1. Special procedures already exist  
The first reason the Working Group offered for the exclusion of defendants from special 
measures was that special procedures already existed for interviewing vulnerable suspects. 
The procedures to which the Working Group referred are contained within the Codes of 
Practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984.
140
 Code C requires, for 
example, that a registered medical practitioner is called to assess a mentally disordered or 
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 This should ensure that the suspect receives appropriate care 
while in custody and is considered fit to be interviewed. Code C also requires that an 
‘appropriate adult’ is present for the interview of a juvenile, mentally disordered or otherwise 
mentally vulnerable suspect.
142
 An appropriate adult can be a parent, guardian or social 
worker. Their role involves providing support, advice and assistance to the detainee at the 
pre-trial stage; ensuring that the police act fairly and respect the detainee’s rights; and 
assisting communication between the detainee and others.
143
 
The effectiveness of these special procedures in protecting vulnerable suspects pre-trial is 
questionable. With regards to the medical assessment of suspects, the practitioners enlisted 
often have no psychiatric training.
144
 Their views on a suspect’s mental health, therefore, are 
of limited value. In addition, research indicates that the implementation of the appropriate 
adult scheme is defective. This is, in part, due to the police failing to sufficiently identify 
vulnerability in all cases where an appropriate adult should be present.
145
 It is also because 
when vulnerability is identified an appropriate adult is not always sought by the police.
146
 
Even when an appropriate adult is engaged, however, they are rarely trained to deal with a 
suspect’s vulnerability. Conversely, they may even make matters worse for the suspect.
147
 
This evidence, which highlights the poor practical application of the appropriate adult 
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scheme, suggests that it may offer ‘more of an illusion of protection than the reality’,
148
 
meaning that vulnerable suspects often remain inadequately supported at the pre-trial stage. 
Even if these special procedures were implemented correctly, it is not clear how they negate a 
defendant’s need for special measures. As discussed earlier in this chapter, special measures 
provide adaptations to the traditional mode of giving evidence in criminal trials for 
vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses. Pre-trial special procedures are not adopted for an 
accused complaining that they are intimidated (ie in fear or distress) and so do not respond to 
their potential need for special measures. Furthermore, the special procedures for vulnerable 
suspects do not appear to eradicate any potential need for such adaptations in relation to 
vulnerable defendants at trial. They do not provide a vulnerable accused with the option to 
give their evidence from outside of the courtroom, from behind a screen, or in private as 
special measures do. Nor do they give a vulnerable accused the opportunity to give evidence 
with the assistance of an intermediary and/or communication aids. In fact, the provision of 
pre-trial support to the accused is likely to have little, if any, bearing on their ability to testify 
in their trial. 
Instead, affirmation from a medical practitioner that a suspect is vulnerable ought to pave the 
way to further assistance in court, not support the denial of it. Equally, the provision of pre-
trial support (such as the appropriate adult) to such vulnerable suspects should provide further 
indications that additional assistance will also be required in court. In relation to non-
defendant witnesses, the Working Group recognised the continuous need for support 
throughout the criminal justice process. It stated that, ‘potentially vulnerable witnesses are 
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likely to … require the adoption of special measures both during the investigation and during 
the pre-trial period as well as at the trial itself’.
149
 This is true of defendant witnesses too. 
For these reasons, the existence of pre-trial safeguards such as medical assessment and 
appropriate adults cannot justify the exclusion of vulnerable suspects and defendants from 
special measures. This is the case regardless of whether those safeguards were thought to 
nullify a vulnerable defendant’s need for support when compared to non-vulnerable 
defendants, or when compared to vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. On 
the basis of this rationale, therefore, the law’s approach to vulnerable and/or intimidated 
participants lacks a coherent commitment to the equality principle. 
3.5.1.2. Safeguards to ensure a fair trial 
The Working Group’s second justification for excluding defendant witnesses from special 
measures was that safeguards already exist in criminal proceedings to ensure a fair trial. They 
provided two examples: the provision of legal representation to defendants and their non-
compellability as witnesses. Here, the Working Group was comparing defendants and non-
defendants, and justifying their decision to exclude defendants on the basis of differences 
between these two cohorts. For example, in relation to legal representation, the report 
highlighted that ‘a defendant has a right to legal representation which the witness does 
not’.
150
 It is true that differences exist between defendants and non-defendants. It is also true 
that these safeguards exist to ensure a fair trial (discussed further below). Whether they 
provide a sound basis from which to justify the non-provision of special measures to 
defendants requires further consideration, however, since all defendants are privy to them. It 
thus needs to be established that they offer sufficient support to vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendants versus their non-vulnerable counterparts, in the same way that special measures 
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do for vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses versus ‘normal’ witnesses. If they do not, then 
the safeguards are an invalid basis from which to exclude all defendants from special 
measures. 
Legal representation 
Dennis highlights that ‘procedural fairness embodies a principle of equality of opportunity for 
parties to litigation’.
151
 This is referred to as the principle of equality of arms; an essential 
component of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. In Crown Court trials in 
England and Wales, the parties (the State and the defendant) are unequally matched. This, as 
Roberts and Zuckerman explain, is an ‘inevitable corollary of the huge material and structural 
advantages available to the prosecution’.
152
 In other words, the existence of the publically 
funded police and CPS to investigate crime, collect evidence, and prosecute on behalf of the 
State leaves the accused at a disadvantage. One of the functions of evidence law is to seek to 
ameliorate this ‘adversarial deficit’
153
 in order to promote equality and fairness in criminal 
proceedings.
154
 One mechanism provided in an attempt to ‘neutralise the worst effects of 
inequality of arms’ is the provision of legal advice and representation to all suspects and 
defendants.
155
 This operates in tandem with the provision of legal aid to ensure that access to 
legal representation is affordable, if not free.
156
 Usually a solicitor will prepare a case for 
trial, and a barrister (or, increasingly, a solicitor advocate
157
) will represent the defendant in 
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court. Their role in court
158
 primarily involves testing prosecution evidence by cross-
examining their witnesses and, if appropriate, conducting the defence case.
159
  
The relevant question for the Working Group was whether the provision of legal 
representation to defendants negated any potential need for special measures provision. In 
other words, does a vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant’s access to legal representation 
serve to protect them from difficulties they may encounter which, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, are inherent to the courtroom environment? Further, does the provision of a legal 
representative enable a vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant to give their best evidence in 
court? Assuming that legal representation does do these things, an inherent problem still 
remains. Not all defendants are legally represented in practice. Between April and June 2015, 
6% of defendants in the Crown Court represented themselves.
160
 Some of these defendants 
will have chosen to waive their right to a solicitor and, instead, represent themselves. Other 
such defendants do not qualify for legal aid and/or cannot afford to contribute to defence 
costs, and so have no choice but to self-represent.
161
 For this cohort of defendants, the 
provision of legal representation cannot be said to negate the potential need for special 
measures. A blanket exclusion of defendants from eligibility for special measures, therefore, 
is unjustified on this basis. 
Even if legal representation is employed, it does not follow that a vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant no longer needs special measures. Hoyano highlights that: 
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[D]efence counsel must be able to communicate with their clients in order to 
obtain instructions, and that defendants with impairments must be able to 




For defendants with vulnerabilities which inhibit their communication skills so severely, legal 
representation clearly does not negate the need for special measures.  
For those defendants who can sufficiently communicate with their lawyers, strict rules 
against witness ‘coaching’ mean that having a lawyer does not improve a defendant’s 
position when giving evidence. For instance, as per the Conduct Rules, barristers must not 
‘rehearse, practice with or coach a witness in respect of their evidence’.
163
 The advice an 
advocate can give is limited to ‘directing witnesses to speak slowly, to ask for questions to be 
repeated if they are not understood and not to guess if they do not know the answer’.
164
  
A defence lawyer’s only other recourse is to refer their client to a witness familiarisation 
programme
165
 where they can receive ‘sensible preparation for the experience of giving 
evidence’.
166
 These provisions do not stem directly from a defendant’s right to legal 
representation, but responsibility for referring defendants falls on defence lawyers. It seems, 
however, that very few defendants are referred to the witness familiarisation schemes.
167
 
What needs to be considered is whether improved implementation of the available support 
would negate the need for special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants. In 
other words, would consistent advice from lawyers about the process of giving evidence and 
the regular referral of vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants to the witness familiarisation 
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programmes alleviate all defendants’ potential need for special measures? Taking defence 
lawyers first, their advice cannot enhance a vulnerable defendant’s communication in cross-
examination, or even evidence-in-chief, in the same way that the provision of a trained 
intermediary can. Nor can a defence lawyer reduce the number of people that a vulnerable 
and/or intimidated defendant can see when they give their evidence. A special measures 
direction for live link, screens or to temporarily close the court to the public, however, can.  
A defence lawyer’s referral of a vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant to a witness 
familiarisation scheme may reduce such a defendant’s nervousness and give them slightly 
more confidence in court. However, in the moment in which the vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant gives evidence, such a scheme seems to be of limited value if the 
defendant has difficulty understanding and responding to questions in an intimidating 
courtroom full of strangers. Furthermore, a vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant 
witness is often privy to pre-trial familiarisation programmes and special measures.
168
 Their 
use of the two in tandem indicates that the former, on its own, is insufficient to facilitate a 
witness’ best evidence. 
In summary, if a defendant is legally represented, their lawyer is not able to assist their 
vulnerable and/or intimidated clients to give evidence any more than they can ‘normal’ 
clients. A child defendant, an intellectually disabled defendant, a defendant with mental 
health problems, or a defendant in fear or distress in connection with testifying in the 
proceedings is thus no more assisted when giving their evidence in court than they would be 
absent a lawyer. By comparison to vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses, therefore, they 
remain disadvantaged despite the provision of legal representation. Similarly, by comparison 
                                                          
168
 The Advocate’s Gateway, ‘Case Management in Criminal Cases when a Witness or Defendant is Vulnerable’ 
(Toolkit 1a, The Council of the Inns of Court 2017) 12. 
75 
 
to ‘normal’ defendants, legal representation does not alleviate their disadvantaged position in 
the witness box.  
Compellability 
The second defendant safeguard to which the Working Group referred was the non-
compellability of defendants as witnesses.
169
 Generally, non-defendant witnesses are 
compellable,
170
 marking a difference between them and defendants. The Working Group did 
not elaborate on how or why this difference should negate a vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendant’s need for special measures. I thus explore the various possibilities and assess their 
validity.  
Non-defendants called to testify enjoy a privilege against self-incrimination.
171
 This is a 
safeguard which protects witnesses from implicating themselves in criminal activity, by 
permitting them to refuse to answer questions which would have this result. The defendant 
also benefits from the privilege against self-incrimination. As Roberts and Zuckerman note, 
the existence of the privilege renders it nonsensical to make a defendant compellable for the 
prosecution.
172
 In at least some cases, compelling a defendant to testify would result in them 
invoking their privilege every time the prosecution asked them a question.
173
 The defendant, 
therefore, is not a compellable witness.
174
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 This is arguably the simplest explanation for the defendant’s non-compellability, which, for the present 
purpose, is sufficient. That said, the privilege against self-incrimination and non-compellability of defendants 
also relates to concerns surrounding humane treatment and some argue is intrinsically linked with the 
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A defendant is, however, competent to testify in their defence
175
 but is under no obligation to 
do so. Criminal proceedings are structured in England and Wales so that the burden of proof 
generally
176
 rests with the prosecution, ie the State. Moreover, the standard to which the State 
must discharge the burden of proof to secure a conviction is high – the jury must be ‘sure’
177
 
beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. In theory, therefore, the defendant need not 
run a defence case.
178
 They can instead leave the jury to deliberate on the basis of the 
prosecution evidence alone, in the hope that it will not be sufficiently convincing to warrant a 
guilty verdict. Alternatively, if they do choose to mount a defence, this need not hinge on 
their own testimony, and so they can still decide not to give evidence in their defence.  
Perhaps, therefore, the Working Group was suggesting that vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendants who would find it, at best, difficult to give evidence should simply not testify. The 
prosecution cannot compel them to, and they are under no legal obligation to do so in their 
defence. The problem with this is that the defendant has a right to participate in their trial.
179
 
As per the Criminal Procedure Rules, the court is required to take ‘every reasonable step’ to 
facilitate the participation of all people, including the defendant.
180
 This is expanded in the 
Criminal Practice Directions to include ‘enabling a … defendant to give their best 
evidence’.
181
 If the defendant wants to give evidence, therefore, they should be able to do so, 
regardless of the absence of a legal requirement to do so.  
                                                          
175
 Criminal Evidence Act 1898, s 1(a). 
176
 Although there are exceptions, see Paul Roberts, ‘Taking the Burden of Proof Seriously’ [1995] Criminal 
Law Review 783. 
177
 R v Stephens [2002] EWCA Crim 1529 [15] (Keene LJ). 
178
 Though ‘a tension between adversarial ideologies and efficient fact-finding’ has resulted from amendments 
to the law which are designed to secure the defendant’s/defence party’s participation (eg the disclosure rules 
under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s 3 as amended by Criminal Justice Act 2003). See 
Abenaa Owusu-Bempah, Defendant Participation in the Criminal Process (Routledge 2017) 72-73. 
179
 ECHR, art 6(1). 
180
 Criminal Practice (Amendment No 2) Rules 2017 CrimPR 3.9(3)(b). 
181
 Criminal Practice Directions (October 2015 edition, amended April 2016) CPD 3D.2. 
77 
 
Denying a defendant the opportunity to give evidence in their defence (and not just any 
evidence, but their ‘best evidence’) due to the lack of support available to them thus 
undermines their right to effective participation. In addition, it contravenes equality 
legislation, which also requires ‘reasonable steps’ to be taken to accommodate those who 
would otherwise be ‘put at a substantial disadvantage … in comparison with persons who are 
not disabled’.
182
 The implementation of the Working Group’s position – that there is no need 
for special measures because a vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant can just not testify – 
would result in a system that does not comply with the law.  
This becomes increasingly problematic when it is considered that a defendant’s failure to 
testify in their defence is not consequence free. Instead, it opens up the possibility for the jury 
to draw adverse inferences from the accused’s silence at trial.
183
 Such inferences can 
contribute directly to a finding of guilt.
184
 In some criminal proceedings the risk of this 
materialising is increased. For example in a rape trial, not hearing from the defendant may be 
particularly damaging since the nature of the offence usually makes it necessary that the jury 
hears the defendant’s version of events. Thus, even when leaving the issue of effective 
participation aside, the consequences of opting out of testifying further problematise the 
Working Group’s insinuation that vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants do not need 
special measures. It remains true that defendants are not obliged to testify, but they can be 
penalised if they do not.
185
 
The only point of mitigation here is that, in limited circumstances, section 35(1)(b) of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) 1994 permits a judicial direction to the effect 
that hearing from a defendant suffering a ‘physical or mental condition’ would have been 
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‘undesirable’. This, in theory, prevents the jury from drawing adverse inferences from a 
vulnerable defendant’s silence at trial.
186
 The Working Group may thus have considered that 
this safeguard justified their suggestion that the non-compellability of defendants as 
witnesses supported the denial of defendant special measures. However, by definition it is 
only applicable to defendants suffering physical or mental disorders. This leaves many 
defendants (those vulnerable by way of young age, those with intellectual disabilities, 
learning difficulties and those in fear or distress in connection with testifying in the 
proceedings) exposed to the risk of adverse inferences if they do not testify. For many 
defendants, therefore, the ‘undesirable’ direction is an inadequate basis from which to 
exclude them from special measures provisions. 
Even for those to whom the direction is available in theory, the ‘restrictive’
187
 interpretation 
of ‘undesirable’ by the courts renders questionable its effectiveness as a safeguard in practice. 
Initial interpretations focused on the undesirable effect that giving evidence might have on a 
vulnerable defendant’s health, rather than on their ability to give evidence or the impression 
they left on the jury as a result of their condition.
188
 This jurisprudence has since developed to 
include potential impacts on the quality of evidence,
189
 but interpretations remain generally 
restrictive.
190
 Difficulties giving evidence are instead thought to properly go to the weight of 
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the evidence rather than the decision as to whether it is desirable to hear it at all.
191
 In 
addition, the type of physical or mental condition which might render a defendant’s testimony 
undesirable has also been interpreted narrowly by the courts. Depression and battered woman 
syndrome, for example, fail to provide sufficient cause for a direction regarding 
undesirability.
192
 By comparison, if such conditions were likely to result in a diminution of a 
non-defendant witness’ evidence, special measures would be available under section 16 
YJCEA.
193
 The courts’ decisions render the availability of this judicial direction to vulnerable 
defendants significantly narrower than the provisions for special measures to vulnerable non-
defendant witnesses. 
Another barrier faced by defendants seeking that their testimony is ruled undesirable is that 
the decision does not centre on just the defendant’s physical or mental condition and its 
effects. In Tabbakh
194
 the Court of Appeal ruled that the more significant the defendant’s 
evidence is in the case, the less likely it will be ruled that to hear from them directly would be 
undesirable.
195
 This shifts the focus of attention away from the defendant’s ability to give 
evidence. Instead, desirability is considered with regards to the importance of the defendant’s 
evidence. This further undermines this provision as a possible justification for denying 
special measures to vulnerable defendants.  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has recently supported the Court of Appeal’s 
approach in Tabbakh. It dismissed the appeal of an applicant with an IQ in the bottom 1% of 
the general population and a six year old’s understanding of spoken English whose evidence 
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was not deemed undesirable in a murder trial.
196
 In reaching its decision, the ECtHR 
considered all of the circumstances in the case, including that the weight of the circumstantial 
evidence against the applicant called for an explanation.
197
 Again, weight was placed here on 
the need for an explanation from the defendant rather than their ability to give it. This 
weakens the protection offered to vulnerable defendants by section 35(1)(b). The provision of 
special measures, however, could enable a vulnerable defendant to give the desired evidence 
while simultaneously assisting them to do so. 
Furthermore, Quirk highlights the seemingly high standard of proof to which the defence 




 the court ruled 
that it should be left to the jury’s judgment when conflicting expert evidence has not resolved 
the issue of desirability to ‘any degree of certainty’.
200
 This seems to imply a standard of 
proof beyond the balance of probabilities that is usually required if the defence raises an 
issue.  
Accordingly, this combination of factors renders it unlikely that the court will find it 
undesirable to hear from a defendant directly, regardless of their objective ability to give 
evidence and to do so well. Quirk’s empirical findings are in keeping with this. In the late 
1990s, she interviewed 16 barristers about the right to silence and found that ‘only one … 
described making tactical efforts to avoid inferences being drawn against defendants for not 
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 The use of section 35(1)(b) as a safeguard which negates the need for special 
measures for defendants, therefore, seems to lack robustness. 
The Working Group has essentially left vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants to make an 
often damning choice between two unfavourable options. The first is that the defendant 
chooses not to testify at all. Of course, as discussed, it is likely that the jury will then be at 
liberty to draw adverse inferences from the accused’s silence in court. This may unfairly 
affect their chances of acquittal. Alternatively, a vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant can 
proceed to give evidence in their defence. Even before the erosion of the right to silence,
202
 
when not giving evidence was free of any legal consequence, Zander and Henderson found 
that 70-74% of defendants gave evidence in their defence.
203
 It seems likely, given the risk of 
adverse inferences, that a higher proportion of defendants will now opt to testify.
204
 However, 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants risk doing so poorly due to the existence of their 
condition and a lack of support. This could result in them making a bad impression on the 
jury which, again, may unfairly affect their chances of acquittal. It could also result in them 
making a bad impression on the judge, which might result in a harsher sentence if convicted.  
To summarise, the Working Group’s second reason for excluding defendants from eligibility 
for special measures was that safeguards existed in the system which protect the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial. They referred specifically to the provision of legal representation to the 
defendant and their non-compellability as witnesses. Indeed, these provisions, and other 
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safeguards, do contribute to ensuring a defendant has a fair trial, but not in every respect. 
They do not improve the treatment of vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants in criminal 
proceedings in the way special measures do for witnesses, or help to facilitate their best 
evidence, and nor were they designed to. These safeguards, therefore, do not constitute a 
convincing reason from which to justify the denial of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses. Such defendants remain at a disadvantage by comparison to 
both their non-vulnerable counterparts, and to vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant 
witnesses in receipt of special measures. 
3.5.1.3. Special measures are designed to protect witnesses from the defendant 
The final reason offered by the Working Group for the denial of special measures to 
defendants centred on the alleged purpose of those measures. The Working Group contended 
that ‘many of the measures … are designed to shield a vulnerable or intimidated witness from 
the defendant ... and so would not be applicable in the case of defendant witnesses’.
205
 Even 
if we confine our attention solely to the particular measures the Working Group had in mind 
here (live links, pre-recorded video evidence, and screens) this betrays a simplistic 
conception of their purpose. As has been alluded to throughout this chapter, such measures 
help to improve the treatment of witnesses in court by protecting them from some of the 
difficulties they may face when recounting personal, intimate or distressing events. They also 
adapt proceedings to help facilitate best evidence from witnesses who are young and/or 
suffering from a range of physical, mental or intellectual disabilities.
206
 Non-defendant 
witnesses can also invoke special measures as a result of the nature of the offence to which 
the proceedings relate or a witness’ personal characteristics such as their social or cultural 
background.
207
 It is true that these measures may, on occasion, be invoked to assist a witness 
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deemed ‘in fear or distress’ due to the ‘defendant’s behaviour towards them’.
208
 This, 
however, is far from their only function. 
The Working Group further argued that the unavailability of existing child provisions to 
defendants was evidence of a prior recognition that they would not be useful to defendants.
209
 
The child provisions to which they referred permitted pre-recorded statements as evidence-in-
chief and the ability to give evidence by live link.
210
 The motivations underpinning the 
enactment of these measures were discussed in the first part of this chapter. It was 
demonstrated that concerns regarding the ability of the system to convict child abusers led to 
reforms to rules of evidence to enable children to give evidence in criminal trials. The 
enactment of special measures followed, largely in response to concerns about the inhumane 
treatment of children in court in the absence of such adaptations. Child defendants simply did 
not factor in these considerations. The primary concerns were with increasing the criminal 
justice system’s ability to convict child abusers, and, relatedly, to increasing child witnesses’ 
ability to give evidence of a high quality. The needs of defendants were not considered at this 
juncture. The Working Group was thus wrong to rely on the prior non-provision of defendant 
special measures to support their decision to exclude defendants from its recommendations 
for a new scheme.  
The blanket denial of special measures to defendants meant that vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses choosing to give evidence in their defence were left without 
the same assistance as vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. The 
assumption underlying the legislative scheme seems to be that defendants are not vulnerable 
or intimidated. There is no empirical basis for such a belief. In section 1.1, I highlighted the 
pervasiveness of vulnerability in the general population. Many of the issues which may lead 
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to a witness’ classification as vulnerable and/or intimidated are also prevalent among the 
defendant population. The available evidence suggests that such issues may even be 
disproportionately common among those accused of, and those proved to have been involved 
in, criminal activity. For example, the recent Children’s Commissioner Report highlights that 
the prevalence of neurodisability in young people who offend is often significantly higher 
than it is among young people in the general population.
211
 Furthermore, Brooker et al found 
that the percentage of the probation population in Lincolnshire with a current mental illness is 
39%.
212
 In addition, a survey conducted in 2012 found that 36% of surveyed prisoners had a 
disability and/or mental health problem.
213
  
Jacobson et al observed that ‘defendants … struggle on those occasions when they give 
evidence’ due to the ‘obvious educational and intellectual disparity between prosecution 
counsel and the defendant’.
214
 Louck’s review of the literature surrounding defendant 
vulnerability highlighted that many suspects/defendants/offenders suffer from learning 
disabilities and/or difficulties, although there is no consensus as to the exact numbers.
215
 This 
may, in part, be due to the fact that the issues facing defendants can be multiple and complex. 
For example, Jacobson and Talbot identified that many individuals appearing before the 
courts ‘do not have a single or clearly delineated form of intellectual or psychological 
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difficulty … mental illness and learning disability (or learning difficulty) may co-exist’.
216
 
Furthermore, Lord Bradley noted that some have a ‘dual diagnosis’ where mental health 
problems are combined with drug and/or alcohol problems.
217
 Child defendants are deemed 
‘doubly vulnerable’
218
 due to a combination of their young age and other mental, intellectual 
and emotional problems from which they may suffer.
219
 This is likely to be particularly 
problematic for child defendants in the Crown Court, due to the more formal nature of 
proceedings and the courtroom’s grandeur.  
The Working Group noted that giving evidence by live link, screens and/or pre-recording 
their testimony were not designed for defendants. It is in fact the case, however, that these 
measures hold substantial potential to help to mitigate some of the difficulties faced by 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants.
220
 For example, a defendant with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), who is easily distracted by the multiple stimuli within a 
crowded court, could use the live link to give evidence and thus be able to better focus on 
their testimony. A defendant with an anxiety disorder may find that it is intensified by the 
requirement to give evidence in a courtroom filled largely with strangers. 
This ‘distress’ connected with testifying in the proceedings could also be dealt with by 
allowing the defendant to give their evidence by live link.
221
 Alternatively the defendant’s 
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distress could be alleviated by permitting them to testify from behind a screen, reducing the 
number of people who can see the defendant and whom the defendant can see. Provisions for 
pre-recorded evidence could, in theory, be utilised to secure contemporaneous evidence from, 
for example, child defendants at the pre-trial stage in the same way that they were envisioned 
to (and now do) with non-defendant witnesses.
222
  
The Working Group did not refer to the use of other special measures by defendants, such as 
the removal of wigs and gowns, closing the court temporarily to the public, intermediaries or 
communication aids. Again, this does not mean that they cannot benefit a defendant. For 
example, a young defendant, one with an anxiety disorder, or one in fear or distress in 
connection with testifying in the proceedings, could also benefit from the removal of official 
court attire and closing the court (to minimise the number of on-lookers) while they give 
evidence. Furthermore, a defendant with a low IQ or with an autism spectrum disorder would 
also likely benefit from the provision of an intermediary and/or use of communication aids 
when giving their evidence.
223
 The Working Group’s assumption in its report, therefore, that 
special measures will not benefit defendants because they are ‘designed to help witnesses’ is 
flawed. Defendants can be equally as vulnerable as non-defendant witnesses, and special 
measures can help to alleviate many of the issues they may face. Thus, this final reason 
offered by the Working Group to justify the exclusion of defendants from special measures is 
also invalid.  
In summary, the three reasons offered by the Working Group (special procedures pre-trial, 
fair trial safeguards at trial, and the unsuitability of special measures for defendants) were not 
adequate to justify the exclusion of defendants from special measures eligibility. As noted at 
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the beginning of this section, the Working Group had intended these reasons to cumulatively 
justify its denial of special measures to defendants. I have demonstrated that each of the 
reasons offered is invalid and simply insufficient when taken individually. Thus, even if 
taken collectively, as the Working Group intended, these three invalid reasons cannot amount 
to a sufficient basis from which to justify the exclusion of vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendants from special measures. 
I also noted previously in this section that two distinct but related issues need to be 
considered in relation to the non-provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants. The first was whether vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants 
require more support than the ‘normal’ defendant cohort if they are to give equally good 
evidence. The second was whether there are any justifiable grounds to distinguish between 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant and non-defendant witnesses, or whether they should 
be treated equally and all receive special measures. A consideration of both of these issues 
follows. 
Earlier in this chapter, I showed that the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated non-defendant witnesses was premised on a notion of equality. The comparably 
disadvantaged position of the vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses to other 
‘normal’ non-defendant witnesses when giving evidence justifies the provision of additional 
support to them. In light of this, it is difficult to resist the argument that special measures 
should also be provided to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses. They too are at 
a disadvantage by comparison to non-vulnerable defendants who may wish to give evidence. 
The denial of special measures to such defendants thus runs counter to the principle of 
equality on which special measures were initially developed. This means that there was an 
absence of internal coherence in the law of special measures under the 1999 Act.  
88 
 
With regards to distinguishing between defendants and non-defendants, the differences 
highlighted by the Working Group do not justify denying special measures to vulnerable 





 reason for unequal treatment, the only ‘rational’ option is to proceed on the 
basis of equality.
226
 Speaking extra-judicially on ‘Evidence of Child Victims,’ Lord Judge, 
the then Lord Chief Justice, argued in a similar vein: 
I do not see why the processes which protect the child witness or victim should 
not be available to the child defendant. To my mind it is not just a question of 
equality of arms, it is simply that the defendant who is a child is a child like the 




It is concluded, therefore, that all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users, irrespective of 
their position in the proceedings, should have equal access to special measures. The absence 
of any valid reason for their exclusion leaves only equality as the justifiable way to proceed. 
The exclusion of vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses from such support thus 
marks an internal inconsistency in the provision of special measures – the law is not adhering 
to its own standard. This position is pithily summarised by Lawson, who notes that the 
exclusion of defendants from special measures ‘overlooks the equality-driven requirement for 
adjustments to be made to court … to ensure that disabled people (whether they are the 
accused or the victim) are able to participate on an equal basis with others’.
228
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Despite this, none of the issues raised in this chapter were discussed in Parliamentary debates 
on the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill in the House of Lords or Commons.
229
 The 
emphasis was entirely on the positive impact that the provisions would have for vulnerable 
and intimidated witnesses in criminal trials, with absolutely no regard for supporting 
comparably disadvantaged defendants. The ‘surround’ in which the Bill was debated goes 
some way to helping us understand why this was. This is discussed in section 5.5.1. 
3.6. Consequences of the exclusion of defendants 
When unpacking the Working Group’s ‘justifications’, I highlighted some of the potentially 
negative consequences which may arise for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants without 
the provision of special measures. These related to their inability to effectively participate in 
their trial. This could occur as a result of such a defendant ‘choosing’ not to give evidence 
because they are unable to do so sufficiently well, or from them giving evidence but doing so 
poorly due the lack of support available to them. Given that a defendant’s ability to give 
evidence is a necessary component of effective participation,
230
 either of these outcomes is 
problematic. 
Furthermore, Roberts and Zuckerman assert that defendants should be treated ‘as thinking, 
feeling, human subjects of official concern and respect, who are entitled to be given the 
opportunity to play an active part in procedures’.
231
 It thus follows that a failure to ensure this 
constitutes a lack of protection for the right to humane treatment. As discussed previously in 
this chapter, protecting against inhumane treatment (and thus promoting equal treatment) was 
one of the motivations underpinning the development of non-defendant witness special 
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measures. It follows, therefore, that the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants can help to ensure that they too are treated humanely.  
In addition, a lack of support to those giving evidence that need it may also undermine the 
principle of accurate fact-finding. This has been described as the ‘cornerstone of the rule of 
law’ as well as the ‘ultimate golden thread tying criminal proceedings to the public 
interest’.
232
 Most defendants, whether guilty or innocent, are likely to be privy to information 
concerning the events leading up to, during and following the alleged commission of an 
offence. Given their superior position in this regard it is in the interests of accurate fact-
finding and efficiency to assist vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants to give their best 
evidence if they wish to testify.
233
  
As well as breaching a vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant’s right to effectively 
participate in their trial, the non-provision of special measures arguably contravenes the 
principle of equality of arms. The ECtHR has ruled that Article 6(1) of the ECHR requires 
that ‘each party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under 
conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent’.
234
 This 
means that ‘both parties should be treated in a manner ensuring that they have a procedurally 
equal position to make their case’.
235
 As discussed this is, in part, facilitated through the 
provision of certain legal rights or entitlements to defendants designed to redress the 
structural imbalance between them and the State.
236
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A concern for equality of arms should also encompass measures which enable witnesses for 
both parties to give evidence effectively. Though often supplemented by documentary, 
physical, or scientific evidence, oral witness testimony remains a feature of many criminal 
trials.
237
 This oral evidence can be a vital component of a prosecution or defence case, 
making the witnesses that give this evidence a key resource for the parties to employ. It 
seems essential, therefore, that all vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses are assisted in 
equal measure to give evidence if required. Since the defendant can be a witness in their own 
defence, they too should be assisted to give evidence if they are vulnerable and/or 
intimidated. As highlighted by one of my respondents: 
…it’s an adversarial system, and the pursuit of best evidence has to apply to both sides. 
[B3] 
 
Failing to provide special measures assistance to such defendants can leave the defence at a 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecution when presenting their case to the jury. This 
arguably falls foul of the ECtHR interpretation of the principle of equality of arms.  
The non-provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants absent 
strong justification also risks contravening the presumption of innocence. This is an express 
right contained within the ECHR.
238
 Disagreement exists as to what exactly constitutes the 
presumption of innocence.
239
 As Lippke notes, ‘a bewildering variety of claims have been 
made about the meaning and implications of the presumption of innocence in the criminal 
law’.
240
 In a narrow way, it is considered to mean that the State must prove the defendant’s 
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 the burden and standard of proof reflecting the system’s commitment to protecting 
the innocent from conviction.
242
 However, Roberts claims that while it is true that the burden 
and standard of proof find their normative justifications in the presumption of innocence, it is 
a ‘tempting fallacy’ to conclude that these evidential burdens alone are all that needs to be 
said about the presumption of innocence.
243
 Instead, properly conceived, the presumption of 
innocence is more than merely a factual presumption; it is a moral and political principle
244
 
which protects the liberty, security and privacy of all individuals.
245
 In other words, placing 
the burden of proof on the prosecution combined with the steeply asymmetrical standard of 
proof marks the State’s ‘unequivocal commitment to the importance of avoiding wrongful 
conviction’ of the innocent to keep ‘its liberal credentials … intact’.
246
 As Young and Wall 




Some interpretations of the presumption of innocence go even further than this. For example 
Ashworth notes that it ‘appears to operate at two different levels’; the trial (as discussed 
above) and the criminal process more generally.
248
 This latter conception of the presumption 
of innocence requires ‘pre-trial procedures [to] be conducted, so far as possible, as if the 
defendant were innocent’.
249
 The ‘so far as possible’ provides an important caveat, since 
presuming suspects to be factually innocent at the pre-trial stage would risk rendering the 
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criminal justice system unworkable in its crime control pursuits. If suspicion of guilt was 
viewed as unjustified,
250
 arrests on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion’
251
 could not be made, 
and prosecutions could not be brought on the basis of ‘a realistic prospect of conviction’.
252
 
However, Packer notes that in this context, the presumption of innocence is ‘a direction to 
officials how they are to proceed, not a prediction of outcome’.
253
 It thus requires that ‘until 
there has been an adjudication of guilt … the suspect is to be treated, for reasons which have 
nothing to do with the probable outcome of the case, as if his guilt is an open question’.
254
 
Essentially, therefore, it is ‘a normative counterforce or counterweight in opposition to 
factual suspicions or reasonable presumption of guilt’.
255
  
On the basis of this interpretation of the presumption of innocence, any unfavourable 
treatment of the accused is unjustified since criminal justice agents should instead be mindful 
of the fact that the suspect’s/defendant’s guilt has not been proved. In the absence of 
convincing reasons for the exclusion of defendants from special measures the only difference 
remaining on which their exclusion may be based is their very position as the accused. This 
violates the presumption of innocence, since a presumption of guilt based on the evidence 
collected pre-trial should not exclude a defendant from special measures eligibility. Instead, 
an assessment as to their vulnerability and/or whether they are in fear or distress in 
connection with the proceedings (ie are intimidated) should be made on the basis that they, at 
minimum, may be innocent. 
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The combination of the potential consequences arising from the non-provision of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants may cause some such defendants to 
give up their right to put the prosecution to proof. McConville et al’s research on criminal 
defence work highlighted that barristers may exploit a defendant’s vulnerability and use fear 
to put pressure on clients to plead guilty.
256
 This was demonstrated through an exchange he 
observed between a barrister and 13 year old client, Wayne. The barrister told Wayne that the 
criminal trial is ‘pretty scary’, in a ‘vast court’, and that he would be asked questions and 
called ‘a liar’.
257
 The absence of support to such defendants may mean that some of them 
decide to plead guilty. It may leave others susceptible to pressure from their lawyer to do so. 
By pleading guilty, the vulnerable defendant is able to avoid the ordeal of testifying while 
also securing a sentence discount.
258
 A plea of guilty tendered in such circumstances is most 
obviously problematic if the defendant is factually innocent. Even if the defendant is factually 
guilty, however, the lack of support available to vulnerable defendants should not result in 
them feeling situationally compelled to enter a guilty plea. A defendant, vulnerable or not, 




In this chapter I have exposed the principle of equality that underpinned the development of 
special measures legislation for non-defendant witnesses. This was one of procedural equality 
of opportunity – treating disadvantaged people (those vulnerable and/or intimidated) 
differently (through the provision of special measures) in order to improve their ability to 
give their best evidence. I demonstrated that while the language in which discussions 
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surrounding the treatment of vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses were framed was rarely 
that of equality, equality was universally accepted within the terms of the debates. This was 
evident with regard to concerns about the inhumane treatment of potential witnesses, 
particularly children and the learning disabled, due to their inability to engage in the criminal 
process. In order for these individuals to be treated more humanely, there was a recognition 
that adaptations would need to be made to standard procedures to accommodate their needs 
when giving evidence.  
Initially the principle of equality underpinning the enactment and development of special 
measures provisions may not have been recognised by those involved in the debates. 
However its role has become increasingly transparent following the proliferation of equality 
legislation. For example, the Equal Treatment Bench Book, citing the Equalities Act 2010, 
advocates adapting trial proceedings for the vulnerable through the use of special measures. 
This demonstrates that special measures do help to achieve equality, even if this has not 
always been explicitly acknowledged. 
This chapter has also examined whether the denial of statutory special measures to vulnerable 
and/or intimidated defendants is consistent with the law’s commitment to the principle of 
equality underpinning the non-defendant special measures provisions. I have shown that the 
differences between defendants and non-defendants, arising from their structural positioning 
in the criminal trial, do not negate the need for special measures for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants. In fact, the exclusion of such defendants from the statutory scheme 
has potentially serious consequences for these defendants. For example, it jeopardises their 
ability to participate effectively in the proceedings as well as potentially violating the 
principle of equality of arms and the presumption of innocence. Ultimately, the lack of 
support available to them has real potential to unfairly affect the outcome of the case. This 
means that the exclusion of vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses from 
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eligibility for special measures marks an internal inconsistency in the approach the law takes 
to the treatment of court users suffering from vulnerability and/or intimidation. 
Establishing the place of equality as an underlying rationale for the enactment of special 
measures provides a strong justification for their continued existence and use. The equal 
treatment of all potential witnesses, regardless of their age, disabilities and/or circumstances, 
thus improving the internal coherence of the law in this area, is a strong basis from which to 
develop law and practice in this area. The next chapter explores how defendant special 
measures have developed since the enactment of the 1999 Act, and the role that the principle 
of equality has played in this. An assessment is then made as to whether these developments 
mean that the law of special measures is now internally consistent in its approach to 




CHAPTER 4: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL 




This chapter examines the development of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendant witnesses following the statutory exclusion of defendants from the YJCEA special 
measures scheme. An inquiry into the way in which this body of law came to fruition 
accomplishes two things. First, it uncovers the motivation(s) for the expansion of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants and, in particular, the extent to which 
the principle of equality was one of those. This means that the law’s consistency in this 
regard can be assessed. Second, it enables an exploration of the way in which the law 
developed – ie via statute or common law – and the potential relevance of this to be 
considered. The current legal provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated 
court users is summarised in the latter part of this chapter. So too is the status of the principle 
of equality within this and an evaluation of the law’s coherence in this area.  
Hawkins’ sociological framework highlights how changes or developments from within the 
legal field can influence the surround. In addition, changes in the legal field can alter the way 
that agents working within it frame particular situations and individuals.
1
 This chapter shows 
specifically how developments in the courts have had some, albeit limited, influence on the 
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political surround. These have resulted in the enactment of some legislative provisions for 
defendant special measures. It also demonstrates how the arguments made by members of the 
legal profession who have framed defendants as vulnerable and/or intimidated and in need of 
support have helped to shape the legal landscape.  
Before examining the development of the special measures law for defendant witnesses, an 
explanatory note is required. Criminal Practice Direction 3G provides various adaptations 
which should be made to the trial process if a defendant is considered vulnerable. These 
include ensuring that the courtroom is all one level;
2
 taking regular breaks; and ensuring the 
use of clear language throughout the trial and particularly through cross-examination.
3
 Such 
adaptations mark admirable steps taken to improve the treatment of vulnerable defendants in 
court. The label of ‘special measures’ should be reserved for those adaptations to the trial 
which are contained within the YJCEA for non-defendant witnesses.
4
 These include the use 
of screens, live link, closing the court to the public, the removal of wigs and gowns, pre-
recorded evidence, intermediaries and communication aids.
5
 It is the development of these 
measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses, therefore, that is the focus of 
this chapter. A discussion of them is undertaken in the order in which they developed. 
4.2. The law’s development: how and why? 
4.2.1. Wigs and gowns/evidence in private 
The development of these provisions for defendant witnesses arose out of the ECtHR 
decision in T v United Kingdom.
6
 The court ruled that the two 11 year old child defendants (T 
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and V) could not participate effectively in their trial for murder.
7
 The appeal to the ECtHR on 
the grounds of Article 6(1) was conceived on three bases – the defendants’ young age; the 
post-traumatic stress from which they suffered; and the intimidating nature of the courtroom, 
caused largely by the volume of people in attendance at the boys’ trial.
8
  
On the subject of the effective participation, a consultant child and adolescent psychiatrist 
highlighted that: 
…the post-traumatic stress disorder suffered by the applicant, combined with the 
lack of any therapeutic work since the offence, had limited his ability to instruct 




Neither T nor V testified in their defence. The ECtHR noted that:  
In his memorial to the court the applicant stated that, due to the conditions in 
which he was put on trial, he was unable to follow the proceedings or take 
decisions in his own best interests. He had been severely intimidated and caused 




The government argued, however, that several steps
11
 were taken prior to and during the trial 
to accommodate the child defendants. The pre-trial steps included familiarisation visits to the 
courtroom with a social worker and the provision of a ‘child witness pack’ to introduce them 
to trial procedure.
12
 The trial proceedings themselves were modified so that the defendants sat 
in a specially raised dock so that they could see, were alongside a social worker, and within 
close proximity to their parents and lawyers.
13
 In addition, the court day was shortened to 
reflect the length of the school day, and ten minute breaks were scheduled every hour where 
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the defendants could spend time in a play area with their parents and social workers.
14
 The 




However, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that: 
[T]he formality and ritual of the Crown Court must at times have seemed 
incomprehensible and intimidating for a child of eleven, in particular with the 
raised dock which … had the effect of increasing the applicant’s sense of 





Lord Reed emphasised further that ‘… a trial held under [these] conditions … could be 
expected to remain a highly intimidating experience for most eleven-year-old children’.
17
 The 
ECtHR accordingly decided that the child defendants’ right to effectively participate under 
Article 6(1) had been violated notwithstanding the adaptations that the trial judge had made 
in an attempt to accommodate the defendants in the Crown Court. As discussed in section 




Following this ruling, the Lord Chief Justice issued a practice direction which governed the 
trial of children in the Crown Court.
19
 This provided further adjustments to trial proceedings 
in addition to those adopted in the trial of T and V. Examples included allowing young 
defendants to sit with parents; the use of courtrooms where everyone is situated on one level 
(ie no raised platforms); and a simplification of the language used to assist child defendants’ 
understanding and thus their ability to participate. In addition, the practice direction 
recommended that barristers and judges refrain from wearing wigs and gowns in trials of 
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children and young persons, and for restrictions to be placed on public access to the 
courtroom to permit only those with an immediate and direct interest in the case. This 
guidance now forms part of the consolidated Criminal Practice Directions.
20
  
At the centre of these reforms was the recognition that child defendants may be unable to 
participate effectively in their trials due to both their vulnerability and the intimidating nature 
of Crown Court proceedings. In section 3.3 I highlighted, in relation to non-defendant 
witnesses, that the provision of extra support to disadvantaged witnesses (vulnerable and/or 
intimidated) was premised on a principle of equality. This is because for there to be equality 
the differential treatment of materially different individuals is required. The same is true here 
with regards to young, intellectually disabled or intimidated defendants versus other non-
vulnerable, non-intimidated defendants. Adaptations may need to be made for the former 
group of defendants in order that they can participate as effectively as the latter group. When 
viewed in this way, a concern for the effective participation of vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendants is, at least implicitly, premised on a concern for equality. 
4.2.2. Communication aids 
Communication aids include prompt cards, alphabet charts, dolls and other props which help 
a vulnerable person to express their evidence and understand questions asked under 
examination.
21
 The provision of them to vulnerable defendants has not arisen as an issue in 
the courts or Parliament. Instead, the court’s inherent power to make adjustments to the 
proceedings to ensure the effective participation of all involved, as emphasised in the 
Criminal Procedure Rules,
22
 has come to include the provision of communication aids.  
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4.2.3. Live link 
As explained in section 1.2, the live link provision enables live evidence to be obtained from 
a witness from outside of the courtroom while they are still seen and heard by the judge, jury 
and legal representatives in court.
23
 The development of the defendant live link provision 
commenced with the case of R (on the application of DPP) v Redbridge Youth Court.
24
 The 
case involved the trial of a 14 year old defendant charged with the indecent assault of two 14 
year old girls. Applications for the complainants to give their evidence by pre-recorded 
statement and live link, made under the Criminal Justice Act 1988,
25
 were denied in the 
Youth Court.
26
 Having had regard to the similar age of the defendant and complainants; the 
nature of the proceedings (the indecent assault charge arose from a slap on the bottom over 
clothes); and the lack of evidence as to the complainants’ trauma
27
 the decision to deny 
special measures was upheld on appeal by the Divisional Court.
28
 The prevailing assumption 
underpinning this decision was that evidence given in court is superior, (based on the 
perception that special measures diminish the quality of the evidence and the defendant’s 
ability to challenge it)
29
 and thus that it was not in the interest of the court to allow their use.  
Birch suggests that the Redbridge decision can also be interpreted as ‘the court … faced with 
a situation of inequality of arms’.
30
 She considered the conditions under which evidence is 
given to be relevant to the principle of equality of arms.
31
 Thus, the importance the court 
placed on the similar age of the children involved in the trial may be evidence of ‘judges 
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seek[ing] to restore some even-handedness by depriving other witnesses’ of the special 
measures for which they are eligible.
32
 This approach embodies the principle of equality that 
I highlighted in Chapter 3. It requires that all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users are 
afforded equal support irrespective of their position in the trial. The provision of special 
measures to non-defendant witnesses when a similarly situated defendant is denied them, 
therefore, would fall foul of this equality principle, thus rendering the law incoherent. The 
suitability of this approach to remedying the inequality is discussed later in this sub-section. 
The non-provision of live link to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses arose 
again in R v Waltham Forest Youth Court.
33
 The case involved four co-defendants aged 
between 13 and 16 years of age each charged with the robbery of two other children. The 
circumstances in this case differed quite significantly from those in Redbridge. The issue 
concerned the exclusion of a 13 year old defendant with ‘serious learning difficulties’
34
 from 
special measures who, if she testified, would make allegations against two of her co-accused. 
This defendant, (S), informed her solicitor that she ‘was too scared to do so in the physical 
presence of her co-defendants’ and that ‘rather than take that course, she would choose not to 
give evidence in her defence’.
35
  
The District Judge declined to make a special measures direction for live link for S under the 
YJCEA because although: 
[H]e could understand that there might be very good reasons why a 13 year old 
defendant such as S might wish to have such protection … the unambiguous 
terms of the [YJCEA meant that] there were no powers to make a special 
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Following this, an application was made for the District Judge to, instead, ‘exercise common 
law discretion to permit S to give her evidence by means of a video link’.
37
 This was also 
denied. The judicial review of these decisions found, albeit ‘with some reluctance,’
38
 that the 
District Judge was ‘plainly right’ to conclude that there was no power under the 1999 Act to 
grant special measures to defendants.
39
 It was also held that, despite the YJCEA’s retention of 
the court’s common law powers,
40
 no common law power existed in relation to the provision 
of live link and video-recorded evidence since these measures had been governed entirely by 
legislation since their birth.
41
  
Despite the unsuccessful nature of the appeal in Waltham Forest, the submissions to the High 
Court highlight the gradual recognition and exposure of the multiplicity of issues caused by 
the exclusion of defendants from special measures. They argued that the denial of the live 
link to the applicant (S) prevented the court from sufficiently protecting all vulnerable 
witnesses (of whom the defendant is potentially one).
42
 The denial of live link to defendants 
also permitted fear caused by the co-accused’s threats to essentially undermine the 
defendant’s right to choose whether or not to give evidence.
43
 Furthermore they argued that it 
potentially violated the principle of equality of arms, since if prosecution witnesses can use 
special measures ‘for the purpose of maximising “the quality of their evidence” … it may be 
unfair for a vulnerable defendant to be denied comparable facilities’.
44
 The defence further 
submitted that ‘there is no justification for drawing a distinction between prosecution and 
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defence witnesses and, indeed, no adequate explanation [for doing so] was provided in 
Speaking up for Justice’.
45
  
In essence, counsel for the appellant had correctly applied the principle of equality in an 
attempt to secure the law’s consistent treatment of vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. 
They concluded, first, that the position in which vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants 
(such as S) are left, absent a direction for live link, is inferior to that of comparably 
vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses for the prosecution. This was both in terms of their 
protection in the courtroom, their ability to give evidence, and its likely quality if they did. 
Second, counsel for the appellant concluded that the reasons offered by the working group in 
the Speaking up for Justice Report are invalid as justifications on which to differentiate in 
this way between the defendant and other witnesses and that there is no other justifiable basis. 
At judicial review, the court was unimpressed by the ‘equality of arms’ argument.
46
 So too 
were the ‘interested parties’ (the CPS and the Secretary of State for the Home Department). 
Their response maintained instead that ‘there is a legitimate and rational basis for 
discriminating … between witnesses and the accused’.
47
 This basis mirrored the justifications 
provided in the Speaking up for Justice Report, namely that: the accused does not have to 
give evidence but witnesses do; the accused has legal representation and witnesses do not; 
and that ‘the giving of evidence in court may be disturbing and traumatic – particularly in the 
case of victims’.
48
 A discussion of the reasons for why the first two justifications offered are 
invalid was held in section 3.5.1.2. As for the third justification, I also highlighted in section 
3.5.1.3 how defendants may find giving evidence ‘disturbing and traumatic’ too.  
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In summary, counsel for the appellant’s arguments, based on the principle of equality, 
broadly mirrored those I made in sections 3.5 and 3.6, but were not sufficiently persuasive on 
this occasion. Though the court was ‘tempted’
49
 to conclude that an inherent power for 
defendant live link existed, this was not on the basis of the argument for equality between 
defendants and non-defendants. Instead, it was on the basis of ‘the apparent derogation from 
the Claimant’s right to choose whether or not she gives evidence in her own defence … [as] 
she would only do so if able to use the live link facility’.
50
 This marks a concern for 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants’ effective participation in their trials as witnesses 
rather than for equality between court users. As discussed earlier in this chapter, and in 
Chapter 3, ensuring the effective participation of those who are in some way disadvantaged 
additionally enhances equality between all court users. Though unsuccessful on this occasion, 
the arguments for equality were beginning to come through.  
Arguments based on equality seemed particularly apparent in practice. Despite the Waltham 
Forest decision, concern in the legal field about the inequality of support between vulnerable 
and/or intimidated court users continued to gain ground. Sanders et al found evidence of a 
‘parity principle’ in early decisions made by criminal justice agents in relation to special 
measures for prosecution witnesses.
51
 Prosecutors perceived it as ‘unfair to provide a measure 
to help a prosecution witness that is statutorily barred to the defendant even where it would 
be equally helpful.’
52
 As a result, the researchers found that the application of the ‘parity 
principle’ meant that special measures were not always applied for on behalf of prosecution 
witnesses who legally qualified for their use.  
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Evidence of this seemed especially prominent in circumstances where the defendant and the 
victim/witness were both older children of similar ages; the victim was at the older end of the 
qualifying age bracket (ie nearing 17 years old); and/or the defendant was particularly young 
(ie aged 11).
53
 Other situations in which the ‘parity principle’ was applied included where 
‘allegations of mutuality or provocation’ made it difficult to decide who the ‘victim’ is.
54
 If 
an accused was relying on self-defence, for example, awarding special measures to the 
‘victim’ in these circumstances, and not to the accused was thought to risk denying ‘the 




Sanders et al did not find any evidence of the operation of the parity principle in cases 
involving sexual assault,
56
 perhaps because of the more prescriptive legislative provisions in 
this area.
57
 However, Birch considered a hypothetical scenario in which both the complainant 
of a sexual assault (A) and the accused (B) are equally disabled.
58
 She questioned whether, if 
both A and B claim to be the victim of the sexual assault, it is fair that only the complainant 
(A) can benefit from special measures, and that B is excluded on the sole basis that he is the 
accused.
59
 The unfairness of the defendant’s exclusion from special measures in the context 
of a case involving two learning disabled individuals, particularly given the allegation of 
mutuality, becomes especially obvious. Applying the ‘parity principle’ to remedy this 
inequality – and thus denying the necessary (and available) support to the complainant – 
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highlights the problems inherent in this approach. To render two learning disabled court users 
equally disadvantaged cannot be the most desirable way to ensure ‘equality’.  
There is also evidence that the essence of the ‘parity principle’ resonated in the courts. 
Sanders et al interviewed a prosecutor who attributed the ‘reluctance to apply for the live link 
… to the anticipated approach of the courts’.
60
 The way in which criminal justice agents 
framed the situations with which they were faced, therefore, may have been a direct result of 
the way in which such situations were approacheded in the courts within the legal field in 
which they worked. The case of R v C
61
 provides an example of arguments that were made 
for the application of the ‘parity principle’.  
The trial judge in R v C strongly voiced his concerns for the equality of arms where the 
complainant in a rape trial, of a similar age to the defendant, gave evidence by live link.
62
 
Ultimately he permitted the complainant to give evidence in this way since this had 
previously been promised to her in a pre-trial hearing by a different judge.
63
 Nevertheless, he 
felt that: 
… I think it was wrong to agree for that application [for live link] at that stage [the 
pre-trial stage], because there is no provision for a defendant of the same age [as the 
complainant] to give evidence other than in front of a jury live, and I certainly think it 
is arguable that both where there is a complainant and a defendant [in] those 
circumstances, one would think in terms of them both giving evidence in the same 
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This clearly shows the influence that the parity principle had on the trial judge’s view. The 
decision to allow special measures on this basis was upheld by the Court of Appeal,
65
 with no 
reference made to the validity of the trial judge’s concerns regarding the equality of arms.  
The ‘parity principle’ came to the fore again in R v Camberwell Green Youth Court.
66
 The 
District Judges’ decisions to deny special measures to child witnesses in three cases involving 
allegations of robbery or assault were the subject of an interlocutory judicial review on the 
DPP’s request. Special measures had been denied as the judges perceived they would ‘give 
rise to substantial inequality between prosecution and defence, contrary to the fair trial 
provisions of Article 6(1) and the right under Article 6(3)(d) to examine witnesses under the 
same conditions as witnesses against the defendant’.
67
 This was rejected by the Divisional 
Court on the basis that ‘the fairness of proceedings challenged by reference to Article 6 can 
only be judged retrospectively by reference to the trial and any appeal, not prospectively 
before the trial has taken place’.
68
 As a result, the District Judges in the Youth Court had to 
provide the child witnesses in the trials with special measures.  
The case was then heard on appeal in the House of Lords. The issue before the court was 
whether the then irrebuttable primary rule,
69
 that children ‘in need of special protection’ are 
to give evidence by pre-recorded statement and live link, was Article 6 compliant. This arose 
since the rule prevented an ‘individualised consideration of the necessity’ of such a 
direction.
70
 The House of Lords unanimously ruled that the primary rule was not in 
contravention of Article 6 ECHR.
71
 In reaching their decision, the Lords considered the issue 
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of equality of arms, as the defence argued that application of the primary rule for non-
defendant witnesses left comparably disadvantaged defendants without the same level of 
support.  
In her leading speech,
72
 Baroness Hale acknowledged that ‘child defendants are often among 
the most disadvantaged and the least able to give a good account of themselves’ and that 
‘increasing numbers are being committed for trial in the Crown Court where these 
disadvantages will be even more disabling’.
73
 She argued, however, that ‘to deprive the court 
of the best evidence available from other child witnesses merely because the 1999 Act 
scheme does not apply to the accused … would be … the worst of all possible worlds’.
74
 In 
other words, ‘the fact that the accused may need assistance to give his best evidence cannot 
justify excluding the best evidence of others’.
75
 The solution to the unequal provision of 
special measures to defendant and non-defendant witnesses was not, according to Hale, to 
deny such support to non-defendants because defendants do not also get it.  
Instead, the courts should ‘ensure that the defendant is not at a substantial disadvantage 
compared with the prosecution and any other defendants’.
76
 Lord Rodger, in agreement with 
Hale, pointed to the courts’ ‘inherent jurisdiction to make an order, or to give leave, of any 
description in relation to such defendants who are witnesses’.
77
 Adapting the proceedings for 
defendants, ie by removing wigs and gowns or providing intermediary support,
78
 would 
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In summary, the strength of the equality argument as seen through the operation of, and 
resistance to, the ‘parity principle’ was gaining momentum among criminal practitioners, 
academics, trial judges and members of the senior judiciary. The emphasis had begun to shift 
away from the defendant’s ability to effectively participate without special measures, towards 
the unfair advantage that special measures give a vulnerable and/or intimidated non-
defendant witness over a comparably vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant. The more 
persuasive concern, however, was still that of the effective participation of defendants.  
For example, in her judgment, Hale also considered the Waltham Forest decision that there is 
no inherent power to provide live link to defendants. Her obiter musings indicate that she did 
not agree with that conclusion. She noted ‘with respect … [that] section 19(6) [YJCEA] 
makes it clear that the 1999 Act does not purport to make exclusive provision for any of the 
special measures it prescribes’.
80
 She advised, however, that this point was ‘better taken on 
an appeal against conviction in which a defendant argues he was not given a proper 
opportunity to defend himself’.
81
 This almost constitutes an invitation for a future appeal on 
this issue. It also provides an insight into the circumstances under which live link may have 
been granted for defendants (ie for those unable to effectively participate as a witness) if it 
had been left within the domain of the common law. 
The government stepped in, however, and made a late insertion into its Police and Justice Bill 
2006 for a defendant live link provision.
82
 Baroness Scotland of Asthal (then Attorney 
General) stated that this was ‘the solution that the Government have [sic] been discussing 
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 Hansard, HL Deb 11 July 2006 vol 684 col 678-79 (Baroness Scotland of Asthal). 
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with the senior judiciary to make available to vulnerable defendants the sort of special 
measures that apply to vulnerable witnesses’
83
 in response to the decision in SC v UK.
84
 This 
was a ECtHR decision regarding the trial of an 11 year old defendant in the Crown Court. 
The child defendant ‘had very low intellectual ability for his age, showed “a significant 
degree of learning difficulty” and his ability to reason was “noticeably restricted”, equivalent 
to that of an average child between six and eight years old’.
85
 In light of this, steps had been 
taken at trial to make the ‘procedure as informal as possible’.
86
 While it was held that the 
defendant had been fit to plead, and despite the steps that had been taken at trial, the ECtHR 
ruled that the defendant was not capable of participating effectively in his trial as per Article 
6(1).
87




No discussion of the 1999 Act’s special measures regime, the defendant’s exclusion from it, 
or any concern relating to equality of arms featured in this case. Instead, it centred solely on 
the child defendant’s ability to participate in the Crown Court in the presence of a jury. The 
government rejected the ECtHR’s conclusion that child defendants should always be tried in 
a specialist tribunal because of: the importance of jury trials in the England and Wales; the 
experience of Crown Court judges at sentencing for serious crimes; and the expense and 
added complexity to the system that a new specialist court would entail.
89
 Instead, as 
displayed above, the creation of the defendant live link provision was cited as the solution to 
the SC v UK decision. Baroness Scotland promoted the measure in the House of Lords, 
stating that ‘giving evidence via a live link from a comfortable room in the courthouse, away 
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from the formality of the courtroom itself, may be less distracting and difficult than giving 
evidence in the courtroom’.
90
  
There was no objection in Parliament to the defendant live link provision
91
 and it was thus 
inserted into the YJCEA. It had been borne out of a concern for the effective participation of 
vulnerable defendants in their trial as witnesses. As previously highlighted, the ability to 
effectively participate includes the ability to give best evidence. This recognises that some 
defendants require additional support to give evidence when compared with other defendants, 
and that the live link provision is a mechanism through which this can be provided. It also 
puts such vulnerable defendants on a more equal footing with vulnerable and/or intimidated 
witnesses. Although the justification for the enactment of this provision was not explicitly 
one of equality, its effect is to enhance more equal treatment of vulnerable defendants in the 
same way that the non-defendant live link provision does for those witnesses.  
The insertion of the defendant live link provision demonstrates how the decisions made in the 
legal field can infiltrate decisions made in the surround.
92
 Difficulties ensuring the effective 
participation of young defendants became apparent through national and Strasbourg case law. 
Furthermore, problems arose in ensuring the protection of vulnerable non-defendant 
witnesses, given the lack of comparable protection for defendant witnesses. The inconsistent 
approach taken in the law to the treatment of vulnerable and/or intimidated court users was 
presenting problems in the courts. The defendant live link provision went some way to 
remedying this inconsistency and those problems.  
Furthermore, the insertion of a defendant live link provision into the YJCEA also reduces the 
likelihood that the application of the ‘parity principle’ at all stages of the criminal process 
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will continue to leave non-defendant witnesses without the special measures support to which 
they are entitled. Although the House of Lords had already condemned this practice there are 
at least two reasons why it seems likely to have continued. First, early decisions to deny 
special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses may result in the 
collapse of prosecution cases and thus not be the subject of judicial scrutiny. Second, even if 
the trial did go ahead without special measures, not all such cases would be the subject of a 
judicial review or an appeal. The enactment of the statutory provision, however, should abate 




The live link provision for vulnerable defendant witnesses, section 33A of the YJCEA, 
provides that: 
(1) This section applies to any proceedings (whether in a magistrates’ court or 
before the Crown Court) against a person for any offence. 
(2) The court may, on the application of the accused, give a live link direction if 
it is satisfied –  
(a) that the conditions in subsection (4) or, as the case may be, subsection (5) 
are met in relation to the accused, and 
(b) that it is in the interests of justice for the accused to give evidence through 
a live link 
(3) A live link direction is a direction that any oral evidence to be given before 
the court by the accused is to be given through a live link. 
(4) Where the accused is aged under 18 when the application is made, the 
conditions are that –  
(a) his ability to participate effectively in the proceedings as a witness giving 
oral evidence in court is compromised by his level of intellectual ability or 
social functioning, and 
(b) use of a live link would enable him to participate more effectively in the 
proceedings as a witness (whether by improving the quality of his evidence 
or otherwise). 
(5) Where the accused has attained the age of 18 at that time, the conditions are 
that –  
                                                          
93
 And my interview findings indicate that it has done so – I asked 7 respondents if the vulnerability of the 
defendant would affect special measures decisions for the witnesses in the case, and was met with a unanimous, 
resounding, and somewhat perplexed, no. 
115 
 
(a) he suffers from a mental disorder (within the meaning of the Mental Health 
Act 1983) or otherwise has a significant impairment of intelligence and 
social function, 
(b) he is for that reason unable to participate effectively in the proceedings as a 
witness giving oral evidence in court, and 
(c) use of a live link would enable him to participate more effectively in the 
proceedings as a witness (whether by improving the quality of his evidence 
or otherwise). 
 
The enactment of a defendant live link provision has improved the support available to some 
vulnerable defendant witnesses. However, in many ways the provision of live link to 
defendants remains more restrictive than it is for non-defendant witnesses.
94
 For example, it 
is not available to intimidated defendants. The only statutory criterion on which a defendant 
can apply is vulnerability. This is particularly curious given that, in the House of Lords 
debate on the live link provision, Baroness Linklater specifically highlighted its benefit for 
intimidated defendants. She stated that, ‘a video link may … help a child to be less 
intimidated by the process of giving evidence’.
95
 The omission of such a clause means that, 
unless all intimidated defendants are also classed as vulnerable as per section 33A, not all 
intimidated defendants
96
 who may need and could benefit from the live link provision will be 
eligible for its use.
97
  
For adult defendants to secure the use of the live link they must be suffering from either a 
mental disorder or a significant impairment of intelligence and social function and as a result 
of this be unable to effectively participate in the proceedings as a witness (emphasis added).
98
 
This is a higher threshold than for non-defendant adults, where all that it is necessary to show 
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is that the quality of their evidence ‘is likely to be diminished’.
99
 It is also a more onerous 




In addition, unlike for non-defendant witnesses physical disabilities or disorders
101
 are not a 
qualifying trigger for defendant live link. This was confirmed in R (Hamberger) v CPS,
102
 
where a defendant was denied access to section 33A for reason of a heart condition, because 
it did not fall within the ambit of section 33A(5)(a).
103
 Had the application for live link been 
for a non-defendant witness with the same heart condition, on the wording of section 16 it 
would likely have been granted. Not only, therefore, is there a cohort of defendants left 
disadvantaged by comparison to other defendants without physical disabilities or disorders, 
they may also be left at a disadvantage compared to non-defendant witnesses with the same 
condition. 
Another way in which the defendant live link provision is more restrictive is with regards to 
children. As highlighted in section 3.2.1, section 16(1)(a) of the YJCEA provides that all non-
defendant witnesses under the age of 18 automatically qualify for special measures. This is 
not the case for child defendants. Instead, in addition to being under 18, their ability to 
participate as a witness must be compromised by their level of intellectual ability or social 
functioning;
104
 and the live link should improve this ability to participate.
105
 As per the 
YJCEA, therefore, defendants under the age of 18 are not considered as inherently 
vulnerable, but non-defendant witnesses under the age of 18 are. As discussed in section 
3.5.1.3, there is no basis upon which this distinction can be justified. It runs contrary to the 
                                                          
99
 YJCEA, s16(1)(b). 
100
 See YJCEA, s33A(4)(a). Child defendants are discussed below. 
101
 See YJCEA s 16(2)(b). 
102
 [2014] EWHC 2814 (Admin). 
103
 ibid [29]. 
104





principle of equality and limits the potential of this provision to improve the ability of all 
children to participate effectively as witnesses in criminal proceedings. 
When this provision was debated in the House of Lords, Baroness Linklater proposed that 
‘the additional requirement regarding intellectual ability or social functioning be removed … 
because it is simply not fair’.
106
 Instead, she argued that ‘the criteria for ordering special 
measures, for all witnesses, should be the same’.
107
 Her approach was in keeping with the 
principle of equality, since making the eligibility threshold more onerous for one cohort of 
children over another, absent sufficient reason, runs contrary to equality. Baroness Scotland’s 
response to this, however, was uncompromising. She argued that ‘it should [not] be applied 
to all children because, if it were, we would have all children giving evidence via a video 
link’ and that this position would be ‘very difficult to accept’.
108
 This response was 
unconvincing. Not all non-defendant child witnesses give evidence by live link, despite their 
automatic categorisation as vulnerable witnesses.
109
 Thus, it is unlikely that classifying child 
defendants as inherently vulnerable, in the same way that child witnesses have been, would 
give rise to all child defendants giving evidence by live link either. Nevertheless, the statutory 
inequality prevailed. This means that different sections of the 1999 Act conceptualise a 
child’s vulnerability differently. 
Finally, for all defendants (child and adult) it must also be considered as ‘in the interests of 
justice’ to give evidence via live link.
110
 This requirement does not exist for non-defendant 
witnesses. Defendants thus have yet another statutory hurdle to overcome to invoke the use of 
the live link. The ‘interests of justice’ test for live link use is not defined in the Act and nor 
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has it been the subject of discussion in the courts. This leaves the meaning of the phrase 
uncertain, but it arguably preserves the judge’s discretion to deny the use of the live link even 
if all the other statutory conditions are met. Hoyano notes, however, that ‘it is surely 
inconceivable that when a child’s capacity to defend himself under normal procedures of the 
adversarial trial is so compromised as to meet the statutory threshold, the court would not 
find the superadded requirement ipso facto satisfied’.
111
 Perhaps, therefore, this additional 
legislative hurdle for defendants has no real effect in practice. 
As highlighted in section 3.5, academic concern with the exclusion of defendants from 
special measures developed from the enactment of the 1999 scheme.
112
 It follows from these 
differences that defendant witnesses will be unlikely to give evidence by live link as 
frequently as their non-defendant counterparts. Despite this, specific critique of the restrictive 
defendant live link provision from academics in the legal field has been minimal. The Royal 
College of Psychiatrists has branded the additional conditions which a child defendant must 
meet by comparison to a child non-defendant witness as both ‘anomalous and 
unacceptable’.
113
 Hoyano noted that, when the provision of live link is considered in relation 
to a child’s capacity to give evidence, the ‘differences between child defendants and other 
child witnesses remain unexplained’.
114
 The Law Commission has stated in its report on 
unfitness to plead that ‘[t]here is no justifiable basis for the inequality’ in the provision of live 
link to defendants versus non-defendants.
115
 Generally, however, the defendant live link 
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provision is cited as a progressive step towards improving the support available to vulnerable 
defendants.
116
 This is notwithstanding the remaining gaps in the protection it provides to 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants both by comparison to ‘normal’ defendant 
witnesses and vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses who would be able to 
access the live link.  
Following the insertion of section 33A into the YJCEA the courts have treated the defendant 
live link issue, for the purposes of giving evidence, as legally settled. It is arguable that this 
should not be the case. In R v Ukpabio
117
 the subject of the appeal was the trial judge’s denial 
of live link to the appellant both for the duration of his evidence and in order to participate in 
the trial as a whole. These applications had been denied on the basis that they fell outside of 
the powers contained in section 33A.
118
  
Counsel for the appellant argued that the court should instead rely on its inherent power to 
permit the live link. They contended that:  
[T]he decision of the Divisional Court in the Waltham Forest case [that there is 
no inherent power for live link] is one which we should not follow, bearing in 
mind in particular that the decision was expressly doubted by Baroness Hale in R 




This did not persuade the Court of Appeal to find for the appellant on the issue of the first 
application – live link for giving evidence. Instead, they turned to the effect of the enactment 
of section 33A, stating that:  
[W]e can see no justification for concluding that the special measures provisions 
in the 1999 Act do not provide the complete statutory scheme by which evidence 
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can be given by video link and which, apart from those statutory provisions, 




In other words, they interpreted the insertion of section 33A as eradicating the use of any 
other potential means by which a defendant can secure the live link for giving evidence. With 
regards to the provision of video link for the duration of the trial, however, the Court of 
Appeal ruled that: 
[T]here may be circumstances, exceptionally, where that might [video link] be a 
sensible method of ensuring participation for a defendant who would otherwise 
not be able to participate properly in all or some of the trial process. Accordingly, 
the judge was wrong in the present case to conclude that he had no jurisdiction or 




This conclusion acknowledged the existence of an inherent power to grant the live link for 
purposes other than giving evidence (eg, to hear the evidence of others). The Court of 
Appeal’s decision to uphold section 33A as the exclusive authority on defendant live link for 
the giving of testimony left no room for the use of inherent power for the purposes of 
ensuring a defendant can effectively participate as a witness. However, the YJCEA into 
which section 33A was inserted explicitly preserves the inherent powers of the courts for 
witnesses who are not eligible for special measures under the Act.
122
  
Given that the ambit of section 33A is much narrower than that of the non-defendant live link 
provision, some defendants who still do not qualify for the live link may in future claim that 
they cannot participate effectively as witnesses without it. In these circumstances, a potential 
challenge could now be mounted on the basis that the Court of Appeal’s Ukpabio decision 
(that section 33A contains the only reasons for which the live link can be used to give 
evidence) is in conflict with the provisions of the YJCEA. The Court of Appeal in Ukpabio 
has essentially overruled the Waltham Forest decision that there is no inherent power for live 
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link, by recognising that an inherent power for live link does, in fact, exist (albeit for the 
purpose of participating in the whole trial and not just for evidence). The legal basis now 
exists, therefore, for the courts to use this inherent power to grant live link to vulnerable 
and/or intimidated defendants giving evidence who fall outside of the ambit of section 33A. 
Reliance on this inherent power could thus bridge the gaps in protection left by the existing, 
limited, statutory provision. As the statutory provision stands, however, the law’s 
commitment to the principle of equality remains inconsistent with regards to all vulnerable 
and/or intimidated court users giving evidence.  
4.2.4. Screens 
In the Waltham Forest case, the Administrative Court confirmed that ‘a range of steps … can 
be taken where appropriate and necessary for facilitating a fair trial process’.
123
 One ‘familiar 
example’ given was the power to shield a witness using a screen.
124
 As discussed, section 
19(6) of the YJCEA protects this inherent power: 
Nothing in this [Act] is to be regarded as affecting any power of a court to make 
an order or give leave of any description (in the exercise of its inherent 
jurisdiction or otherwise) … in relation to a witness who is not an eligible 
witness’. 
 
As per Criminal Procedure Rule 3.9(3)(b),
125
 therefore, the judge can permit a defendant the 
use of screens in order to ensure their effective participation in the trial. As discussed in 
section 3.5.1.2, effective participation includes ‘enabling a … defendant to give their best 
evidence,’
126
 and so the use of screens should be granted, when necessary, for this purpose. 
The legal provision in this area thus upholds a consistent commitment to the principle of 
equality, albeit through a different source of law (common law versus statute). 
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4.2.5. Pre-recorded evidence in chief  
The first recorded case in which the prospect of a defendant admitting a pre-recorded 
statement as their evidence in chief was raised was R v SH.
127
 Evidence from a chartered 
psychologist revealed at trial that the defendant had an IQ of 51, could not read or write, and 
‘would have considerable difficulties in following the thread of questions and in 
remembering the answers he had already given in his evidence’.
128
 The defence considered 
that the use of pre-recorded testimony would be ‘less intimidating to him’.
129
 The trial judge 
denied permission for a vulnerable defendant’s evidence in chief to be heard via a pre-
recording.
130
 For reasons which are irrelevant to this issue, the Court of Appeal concluded 




LJ Kay’s obiter statements noted the concerns for ‘how this appellant with his limitations 
[was] going to be able to put his account before the jury so that they can adequately consider 
it’.
132
 This is an issue of effective participation. LJ Kay also highlighted the argument for 
allowing a defendant’s pre-recorded video evidence: ‘that it was wrong that a prosecution 
witness with similar disabilities could put forward their evidence in that way, but that the 
defendant could not’.
133
 He raised two points in relation to equality. The first was ensuring 
the defendant is adequately assisted, with regard to his disadvantaged position in the trial due 
to his disability. The second was the defendant’s disadvantaged position, absent the ability to 
submit pre-recorded evidence, in contrast with non-defendant witnesses with similar 
disabilities.  
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With regard to this special measure, however, LJ Kay stated that there are ‘very substantial 
differences between the situation, so far as a defendant was concerned, and that so far as a 
prosecution witness was concerned’.
134
 For example, he noted that there would be no 
requirement that the defence disclosed the defendant’s pre-recorded interview, meaning that 
multiple attempts could be carried out and then the best version selected to be played at 
trial.
135
 Furthermore, issues were foreseen in relation to who should interview the defendant 
and what their responsibilities were in doing so.
136
 Baroness Hale echoed these concerns 
regarding the practicality of the measure for defendant witnesses in Camberwell Green.
137
 
As discussed in section 3.5.1, the Working Group’s reasons for excluding defendants from 
special measures centre on the fact that the defendant is already privy to a series of other 
protections that non-defendant witnesses are not. The areas which LJ Kay flagged up as 
problematic do not fit this pattern. Instead, they relate to difficulties providing this measure to 
defendants due to the logistics of its implementation arising from their different position in 
the trial. The Court of Appeal stated that ‘before one could conclude that a defendant is in 




If these logistical matters were resolved, then the initial equality based arguments – that the 
defendant may need the assistance to present his evidence, and that unequal access by all 
court users with similar disabilities to the same provision would be prima facie wrong – may 
still stand. The implementation difficulties do not negate a vulnerable and/or intimidated 
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defendant’s potential need for support, or the potential benefits the measure could provide.
139
 
Those difficulties are not, however, suitable for resolution by the judiciary.  
Since R v SH, the Divisional Court in Waltham Forest ruled that no inherent power exists in 
relation to video link facilities.
140
 As discussed, the Court of Appeal in Ukpabio found, 
contrary to this, the existence of an inherent power for live link, though not for the purposes 
of giving evidence.
141
 Whether an inherent power does exist to permit a defendant to give 
pre-recorded evidence is perhaps, therefore, unclear. Even if Ukpabio has provided the basis 
from which to recognise an inherent power for pre-recorded video statements, it is likely that 
any development of this measure would need to come from legislation so that the practical 
issues could be addressed by Parliament. If the legislation cannot resolve the practical issues 
then there is a legitimate reason to treat defendant witnesses unequally.  
4.2.6. Intermediaries 
Intermediaries, as discussed in section 1.2, enable more effective communication between the 
defendant and advocates in the trial. Research conducted by Henderson with judges and 
advocates found that the addition of intermediaries has ‘embedded well … is well respected 
and causes few problems’.
142
 The provision of intermediaries for defendants was first 
approved by the Court of Appeal in R v SH.
143
 At first instance, an intermediary was allowed 
to assist a severely intellectually challenged defendant.
144
 This was approved by LJ Kay who 
could find ‘no reason why such a person in the exercise of the court’s inherent powers should 
not, if the judge finds it necessary and appropriate, be allowed to act in a role equivalent to an 
                                                          
139
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interpreter when the defendant is in the witness box’.
145
 These obiter comments marked a 
progressive step, particularly given that the non-defendant witness provision for 
intermediaries contained in the YJCEA was not yet in force.
146
  
The Court of Appeal’s obiter statements in R v SH was cited with approval by the House of 
Lords in Camberwell Green Youth Court.
147
 However, in C v Sevenoaks Youth Court
148
 the 
application for a 12 year old boy with complex mental health issues and limited intellectual 
ability
149
 to use an intermediary was denied. Two experts at trial had argued that the 
provision of an intermediary would be the only way in which this defendant would be able to 
participate effectively in the proceedings and as a witness if required.
150
 The District Judge 
initially granted this measure. He then revoked permission because there was no statutory 
power for defendant intermediaries under the YJCEA and his clerk (erroneously) advised him 
that the decision in Waltham Forest Youth Court (that there was no inherent power for live 




The High Court quashed this decision, ruling that there is ‘nothing in the Waltham Justice 
case … which prevents the court from appointing an intermediary for a defendant pursuant to 
its common law powers’.
152
 They cited the obiter statements in R v SH, Hale’s endorsement 
of such in Camberwell Green Youth Court, and the ECtHR judgment in SC v UK as support 
for the existence of an inherent power in relation to intermediary provision. The High Court 
also ruled that the inherent power to provide an intermediary went beyond merely providing 
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an intermediary to assist a defendant to give evidence, and also applied for the duration of the 
trial and beforehand if required.
153
  
Plotnikoff and Woolfson claim that the courts extended the intermediary provision to 
defendants ‘[i]n an effort to redress the imbalance between witnesses and defendants’.
154
 As 
noted above, however, the courts developed the intermediary provision for defendants before 
it was routinely available to vulnerable non-defendant witnesses. For Plotnikoff and 
Woolfson to be correct, therefore, would mean the common law provision to defendants was 
a pre-emptive move to redress a future imbalance which would arise when the non-defendant 
provision was implemented. However, none of the judges in the Sevenoaks case, R v SH or 
Camberwell Green Youth Court made reference to this as their rationale, or appeared 
motivated by a desire to achieve equality between all vulnerable court users.  
Instead, the development of the defendant provision seemed to arise out of a concern for the 
ability of vulnerable defendants to participate effectively in their trials. This includes the 
ability to give their best evidence as a witness. As previously argued, ensuring effective 
participation captures the essence of equality since it helps to ensure that disadvantaged 
defendants are able to participate in proceedings as non-vulnerable defendants can, through 
the provision of additional support. It does also mean that the treatment of vulnerable 
defendants giving evidence is in line with that of vulnerable non-defendant witnesses now 
that their intermediary provision has been implemented. 
The next stage of the development of the defendant intermediary provision came in the form 
of legislation. The Coroners and Justice Bill 2009 contained a defendant intermediary 
provision. Debate on this in the House of Lords centred on the ability of an intermediary, 
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along with the live link (as already enacted), to enhance a defendant’s effective participation 
in light of the ECtHR decision in SC v UK.
155
 The intermediary provision was similarly 
introduced in the Commons as a measure which would enable defendants with a disability to 
participate effectively in the proceedings.
156
 In addition, David Howarth (Shadow Secretary 
of State for Justice) highlighted the ‘logic behind the clause … [was] that the provision 
already exists to help witnesses in such circumstances, and since defendants are also often 
witnesses they should be offered the same facility’.
157
 Bridget Prentice (Under-Secretary of 
State for Justice) further emphasised this:  
…the intermediary is there to assist with communication when a person is being 
questioned as a witness. The clause is modelled on the vulnerable witnesses [sic] 
intermediary provision in section 29 of the 1999 Act, which was rolled out 




In addition to matters relating to the defendant’s ability to effectively participate, therefore, 
there was support for equality between vulnerable court users following the implementation 
of the non-defendant provision. This was the first time that this particular strand of the 
equality argument had gained such support with regards to the provision of special measures 
to defendants. It increased internal coherence in the law’s approach to the treatment of 
vulnerable court users required to give evidence. However, David Howarth noted that ‘there 
are questions to be asked about why the criteria for defendants seem to be much stricter than 
those for prosecution witnesses’.
159
 This was met with no response or justification in the 
Commons, and the originally proposed measure was enacted.  
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 inserted section 33BA and section 33BB into the 
YJCEA.
160
 This permits vulnerable defendants to give evidence with the assistance of an 
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intermediary if it is ‘required to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial’.
161
 As with the 
defendant live link provision, the eligibility criteria differ between adult and child defendants: 
s 33BA(5) Where the accused is aged under 18 when the application is made the 
condition is that the accused’s ability to participate effectively in the proceedings 
as a witness giving oral evidence in court is compromised by the accused’s level 
of intellectual ability or social functioning 
 
s 33BA(6) Where the accused has attained the age of 18 when the application is 
made the conditions are that –  
(a) the accused suffers from a mental disorder (within the meaning of the 
Mental Health Act 1983) or otherwise has a significant impairment of 
intelligence and social function, and 
(b) the accused is for that reason unable to participate effectively in the 
proceedings as a witness giving oral evidence in court. 
 
This new provision has been criticised because it is more restrictive than the common law 
position which enables an intermediary to be used before, and for the duration of, the trial.
162
 
Nevertheless, the courts maintain their inherent power to provide an intermediary in these 
latter circumstances. The statutory provision does generally mirror the non-defendant 
intermediary provision as Prentice claimed in the House of Commons.
163
 The non-defendant 
provision is also only available to ‘vulnerable’ court users rather than ‘intimidated’ court 
users. While it is true that all non-defendant child witnesses automatically qualify for the use 
of special measures, and child defendants do not, a child witness’ prima facie eligibility for 
special measures does not equate to an automatic entitlement to an intermediary. The 
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suitability of an intermediary for a child witness must still be established,
164
 with emphasis on 
the ability of the witness to communicate their evidence effectively and understand the 
questions put to them under examination. This is the same for child defendants.  
Where adult defendants are concerned, Cooper states that the wording does not go as far as 
that for adult witnesses in section 16(1)(b), which makes references to the quality of a 
witness’ evidence.
165
 However this may be immaterial, since references to a defendant’s 
ability to participate effectively (as in the above provision) should be interpreted to include 
the ability to give their best evidence, as per the Criminal Procedure Rules.
166
 This brings the 
provision more in line with the existing non-defendant provision. The defendant provision 
may still be more restrictive than the non-defendant provision, however, since adult 
defendants with ‘reduced cognitive functioning … or an adult who takes prescribed 
medication for pain relief, may also have impaired cognitive functioning but may not be so 
easily categorised for the purposes of making an application to the court for special 
measures’.
167
 Furthermore, the statutory intermediary provision for all defendants must be 
deemed necessary to ensure a fair trial.
168
 
The legislative provision is yet to be implemented, despite Lord Carlile’s
169
 and the Law 
Commission’s
170
 recommendations to address this. This has resulted in two separate 
intermediary schemes operating in practice, something Hoyano refers to as the ‘new mutation 
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of inequality of arms’.
171
 The Ministry of Justice ‘Witness Intermediary Scheme’ matches 
and funds registered intermediaries to non-defendant witnesses who qualify for support under 
the 1999 Act.
172
 Non-registered intermediaries are available to defendants under the common 
law. This is an important distinction which affects the funding regimes, the availability and 
arguably the quality of intermediaries for the defendant,
173
 as is explored in more depth in 
section 7.3.3. 
The provision of intermediaries to vulnerable defendants, therefore, remains governed by the 
common law. This has continued to develop somewhat inconsistently. In R (on the 
application of AS) v Great Yarmouth Youth Court
174
 the young defendant had ADHD and 
difficulties understanding complex vocabulary. The intermediary’s proposed purpose was to 
draw the court’s attention to the difficulties which may arise as a result of the defendant’s 
issues.
175
 This District Judge’s denial of the provision, on the basis that many other youths 
appearing before the court also suffer such difficulties,
176
 was the subject of judicial review. 
The High Court quashed the decision, affirming that: 
[T]here is a right, which may in certain circumstances amount to a duty, to 
appoint a registered intermediary to assist the defendant to follow the proceedings 




Furthermore, that an intermediary should be provided even as just a precaution, since its 
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The High Court in the Great Yarmouth case had further advanced the common law approach 
without reference to the new, but dormant, legislative provisions. This was the high water 
mark decision for the provision of intermediaries to vulnerable defendants for the entirety of 
the trial, including giving evidence. The Court of Appeal in R v Cox
179
 subsequently 
downplayed the significance of an intermediary for ensuring a fair trial. Cox, a vulnerable 
defendant with complex psychiatric difficulties, a learning disability and a personality 
disorder, had been granted an intermediary at trial. Despite the defence’s best efforts, 
however, an appropriate intermediary could not be found to assist the defendant.
180
 The trial 
judge allowed the trial to continue without an intermediary, and personally ‘play[ed] “part of 
the role which an intermediary, if available, would otherwise have played.”’
181
  
The basis of the appeal was that the deprivation of an intermediary meant that the appellant 
had been unable to play a proper and effective part in the trial.
182
 The absence of an 
intermediary was, according to counsel for the appellant, a contributing factor to Cox’s 
decision not to give evidence in his defence.
183
 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 
They considered that ‘[i]t would, in fact, be a most unusual case for a defendant who is fit to 
plead to be found to be so disadvantaged by his condition that a properly brought prosecution 
would have to be stayed’.
184
 While intermediaries may ‘improve’ the process, their role is not 
one on which the fairness of the proceedings rests.
185
 In other words, the Court of Appeal felt 
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On the issue of the defendant’s failure to give evidence, the trial judge had ‘carefully 
reminded the jury of … the appellant’s difficulties’ when directing them on the adverse 
inferences that could be drawn from his silence.
187
 Seemingly this was sufficient for the 
Court of Appeal. As discussed in section 3.5.1.2, a trial judge can direct the jury that adverse 
inferences cannot properly be drawn from the defendant’s silence, since to have heard from 
the defendant directly would have been undesirable due to his ‘mental condition’.
188
 This 
option was at the judge’s disposal in Cox’s trial, but not invoked. The Court of Appeal did 
not recommend it as an additional step that could be taken to ensure fairness at trial in the 
absence of an intermediary. This lends further support to the conclusion reached on this issue 
in section 3.5.1.2 – that this legislative safeguard may be seldom used. 
The decision reached in Cox dilutes the protection guaranteed to vulnerable defendant 
witnesses. The Court of Appeal advanced the view that an intermediary is merely a desirable 
and not a necessary measure. This runs contrary to the High Court’s view in the Great 
Yarmouth Youth Court case, where they regarded the provision of an intermediary as highly 
important for ensuring a fair trial. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has endorsed the view 
that an intermediary’s contribution can be sufficiently fulfilled by a judge. This contradicts 
the High Court’s view in C v Sevenoaks Youth Court that ‘it is in the highest degree unlikely 
that [the] level of help [given by an intermediary] can be given by a lawyer’.
189
 The reality is 
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likely to be the same where judges are concerned, no matter how well-intentioned they may 
be. Thus, Cooper and Wurtzel warn against the dangers of ‘extract[ing] a binding precedent’ 
from the facts in Cox, as although it may have been sufficient to allow the judge to assist the 
defendant on this occasion, on others it may not be.
190
 
In Cox, the Court of Appeal showed no interest in the argument that the ability to participate 
effectively should include the ability to give best evidence as a witness. Intermediary 
provision for non-defendant witnesses, however, is premised on exactly that. It is likely, 
therefore, that a gap remains in practice between the quality of evidence elicited from 
vulnerable defendants and other vulnerable court users as a result of the narrow interpretation 
of the defendant intermediary power.  
The provision of intermediaries to defendants was also the issue in R (on the application of 
OP) v Secretary of State for Justice.
191
 The appellant had been granted a non-registered 
intermediary for the duration of the trial, but not a registered intermediary. It was specifically 
the Secretary of State’s denial of a registered intermediary to the defendant that formed the 
basis of judicial review, as it was submitted that this risked the defendant receiving a sub-
standard service.
192
 The reasons for this relate to differences in training and supervision 
between registered and non-registered intermediaries, as discussed further in section 7.3.3.
193
 
The High Court directed the Secretary of State to reconsider his decision to deny the accused 
a registered intermediary for the purpose of giving evidence,
194
 when ‘it is unarguable that an 
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individual in jeopardy should be put in the best position to do himself justice’.
195
 Rafferty LJ 
continued: 
We are not reassured that an arguable inequality of arms has not been revealed by 
a review of the legal framework and supporting information in this case. In any 
event, there is either a risk of unfairness or at its lowest a perceived risk of 
unfairness. At the point, should he elect to do so, at which he goes into the 
witness box, the system in place should offer the Claimant the best opportunity to 
do himself justice.  
 
A moment’s reflection shows why. Leaving aside the jeopardy in which he is and 
which crystallises at that point, the scheme as currently operated would allow a 
witness for the Crown to be supported by a [registered intermediary] matched by 
the WIS [Witness Intermediary Service] but the defendant against whom he gave 
evidence denied one under the same scheme. The intelligent observer would be 




This position is undoubtedly underpinned by the principle of equality and a concern for the 
law’s consistency in its approach to assisting vulnerable court users giving evidence. The 
provision of a non-registered intermediary was considered insufficient. Registered 
intermediaries are, at least perceived, to provide superior support to non-registered 
intermediaries,
197
 and should thus be available to vulnerable defendants who qualify for 
intermediary use.  
The provision of a registered intermediary to a vulnerable defendant is thus important, as per 
Rafferty LJ’s judgment, for two reasons. First, to ensure that a defendant can ‘do himself 
justice’ when giving evidence, through the provision of the best available support. Second, 
because vulnerable non-defendant witnesses already have access to the best support available, 
and there is no reason for differentiating between them and vulnerable defendants. The 
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defendant’s right to legal representation, their non-compellability and other adjustments 
available to the court did not affect her view that vulnerable defendants should be treated the 
same as vulnerable witnesses. In short Rafferty LJ had concluded that all vulnerable court 
users should have equal access to intermediaries of the same calibre, via the same scheme.  
Rafferty LJ’s judgment indicates the existence of disagreement within the appellate courts as 
to the necessity of an intermediary for vulnerable defendants. Rafferty placed central 
importance on the ability of defendants to ‘do themselves justice’ when giving evidence with 
the assistance of an intermediary. It is implicit in her argument that an intermediary of some 
description is required. This runs contrary to the binding authority from the Court of Appeal 
in Cox; that an intermediary is desirable rather than necessary.
198
  
The law on defendant intermediaries is left in a complex state. As discussed, in Cox the Court 
of Appeal downplayed the importance of an intermediary for defendants. This was followed 
by the High Court in R(OP) ruling that it should be registered intermediaries which are 
provided to eligible defendants, with the emphasis placed on the importance of comparable 
support between vulnerable court users. The current law, therefore, is that even if an 
intermediary is granted in principle it is not essential for a fair trial that one is actually 
employed, as the judge can play the role an intermediary would otherwise have played. If an 
intermediary is (successfully) sought, however, then the interests of fairness require that it 
should be a registered intermediary, as non-registered intermediaries are not as good. These 
two points of law, while not directly in conflict, are difficult to reconcile. 
The Lord Chief Justice has provided guidance on the issue of defendant intermediaries in the 
Criminal Practice Directions. This has recently been the subject of some amendments. The 
October 2015 guidance regarding the provision of intermediaries to defendants was that: 
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3F.3 A court may use its inherent powers to appoint an intermediary to assist the 
defendant’s communication at trial (either solely when giving evidence or 




The equivalent direction in the April 2016 version, which has remained unchanged in the 
October 2016 update, now seeks to regulate when this inherent power can be used: 
3F.13 The court may exercise its inherent powers to direct appointment of an 
intermediary to assist a defendant giving evidence or for the entire trial … 





The new guidance in the Criminal Practice Directions indicates that, although the power to 
grant an intermediary for the purposes of giving evidence exists, it is a power which will be 
seldom used.
201
 This reasserts the Court of Appeal’s authority in Cox but marks a change in 
tone
202
 and an emphasis on the rarity of circumstances in which an intermediary will be 
deemed a necessary adaption. Hoyano and Rafferty assert that this Criminal Practice 
Direction is: 
[C]learly inconsistent with the Criminal Procedure Rules requiring the court to 
take every reasonable step to facilitate the participation of defendants in the 
proceedings … clearly dissonant with the Equal Treatment Bench Book, the 





Nevertheless, the Lord Chief Justice reasserted the position taken in the 2016 Criminal 
Practice Direction when handing down judgment in R v Rashid.
204
 The relevant ground of 
appeal was in relation to the trial judge’s refusal to allow the applicant an intermediary for the 
duration of the trial, and instead merely granting one for the duration of evidence. Leave to 
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appeal was refused, and the Lord Chief Justice emphasised with regard to intermediary use 
for evidence that: 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, competent legal representation and good 
trial management will [assist the defendant to give his best quality evidence]. 
There may be rare cases where what is provided by competent legal 
representation and good trial management is insufficient because of the 





This reiterates two points from previous cases. First, the rarity with which intermediaries can 
be invoked for vulnerable defendants giving evidence in their defence. Second, the 
significance placed on criminal practitioners’ seeming abilities to ensure that a vulnerable 
defendant can adequately participate in their trial and give their best evidence. 
The Lord Chief Justice’s 2016 amendment to the Criminal Practice Directions also indicates 
that, despite the authority in R(OP), current practice with regards to sourcing defendant 
intermediaries remains the same:
206
 
3F.15 The WIS [Witness Intermediary Service] is not presently available to 
identify intermediaries for defendants (although in OP v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2014] EWHC 1944 (Admin), the Ministry of Justice was ordered to 
consider carefully whether it were justifiable to refuse equal provision to 
witnesses and defendants with respect to their evidence). 'Non‐registered 
intermediaries' (intermediaries appointed other than through the WIS) must 
therefore be appointed for defendants. Although training is available, there is no 





Two types of intermediary are thus still operational in the criminal justice system despite 
Rafferty LJ’s decision in OP: registered intermediaries for non-defendant witnesses and non-
registered intermediaries for defendant witnesses. Presumably this will not change unless the 
                                                          
205
 ibid [73] (Lord Thomas). 
206
 A point which, again, has independently been raised by Hoyano and Rafferty in Laura Hoyano and Angela 
Rafferty, ‘Rationing Defence Intermediaries under the April 2016 Criminal Practice Direction’ [2017] Criminal 
Law Review 93, 101. 
207
 Criminal Practice Directions (October 2015 edition, amended April 2016 and October 2016) CPD I General 
Matters, 3F: INTERMEDIARIES 3F.15 
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still dormant defendant intermediary provision is implemented by the government so that the 
Witness Intermediary Scheme can also serve defendants.
208
  
All of this leaves vulnerable defendant witnesses in an unsatisfactory position when giving 
evidence. The infrequent provision of intermediaries to vulnerable defendant witnesses puts 
them at a disadvantage by comparison to non-vulnerable defendant witnesses. Several judges 
and advocates have expressed strong concerns about this.
209
 Furthermore, even those 
defendants who successfully secure the use of a (non-registered) intermediary are at risk of 
receiving a service which is inferior to that received by registered intermediary.
210
 As a result, 
the quality of the support received by vulnerable court users is potentially unequal, even 
when an intermediary is provided. The law’s commitment to the principle of equality via the 
intermediary provision is thus inconsistent between vulnerable court users.  
4.2.7. Pre-trial cross-examination  
The possibility of pre-trial cross-examination of vulnerable defendants has not arisen in the 
courts or Parliament. This is unsurprising given that the measure was only piloted for child 
non-defendant witnesses in 2015
211
 and its national implementation is expected to begin in 
late 2017.
212
 Nevertheless, the decision in Waltham Forest, that no inherent power exists for 
‘the use of video facilities,’
213
 is likely to extend to pre-trial cross-examination.
214
 Similarly 
to pre-recorded statements for evidence in chief, it is likely that only Parliament can affect 
change in this area to respond to potential implementation issues. 
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4.3. Summary of current law  
The most prominent motivation in both the courts and in Parliament for the expansion of 
special measures provisions to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants has centred on the 
defendant’s ability to effectively participate as a witness. As argued in section 3.6, the 
disadvantaged position in which vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants find themselves by 
comparison to ‘normal’ defendants requires redress. The provision of special measures to the 
former cohort of defendants seeks to put them on a more equal footing with non-vulnerable 
and/or non-intimidated defendants for the purpose of giving evidence. A concern for effective 
participation, therefore, can be conceived of as a concern for equality among all defendant 
witnesses.  
Throughout the development of the law, support was also evident for the equal treatment of 
all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users, whether defendant or non-defendant. This line 
of argument was ultimately less persuasive to the judiciary, but was still deemed worthy of a 
hearing in court and Parliament. Ultimately, the extension of some special measures 
provisions to some vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses improves the internal 
consistency of the law of special measures. Overall, however, the law’s commitment to the 
principle of equality remains patchy and thus incoherent.  
It is evident that the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
witnesses is governed through a motley collection of active and inactive statutory provisions 
and the courts’ inherent power, as acknowledged in the common law, Criminal Procedure 
Rules and Criminal Practice Directions. Statutory provisions exist for vulnerable defendants 
to give evidence by live link
215
 or with the assistance of an intermediary.
216
 The defendant 
intermediary provision has not yet been implemented. The courts have, however, granted 
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 See YJCEA, s 33A, as inserted by Police and Justice Act 2006, s 47. 
216
 See YJCEA s 33BA, as inserted by Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 104. 
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intermediary use to vulnerable defendants using their inherent power.
217
 Following the Court 
of Appeal’s acknowledgement of an inherent power to grant live link in Ukpabio, a future 
appeal may see the limited live link provision under section 33A expanded. The courts’ 
inherent power also permits the removal of wigs and gowns,
218
 the ability to close the court to 
the public for the duration of a child defendant’s evidence,
219
 the provision of communication 
aids,
220
 and the provision of a screen
221
 from behind which the defendant can give their 
evidence.  
It is unclear whether an inherent power exists to allow the defence to admit a pre-recorded 
statement as the defendant’s evidence in chief.
222
 The possibility of pre-trial cross-
examination of vulnerable defendants has not arisen in the courts or Parliament. It is likely 
that new legislation will be required for either of these measures to be provided to vulnerable 
and/or intimidated defendants. 
Prevailing inequalities between defendant and non-defendant special measures have been 
pinpointed at the relevant junctures in this chapter. One such inequality is the lack of 
provision of the live link to ‘intimidated’ defendant witnesses under the YJCEA. Further 
exploration of this ‘intimidated witness’ category
223
 reveals that the criteria contained within 
it could be extended to include defendants.
224
 A defendant may be ‘in fear or distress in 
connection with testifying in the proceedings’ due to the nature and circumstances of the 
offence with which they are tried. This was clearly the case in the trial of T and V for the 
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murder of two year old James Bulger.
225
 The public outrage at the defendants’ acts, which 
was expressed both outside and within the courtroom, was recognised by the ECtHR as a 
source of fear and distress for the 11 year old defendants.
226
 In addition, just as the age, 
social, cultural, ethnic, religious, political or employment circumstances of a non-defendant 
witness could result in their fear or distress,
227
 so too could these factors have this same effect 
on a defendant witness. Finally, a defendant might be intimidated in court by, inter alia, the 
behaviour of a co-defendant
228
 or their supporters; the presence of rival gang members; or, 
for instance, the aggrieved father of a complainant in the public gallery. 
That these criteria are only applicable to non-defendant witnesses under the Act fails to 
recognise that defendants can find testifying in the proceedings difficult for the same 
reasons.
229
 Furthermore, the victim-centric drafting of the provision means that situational 
vulnerabilities to which only a defendant may be exposed are overlooked. For example, the 
gravity of the charges with which the defendant is faced, and the potentially pivotal 
importance of their evidence with respect to these, may add to their distress and affect their 
ability to participate effectively as a witness. As one of my respondents told me: 
I think it is difficult because when you represent young people, and quite a lot of the kids 
you represent these days are [accused of] child sexual offences, they [the child 
defendants] are absolutely shitting themselves. You can tell that they are on the verge of 
losing control of their dignity they are so frightened. [R3] 
These sources of a defendant’s distress are not recognised within the YJCEA in the way that 
they are for non-defendants. The interests of equality require that the different circumstances 
in which defendants may be vulnerable when giving evidence should be recognised and 
catered for under the Act. The current failure of the law to do this means that the protective 
measures contained in the YJCEA are not sufficiently available to intimidated defendant 
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witnesses. This leaves them disadvantaged by comparison to both non-intimidated defendants 
and to non-defendant witnesses who have the benefit of a special measure; running contrary 
to the principle of equality and marking yet further incoherence in the law. 
The law of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses thus lacks 
a consistent commitment to the principle of equality that the law for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated non-defendant witnesses embodies. It is curious, therefore, that McEwan 
considers the statutory provision of live link and intermediaries (despite the latter provision 
remaining dormant) to have addressed ‘concerns that child defendants could be at a 




Table 4.1 provides a snap shot of the prevailing inequality, as well as highlighting the various 
sources of law which govern the availability of special measures. The cells shaded in light 
grey denote the special measures which are not available for any intimidated court user. The 
cells in dark grey are those which are only unavailable for vulnerable and/or intimidated 
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 Jenny McEwan, ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ (2011) 31(4) Legal 
Studies 519, 535. 
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Table 4.1: Legal provision of special measures  
 Non-defendants Defendants 
Vulnerable Intimidated Vulnerable Intimidated 












Statute No power Inherent power 
(CPR) 
No power 

















Statute Statute No power No power 
Pre-trial cross-
examination 
Statute Statute No power No power 
*Excluding physical disability, and child defendants are not automatically eligible.  
CPD = Criminal Practice Directions; CPR = Criminal Procedure Rules 
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Leaving the inequality (temporarily) aside, one might argue that the source of the law is 
unimportant so long as the ability to secure special measures for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses exists. However, from a black letter perspective, the current 
legal position with regards to defendant special measures is somewhat uncertain. For 
instance: can an inherent power for live link now bolster the protection offered by section 
33A;
231
 what effect will the implementation of section 33BA (defendant intermediary 
provision) have, and when, if ever, will this occur; should the Criminal Practice Direction on 
the provision of non-registered intermediaries to defendants be followed, or should the High 
Court’s judgment in R(OP) have eradicated non-registered intermediaries?
232
  
From a socio-legal perspective, the scattered provisions and issues relating to their legal 
effect create problems for the legal profession in ascertaining what the law is – what is 
available to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses? Furthermore, the lack of 
statutory authority for intermediaries is at the root of the dual-intermediary system currently 
in operation, since the Witness Intermediary Service serves only those eligible for an 
intermediary under statutory power. The effect that these matters have on the operation of the 
law is an empirical question which is explored in the next chapters through an examination of 
the insights into the operation of special measures law in practice gained through interviews 
with members of the legal profession on their experiences.  
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In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the law relating to special measures has developed 
for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses. I have shown that the primary 
motivation was (and still is) the desire to ensure that these defendants can effectively 
participate as witnesses in their trials. This is in keeping with the principle of equality evident 
in development of the law for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. A 
secondary motivation which underpinned the law’s development for such defendants was the 
unequal position in which they were left absent the provision of special measures, when 
compared to their non-defendant counterparts. Again, this is in keeping with the principle of 
equality.  
Despite these developments, however, the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses still falls short of that provided to such non-defendant 
witnesses. Leaving aside the potential implementation issues associated with pre-recorded 
evidence for defendants, there is no justified basis for the differential provision of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. This means that the law remains 
internally incoherent with regards to its treatment of such court users giving evidence in 
Crown Court trials. 
I have also illustrated in this chapter how the development of the law for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses has been largely court driven. Though there has been some 
legislative intervention, it has been minimal and reactive to the common law developments. 
This is in stark contrast to the way in which the law developed for such non-defendant 
witnesses. I have shown, as per Hawkins’ framework, how the decisions and views of 
criminal practitioners have influenced the developments within the legal field with regards to 
defendant witnesses, and ultimately how this has led to developments from within the 
surround. This is discussed further in the section 5.5.2.  
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While the courts are slowly bridging the gap in protection between vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants and similarly disadvantaged non-defendants that special measures 
provide, the pace of change is determined largely by defence lawyers’ willingness and ability 
to challenge the law through appeals and judicial review. This renders it important to 
consider defence lawyers’ knowledge about, and attitudes towards, vulnerability and 
intimidation, special measures, and their use in Crown Court trials. In addition, the working 
conditions in which the legal profession operates become an important part of the story of 
defendant special measures. There may be, for example, opportunities for law reform that 
defence lawyers are overlooking, whether inadvertently or deliberately, and appeals that 
some judges reject on the basis of other priorities.  
Looking to the operation of the law also enables an assessment of the effect that the nature of 
the existing reforms (piecemeal and incomplete) has on the law’s accessibility and its 
implementation by the legal profession. This provides a further reason to examine how 
lawyers think and act in relation to special measures for defendants. The following chapter 
accordingly presents a snapshot of my empirical data, which offers an insight into how 
special measures law operates in Crown Court trials. This provides the basis from which to 
consider the level and coherence of the commitment to the principle of equality in the 
provision of special measures in practice. 
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CHAPTER 5: AWARENESS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown the development of the law of special measures and 
demonstrated the absence of a consistent commitment to the principle of equality within this. 
This chapter marks a shift away from considering the law in books to explore the use of 
special measures by vulnerable and/or intimidated court users in practice and the commitment 
to the principle of equality within this provision. This begins with an overview of the findings 
from the interviews conducted for this research and an outline of how this data should be 
regarded going forward.  
The main body of this chapter embarks on a more in depth exploration of the findings from 
my interviews. I explore the extent to which the respondents were aware of the legal 
provisions for special measures available to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. This is 
followed by an analysis of some potential reasons for the different levels of awareness of 
special measures provisions that my respondents conveyed with regards to non-defendants 
versus defendants. In the final section of this chapter I evaluate insights into the legal 
profession’s ability to accurately identify vulnerability, and whether this differs depending on 
the type of witness with which they are faced.  
Throughout this analysis I consider the legal profession’s commitment to the principle of 
equality in their approach to the vulnerable and/or intimidated. This enables me to consider 
whether the treatment of vulnerable and/or intimidated court users giving evidence in Crown 
Court trials, through the provision of special measures, is approached with any consistency.  
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5.2. Snapshot of findings 
In my interviews I sought to obtain an insight into the operation of special measures law in 
practice according to my respondents’ experiences in Crown Court trials. The nature of the 
sample and the methods adopted in the interviews were outlined in Chapter 2. Table 5.1 
illustrates respondents’ experiences of the use of live link, intermediaries, screens and pre-
recorded evidence in chief in Crown Court trials. Due to time constraints these were the four 
measures focused on in interview, as I perceived them to be the more ‘intrusive’ special 
measures. In other words, they are the measures which most drastically alter the ‘traditional’ 
mode of giving evidence (live, in court). The interviews concentrated in particular on live 
link and intermediaries. This was because these measures are the two which have been the 
subject of most debate and development regarding defendants, as illustrated in Chapter 4. I 
thus asked all 18 respondents directly about their experiences in relation to defendants using 
the live link and intermediaries.
1
  
The data relating to the use of pre-recorded evidence and screens for defendants should be 
treated more cautiously. Due to the semi-structured and fluid nature
2
 of the interviews I 
allowed the respondents, to an extent, to lead the discussion on special measures so that I 
could try to understand the various issues that are at play in practice. This meant that there 
was some inconsistency between the interviews with regards to whether screens and pre-
recorded evidence in chief were discussed in depth for all witnesses. As a result of this 
inconsistency, the data in relation to these two measures in so far as it applies to defendants 
should be treated as only reflecting the views and experiences of a sub-set of those 
interviewed. One should, therefore, be cognisant of the possibility that the figures for 
defendant witnesses may underestimate the use of screens and pre-recorded evidence. 
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 See Appendix 1 for interview guide. 
2
 See section 2.4.2 (p30-35). 
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The removal of wigs and gowns and the use of evidence in private and communication aids 
were raised less frequently in interview and so I do not have the breadth of data required to 
incorporate it in the forthcoming analysis.
3
 I have also omitted pre-recorded cross-




The references in table 5.1 to ‘direct use’ are to trials in which the respondent participated 
where a vulnerable and/or intimidated court user used special measures. ‘Awareness of use 
by others’ refers to the respondent having heard about other trials in which a vulnerable 
and/or intimidated court user has used special measures, in which they had no direct 
involvement.  
                                                          
3
 My overall impression from the interviews was that these measures (removal of wigs and gowns, 
communication aids and giving evidence in private) were used by non-defendant witnesses. With regards to 
defendants, the removal of wigs and gowns was referred to as ‘uncontentious’ [B1]; the measure invoked for 
defendants ‘most often’ [R2]; and something experienced ‘loads of times’ [J3]. J4 asserted that there is ‘no 
disparity’ in relation to the removal of wigs and gowns and aids to communication for defendant and non-
defendant witnesses. However, only one respondent disclosed having experienced a defendant giving evidence 
in private [J5], and B2 and J4 highlighted their concerns for the compatibility of this measure for defendants 
with the principle of open justice. 
4
 For non-defendant witnesses (though see section 3.2.(p44 note 7) for a discussion of the future plans 
surrounding this measure for vulnerable non-defendant witnesses). There are no plans for this to be enacted for 
defendant witnesses. 
Table 5.1: Findings from interviews – respondents’ use of special measures (n = 18) 
 Defendant witnesses Non-defendant 
witnesses 
 Direct use Awareness 
of use by 
others 
Direct use Awareness 
of use by 
others 
Live link 2 2 18 18 
Intermediary 8 2 18 18 
Pre-recorded evidence in chief 0 0 18 18 




The difference in the respondents’ experiences of trials in which vulnerable and/or 
intimidated non-defendant witnesses had used special measures as compared to defendants is 
clear. Special measures were used much less frequently for defendant witnesses: 
They’re [special measures for defendants] very rare I think, aren’t they? [J3] 
No defendant I’ve ever seen has ever used special measures. I haven’t even heard of that 
many, if I’m honest. [PS1] 
It [live link for defendants] doesn’t happen. I’ve never had a case where it has happened 
and I’ve never thought it was necessary to happen... [J1] 
 
As illustrated in table 5.1, two respondents had been involved in trials where there was 
successful implementation of the live link for a defendant witness (B1 and B4). In addition, 
one respondent (R3) had heard about B1’s trial involving live link and another (DS1) had 
heard anecdotally of another case in which a defendant had used the live link provision. 
These responses represent discrete incidents in which the respondents had experienced the 
live link used by a defendant to give evidence.  
The most frequently used special measure for defendants was the intermediary. Eight of the 
respondents (R1, B1, B3, R3, J1, J2, J3 and J4) had been involved in a maximum of two trials 
where a vulnerable defendant gave evidence with the assistance of an intermediary. A further 
two respondents (R2 and B2) knew of a case in which this had happened, but had no direct 
involvement. 
None of the respondents disclosed knowledge of any use in trials they had participated in, or 
in trials involving others, of vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants using a pre-recorded 
statement as their evidence in chief. Only two of the respondents (B4 and DS1) reported 
participating in a trial in which a defendant used screens to give evidence in their trial. No 
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other respondent reported having heard even anecdotally of the use of this special measure by 
defendant witnesses. 
The low uptake of special measures by defendant witnesses does not seem, on the evidence, 
to be the result of denied applications. This is because only one respondent (DS3) reported 
having applied for, but failing, to secure live link and screens for a vulnerable client. Instead, 
it seems that applications for defendants are less frequently made: 
My experience is that applications for special measures for the defendant are rarely 
made. [J1] 
The application [for defendant special measures] is never made. [J4] 
 
This supports existing research on the success of special measures applications for non-
defendant witnesses. Roberts et al found that when special measures were applied for, the 
overall success rate was 98%.
5
 Furthermore, Charles found that of applications considered by 
the court, 83% were granted.
6
  
In contrast to defendant witnesses, each of the respondents had, on multiple occasions, been 
involved in trials where special measures were used by non-defendant witnesses in Crown 
Court trials, and knew of other such trials in which this had occurred. The unequal provision 
in law of special measures between defendant and non-defendant witnesses was cited by 
some respondents as the reason for the lower uptake of them by defendants. Given the 
prevalence of vulnerability among defendants,
7
 however, one might have expected that the 
respondents would have had more experience of defendants using special measures. The 
substantial disparity experienced by the respondents seems to require an explanation which 
                                                          
5
 Paul Roberts, Debbie Cooper and Sheelagh Judge, ‘Monitoring Success, Accounting for Failure: The Outcome 
of Prosecutors’ Applications for Special Measures Directions under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999’ (2005) 9 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 269, 276. Roberts et al theorised that this high 
success rate was because the CPS was too conservative in the applications it pursued to court and made only 
‘sure-fire’ applications. 
6
 Corinne Charles, Special Measures for Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses: Research Exploring the 
Decisions and Actions taken by Prosecutors in a Sample of CPS Case Files (Crown Prosecution Service 
Research Team, April 2012) 42. 
7
 See section 3.5.1.3. (p83-86). 
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extends beyond the narrower legal provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants.  
This is further supported by a distinction that emerged within the interviews between the use 
of special measures by prosecution and defence non-defendant witnesses. For prosecution 
witnesses, the use of special measures seems somewhat routine:  
I think they are now regarded, certainly by judges and advocates, as an anodyne 
commonplace now. [R4] 
There’s become rather a bureaucratic and unthinking attitude towards special measures. 
Box-ticking. ‘You’re a witness; you know you can have special measures; which one do 
you want?’ without really thinking about whether they need them. [J2]  
They are routinely applied for. [DS1] 
…they are considered to be usual measures rather than special measures these days. 
[PS1] 
…special measures are thrown around too often. [PS2]  
There is a tick box [for special measures] on the [Plea and Case Management] form; but I 
think routinely the CPS tick yes and defence tick no, and it’s almost become nothing 
more than a routine now. [DS1] 
 
As evidenced from the last quote from DS1, for non-defendant defence witnesses the 
respondents had not experienced a comparably high use of special measures:  
[I] can’t recall a case where special measures have been applied for for defence 
witnesses. I can envisage circumstances where it would be perfectly proper, but I’ve not 
known it arise … Far more common for prosecution. [R1] 
I’ve never seen a special measures application for a defence witness. [R2] 
I don’t think I’ve ever needed to make an application for a defence witness’ special 
measures. [B2] 
…I do find it a bit odd that [special measures] haven’t been incorporated in the way they 
might for defence witnesses. [R3] 
…I’ve seen far fewer [special measures applications] from the defence. [R4] 
It’s very rare [a special measures application for a defence witness]. [J2] 




I think the defence are less prone to apply. [DS3]
8
 
Do you know, I don’t think I have [seen a defence witness special measures application]. 
I can’t think of any … Unless you include aids to communication, in which case, yes, 
interpreters and the like. But nothing beyond that. [J5] 
 
This breadth of quotes indicates that, despite the legal parity in the provision of special 
measures to all non-defendant witnesses, there is not parity in practice. This is supported by 
data present in The Advocate’s Gateway toolkit on intermediaries. It notes that on average, 
there are 530 requests for an intermediary per month, mostly for prosecution witnesses with 
only a handful of these per year for defence witnesses.
9
 This disparate practice was 
evocatively referred to by one respondent: 
…you have a 15 year old witness for the prosecution – it sounds awful to say – but 
they’re sat on their velvet cushion, given Turkish delight and wrapped up in a big old 
cloak. And if they’re on the defence side … they’re just … they’re not forgotten but 
they’re certainly overlooked to a degree. [R3] 
 
It seems, therefore, that there is procedural inequality between non-defendant defence and 
prosecution witnesses in practice. This is because one group is treated differently (not 
provided special measures) to the other (who is), presumably absent a sufficient justification. 
As a result, the law’s commitment to the equality principle for non-defendant witnesses in 
law does not seem consistent in its operation. This is a further indication that an explanation 
for the differential uptake in special measures is needed which extends beyond their legal 
provision. An attempt to develop this explanation is undertaken in the remainder of this 
thesis.  
The next section sets the data within the context of the number of witnesses in each cohort. 
This goes some way to explaining the differential uptake of special measures. In addition, the 
defendant’s structural position means that pre-recorded video evidence is, as per my 
                                                          
8
 DS3 had, himself, applied successfully for special measures for a defence witness. 
9
 The Advocate’s Gateway, ‘Intermediaries: Step by Step’ (Toolkit 16, Inns of Court College of Advocacy, 10 
April 2017) 17. 
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respondents’ views, not workable for defendant witnesses. It is to this latter point that I turn 
first. 
5.3. Practical differences 
5.3.1. Defendants: pre-recorded evidence in chief 
None of the respondents in this research recalled personal involvement in a trial, or 
knowledge of another trial, in which pre-recorded evidence in chief was used by a vulnerable 
and/or intimidated defendant. This is perhaps unsurprising since there is currently no legal 
basis from which to secure the use of pre-recorded evidence in chief for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses.
10
 Furthermore, as the Court of Appeal in R v SH,
11
 and 
Baroness Hale in Camberwell Green
12
 highlighted, there are practical difficulties in 
implementing the measure for defendants which would need to be addressed by Parliament. 
B4 also highlighted such difficulties: 
Re: pre-recorded interviews – not only are there not the resources for defendants but who 
would they accept as an appropriate person to do the interview? [B4] 
 
Other respondents who discussed this measure in interview highlighted additional problems 
with defendants using this measure. At trial, the defendant gives evidence once the 
prosecution case has concluded. It is important that when doing so they respond to the 
evidence of those who have gone before them. Pre-recording their evidence in chief would 
deny them this opportunity prior to cross-examination: 
…one of the problems is reacting to developments in the trial. … [pre-recording a 
defendant’s evidence] before the judge has decided if there’s even a case to answer – I 
can see all sorts of complications. [R1] 
I think evidence in chief, certainly when calling a client, a lot of it is meeting and getting 
an explanation for what the prosecution witnesses have said. You can’t properly examine 
in chief and answer the case until you know what the case is, so I just don’t think it 
would work. [R2] 
                                                          
10
 See section 4.2.5. (p122-24). 
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I think you’d be putting the cart before the horse. [J1] 
I can see there being an argument for equality but I don’t see how pre-recorded evidence 
could work… [B3] 
 
Structural differences between the defendant and non-defendant witnesses and their different 
roles in the adversarial trial mean that this measure is not workable for defendants. The 
structural position of the defendant is a material difference on which the exclusion of 
defendants from this measure (and thus their differential treatment) is justified. This is a part 
of equality rather than a violation from it
13
 and renders the law coherent in this regard. For 
this reason, this measure is not carried through the analysis in the proceeding chapters.  
5.3.2. Number of witnesses: defendants versus non-defendants 
It is likely that there are a greater number of non-defendant witnesses than defendants in 
many trials. As a consequence, it is probable that more non-defendant witnesses will qualify 
for and use special measures. In addition, unlike non-defendants, defendants are not 
compellable as witnesses in their trials. PS1, who had ‘never’ seen a defendant use special 
measures, highlighted this in interview: 
[A] defendant has a choice not to give evidence. He doesn’t have to. No one says he does 
– it doesn’t work like that … The defendant is the only person in the whole process who 
can go [respondent sat back in his chair and held his hands up]: “I don’t wanna do this; I 
don’t wanna be a part of it.” Fair enough. As you know, adverse inferences can be drawn 
and all the rest of it, you know, from his silence, but he is the only person who can say 
“right, I’m out, I don’t want to give evidence.” [PS1] 
 
The non-compellability of defendants was discredited as a reason for their exclusion from 
special measures in section 3.5.1.2. However, it remains a potential explanation for why 
defendants use special measures less frequently than non-defendants. If vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants opt out of testifying, then the size of the cohort of defendants who are 
eligible to apply for the use of special measures to give evidence is reduced. 
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I asked the respondents whether, in their experience, vulnerable defendants were likely to 
give evidence in their defence. Some were keen to highlight that they would not discourage 
such a defendant from giving evidence:  
They [vulnerable defendants] aren’t encouraged not to testify in my experience. I don’t 
think juries ever liked defendants not giving evidence, even before they were allowed to 
draw adverse inferences from it. They just don’t like it … I’m forever saying to clients 
“look you can’t pretend to be something you’re not, the jury just want to hear from you.” 
[B1] 
The expectation is that they ought to and therefore it’s quite hard as a defence advocate 
not to call them. [R2] 
I would never advise a defendant not to give evidence … I think juries expect it. [R3] 
I’d have made him [vulnerable defendant] give evidence… [B4] 
 
In some cases, the type of offence with which the defendant was charged influenced the 
lawyers’ decisions to advise clients to give evidence:   
I can count on the fingers of one hand the amount of defendants I’ve not called in the last 
ten years. Partly that’s because most of what I do is sex cases and essentially there’s two 
people in the room. [B1] 
There are some cases where a defendant really has to give evidence to explain why he’s 
not there, ie alibi evidence. If the defence is alibi you’re more likely to call a defendant, 
even a vulnerable defendant. [R1] 
 
However, R1 noted that vulnerable witnesses give evidence ‘less often than non-
vulnerable/borderline defendants’. DS3 highlighted that sometimes vulnerable defendants do 
not give evidence despite legal advice that they should do so: 
I have examples of cases in which I have strongly advised clients to give evidence and 
said if they didn’t do it, it would be tantamount to suicide, who have ignored that advice 
and not given evidence, and have cited to me that they are petrified of the process of 
giving evidence and cross-examination. [DS3] 
 
Furthermore, J1 and J2 spoke of occasions in which they had issued a section 35(1)(b) 
direction
14
 to the jury when vulnerable defendants did not give evidence
15
: 
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 See CJPOA 1994. This permits a judicial direction to the effect that hearing from a defendant suffering a 
‘physical or mental condition’ would have been ‘undesirable’; which is designed to prevent the jury from 
drawing adverse inferences from their silence (see further section 3.5.1.2. (p77-80)). 
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I’ve had this a number of times – “you’ve seen the psychiatrist report, I’m not going to 
call him to give evidence, but I don’t want you to give an adverse inference direction 
because he just wasn’t capable of giving evidence.” … I am usually happy to agree to 
that. [J2] 
I’ve certainly had some cases where vulnerable [defendant] witnesses have not given 
evidence and I’ve directed the jury not to infer any adverse inferences therefrom. It is 
usually supported by medical evidence. [J1] 
 
The evidence, whilst not conclusive, suggests that at least some vulnerable defendants do not 
give evidence in their defence.
16
 This reduces the cohort of defendants giving evidence who 
are eligible for special measures assistance and so naturally results in a decrease in the 
number of defendants giving evidence with special measures.  
5.3.3. Number of witnesses: prosecution versus defence non-defendant witnesses 
In a similar vein, the number of non-defendant prosecution and defence witnesses was also 
considered by some respondents to contribute to their different experiences of special 
measures use: 
It’s a difficult comparison because in the vast amount of cases there are far more 
prosecution witnesses than defence witnesses, particularly if you adopt the rule of thumb 
that you don’t call a defence witness unless you absolutely have to, ’cause it’s just 
inviting trouble. If the prosecution get a lever under your defence witness then they can 
go anywhere with it. So often you’ll have a defendant and nobody else. So it’s not a 
direct comparison. [B1] 
Generally not many defence witnesses are called. [R2] 
…in a normal case there are far more witnesses called on behalf of the prosecution. [R4] 
 
The number of both defendant and non-defendant witnesses, and prosecution and defence 
non-defendant witnesses, thus has an obvious bearing on the frequency with which special 
measures are invoked for each cohort. From an equality perspective, these differences partly 
explain the disparate uptake of special measures between defendant and non-defendant 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
15
 In section 3.5.1.2. (p78-80) I noted that the courts have taken a ‘restrictive’ approach to when this direction 
can be invoked. Furthermore, Quirk’s interviews with criminal barristers suggested that a s35(1)(b) direction 
was rarely sought when a defendant did not testify. The comments from J1 and J2 indicate that the direction is 
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16
 I stated in section 3.6. (p89) that one of the consequences of excluding defendants from eligibility for special 
measures was that some may opt out of testifying because they do not feel capable of doing so. Of course, if 
special measures were used more frequently more vulnerable defendants might give evidence. 
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witnesses (and prosecution and defence non-defendant witnesses) and, at least in part, shield 
the law’s operation from accusations of incoherence. The differences in the number of those 
giving evidence remain, however, insufficient to justify the variations in use completely.  
Using Hawkins’ concepts of surround, field and frames, this thesis seeks to delve deeper into 
the disparate uptake of special measures to which my respondents alluded in interview. These 
conceptual devices, as discussed in section 1.6, help to ‘organise thinking about decision-
making’ and ‘show how the making of decisions about individual cases can only be 
understood in a much wider context’.
17
 For present purposes, the surround should be 
understood as the social, political and economic environment, in which the laws on special 
measures were drafted and enacted. The organisational field is the legal system, or criminal 
justice system, in which that law operates.  
References have already been made to these concepts throughout Chapters 3 and 4. For 
example in section 3.3 I highlighted how concern from within the socio-political surround 
about the treatment of children and learning disabled complainants and witnesses by and 
within the criminal justice system was increasing. Alongside this, knowledge advances about 
the ability of such individuals to give reliable and accurate evidence altered the approach 
taken in the legal field to both their complaints and the evidence they could give in criminal 
trials. Then in section 4.2, I showed how unease within the legal field surrounding the 
exclusion of defendants from special measures arose. The perceived implications of this on 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants led to the law’s development both within the legal 
field and within the surround. The specific political context in which the law has developed 
and its effect on the organisation of the legal field is further discussed later in section 5.5.1. 
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Decision-frames help us to understand how those involved in special measures decisions 
approach the issues they face and how they choose to proceed. I showed in section 4.2.3 how 
the legal profession’s dissatisfaction with the exclusion of defendants from special measures 
manifested itself in the operation of the ‘parity principle’. Framing issues are returned to later 
in this chapter (section 5.6) as well as in Chapters 6 and 7. This forthcoming analysis draws 
on the different frames (instrumental, moral, organisational and legal) that criminal 
practitioners adopt in their decision-making about special measures use.
18
  
The findings presented in the next section of this chapter, however, do not fit well with 
Hawkins’ frame device. This is because they are not related to decision-making per se. 
Instead, they raise the issue of the legal profession’s awareness of the law and vulnerability. 
If a defence lawyer, for example, does not know about the available special measures for 
defendants, there is no decision to be made regarding their use. It is thus a ‘non-framing’ 
issue. It is to these non-framing ‘awareness’ issues that this chapter now turns.  
5.4. Awareness (or lack thereof) 
Throughout the interviews, it became apparent that some criminal practitioners were not 
aware of the provision of certain special measures to vulnerable defendant witnesses. This 
was evident in relation to live link and screens. At times this resulted in slightly awkward 
interview exchanges, as it became necessary to explain the existence of authority for these 
measures to defendants in order to elicit views about them. The following extract from an 
interview with a barrister with 21 years of PQE exemplifies this: 
B4: I think the live link should be available [to defendants]… 
Researcher: There is a provision that’s already been inserted into the YJCEA for 
defendants to use the live link… 
B4: Oh, is there? 
Researcher: Yes, section 33A. It’s more restrictive than the provision for non-defendants 
though still. 
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B4: And when was that brought in? 
Researcher: The Police and Justice Act 2006 legislated for it. 
B4: Oh, ok. 
Researcher: I wonder … well, it doesn’t seem to be well known about or used? 
B4: No, it’s not. 
 
This exchange is interesting for two reasons. First, this respondent was unaware of the 
existence of the statutory provision for defendants to give their evidence by live link. She was 
not alone in this regard. Other respondents also revealed their lack of awareness of the 
provisions throughout the course of the interviews: 
It’s [live link] certainly a provision which I was really unaware of to be honest. [PS2] 
DS2: I didn’t think [special measures] were available [to defendants]?  
Researcher: There’s section 33A – it was a late insertion into the YJCEA for live link for 
defendants, for example. 
DS2: Oh right, OK. 
 
The second reason that the above exchange with B4 is interesting is because she was one of 
the two barristers who had successfully secured the use of the live link for her client to give 
evidence. She had thus done so without knowledge of the statutory provision permitting it. 
Instead, B4 described how the vulnerable defendant in her case was authorised to give 
evidence via the live link by ‘the judge us[ing] his inherent power to ensure a fair trial’. This 
is curious since, as discussed in section 4.2.3, the Court of Appeal in Ukpabio affirmed the 
earlier decision in the Waltham Forest Youth Court case; that an inherent power to permit a 
defendant to give evidence by live link does not exist.
19
 
When other respondents were asked why they thought the live link and screens were so 
seldom used by defendants, some also attributed blame to a lack of awareness of their 
availability: 
It’s not on [defence counsel’s] radar in my experience. [DS2] 
I don’t think [defence counsel] would have even considered [live link]. They may not 
even know that the law permits it, sadly to say … As far as other special measures are 
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concerned [excluding intermediaries], I think it really is a question of the advocates and 
the legal representatives being aware that there are some special measures available to a 
given defendant. [J1] 
I think it would appear that most defence advocates are [unaware] too. I think if there 
was more of an awareness then it would be used more. [PS2] 
Solicitors and defence counsel are quite hot on things like intermediaries now … [but] in 
terms of basics [live link/screens] it always seems to pass people by. [B3] 
 
Asking the respondents if they had experienced the use of special measures may have 
highlighted their existence to those who were otherwise unaware. This makes it difficult to 
know from the interviews quite how many of the respondents knew of the provision of 
special measures to defendants. While some respondents openly admitted their lack of 
awareness, others may have concealed it.  
Evidence from the Youth Proceedings Advocacy Review also suggests that there is a lack of 
awareness of the special measures available to vulnerable defendant witnesses. The review 
brings together a series of interviews and surveys undertaken with barristers, solicitor 
advocates and other professionals working within the criminal courts.
20
 There is no mention 
in the report of the use of statutory live link provision by defendants or the availability or use 
of screens for defendants under the common law. Furthermore, one barrister is quoted saying: 
‘it’s only very recently that a lot of advocates even appreciated that you could get special 
measures for defendants, so I don’t think people ask for them’.
21
 These findings support those 
of my own: that there is an absence of awareness among some criminal practitioners of the 
available special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants. 
As noted above, Hawkins’ conceptual framework is of limited applicability when an advocate 
lacks awareness of the available provisions. The frame device becomes inapplicable to 
understanding the uptake of special measures when a lack of knowledge means that they do 
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not know that there is a decision to be made. This is a point which was not considered by 
Hawkins, since he had no reason to think that the regulatory agency was unaware of the range 
of disposals/courses of action available in the event of a health and safety breach. In the 
context of special measures, however, the evidence suggests that at least some of the legal 
profession are not aware of the special measures provisions available to vulnerable defendant 
witnesses. For these criminal practitioners, the frames are not directly relevant
22
 to explaining 
why they did not secure special measures use for their clients. 
Hawkins’ framework is not entirely redundant in this context, however. The data with regards 
to non-defendant witnesses demonstrates that all respondents knew that special measures 
existed, since they had all been involved in trials where they had been used by vulnerable 
and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. The concepts of surround and field help to 
develop an understanding of why the lack of awareness exists with regard to the availability 
of these measures for defendant witnesses, but not with regard to non-defendant witnesses.  
5.5. The awareness deficit: why? 
There are several factors which can contribute to an explanation of the legal profession’s 
differing knowledge of special measures for non-defendant witnesses versus defendant 
witnesses. These are the political context in which the law of special measures has developed; 
the way this development has occurred; the degree to which special measures use is 
scrutinised within the surround; and the organisation of the legal field as a result of these 
issues. In reality these factors are interlinked and overlapping, but for analytical purposes I 
have presented them separately. The following subsections thus demonstrate how these issues 
are likely to have shaped the knowledge that criminal practitioners have of special measures.  
                                                          
22
 The way in which those who are aware of defendant special measures frame their decisions may have an 
impact on the perpetuation of unawareness among the profession. This is discussed in section 6.2.2. (p204-205). 
163 
 
5.5.1. The political context / surround of law reform 
A look at the political context in which the law of special measures developed does two 
things. It enables one to better understand why, when the arguments against providing special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants were so weak (as demonstrated in 
section 3.5.1), such scant regard was given to defendant special measures in the Speaking up 
for Justice Report and the Parliamentary debates on the subsequent Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Bill. This in turn helps us to understand why segments of the legal 
profession lack the requisite knowledge of special measures for defendants to ensure that they 
are used.  
A number of broad trends and salient factors can be identified in the surround at the time of 
the introduction of the statutory non-defendant special measures scheme in 1999. In the late 
20
th
 century, a loss of public confidence in the criminal justice system resulted from a 
developing awareness of the true extent of victimisation;
23
 rising crime rates;
24
 the perceived 
failure of the system to convict child abusers, rapists and those who offend against other 
vulnerable groups;
25
 and a series of high profile miscarriages of justice.
26
 The perception, if 
not reality, that the system was failing to adequately manage the aims of convicting the guilty 
and acquitting the innocent sparked public concern which resulted in growing pressure for 
reform.
27  
In addition, the professionalisation of the criminal justice system over the course of the 
twentieth century has placed much emphasis on the relationship between the defendant and 
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 This largely relegates victims from the criminal process save for their role as 
witnesses for the prosecution;
29
 rendering their private interests ‘subordinate and peripheral’ 
to the public interest being served by the trial.
30
 Dissatisfaction with the resulting treatment of 
victims in the criminal justice system led to the formation of ‘victim’s movement’ groups 
who lobbied for change.
31
 They were emboldened by the decision in Doorson v 
Netherlands,
32
 where the ECtHR extended the right to a fair trial under Article 6 to include 
the interests of third parties (ie victims and witnesses) in the proceedings.
33
  
Supporting victims of crime thus became ‘politically expedient’ and some argue it ‘diverted 
attention away from the other failings of the criminal justice system’.
34
 The New Labour 
government’s 1997 election manifesto highlighted that ‘victims of crime are too often 
neglected by the criminal justice system’.
35
As a result, government policy increasingly 
centred on ‘putting victims at the heart of the criminal justice system’
36
 and creating ‘a better 
deal for victims and witnesses’.
37
 Several reforms were made in pursuit of these goals. One 
way that these issues were addressed was through the provision of rights
38
 to victims and 
witnesses. These fell short of ‘procedural rights’ which would enable victims to impact the 
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criminal procedure, ie through the provision of legal representation to them.
39
 Instead, and 
correctly according to Ashworth, they have been limited to ‘service rights’.
40
 These have 
included, for example, improvements in the provision of information and support
41
 in 
response to the fact that the absence of such services was at the crux of most victims’ 
grievances.
42
 The expansion of The Witness Service and the creation of Witness Care Units 
have assisted this development by enhancing services such as court familiarisation visits and 
arranging separate waiting rooms for prosecution and defence witnesses.
43
  
The enactment of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses was in 
keeping with these policy goals of improving the criminal justice system for victims and 
witnesses. The provision of special measures was framed as an exercise which balanced the 
treatment of victims and defendants.
44
 Several other reforms contained in the YJCEA also 
had the victim’s interests in mind. For example, the Act also prohibits a defendant from 
cross-examining a rape complainant or child witness in person
45
 and limits the admissibility 
of evidence of their past sexual history.
46
  
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 continued the government’s exercise of ‘re-balancing’. One 
way it did so was by enhancing the protection of victims and witnesses in court. In particular, 
the rules relating to the admission of bad character and hearsay evidence were altered so as to 
restrict the ability of the defence to carry out traumatic cross-examinations on non-defendant 
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 whilst simultaneously increasing the evidence available to the prosecution.
48
 
More recent reforms have even enabled witnesses to give evidence anonymously in 
circumstances where they may otherwise be unsafe.
49
 Furthermore, the appellate courts have 
been proactive in the protection of vulnerable witnesses by significantly narrowing the scope 
of the cross-examination permitted against them.
50
  
Developing service provisions to all victims and witnesses and amending rules of evidence 
and procedure has aimed to improve the experience and thus satisfaction of these third party 
participants. As noted above, many of these reforms have been framed
51
 as part of the wider 
policy to ‘re-balance the criminal justice system in favour of victims and witnesses’.
52
 This 
was based on an assumption that the system was unbalanced towards defendants
53
 and thus 
that victims and witnesses were left disadvantaged.  
According to Jackson, there is a ‘clear instrumental connection between concerns for victims 
and concerns about catching and punishing offenders’.
54
 The plight of the victim came to be 
exploited as a political tool to increase the punitiveness of the system.
55
 The use of 
                                                          
47
 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 100. 
48
 Criminal Justice Act 2003, for example s 116(2)(e) permits documentary evidence to be admitted instead of 
oral evidence from those in fear. 
49
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 86-89. 
50
 See R v Barker [2010] EWCA Crim 4; R v Wills [2011] EWCA Crim 1938; Emily Henderson, ‘“A Very 
Valuable Tool”: Judges, Advocates and Intermediaries discuss the Intermediary System in England and Wales’ 
(2015) 19(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 154; Emily Henderson, ‘Bigger Fish to Fry: Should 
the Reform of Cross-Examination be Expanded Beyond Vulnerable Witnesses?’ (2015) 19(2) International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 83; Emily Henderson, ‘Taking Control of Cross-Examination: Judges, 
Advocates and Intermediaries Judicial Management of the Cross-Examination of Vulnerable People’ (2016) 3 
Criminal Law Review 181.  
51
 Hall notes that policy formation and law reform is not a linear process, and that the reality is often more 
erratic and ad hoc, with a ‘policy chain’ established retrospectively. See Matthew Hall, Victims of Crime: Policy 
and Practice in Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing 2009) 44-94. 
52
 Home Office, Justice for All (Cmnd 5563, Home Office 2002). 
53
 John Jackson, ‘Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?’ (2003) 30(2) Journal of Law 
and Society 309, 313. 
54
 ibid 311. 
55
 See Kent Roach, ‘Four Models of the Criminal Process’ (1999) 89(2) The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 671, 703-706; Andrew Ashworth, ‘Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure’ 
in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice (Ashgate 
2000) 186; John Jackson, ‘Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?’ (2003) 30(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 309; Ian Edwards, ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal 
167 
 
‘(re)balancing’ in criminal justice policy depicted defendants’ and victims’ rights as in 
conflict with each other, meaning that to be for victims you have to be against defendants. 
This zero-sum policy game, where ‘the offender’s gain is the victim’s loss,’
56
 results in the 
perception that accused’s due process rights run contrary to the popular concern for 
protecting victims, and keeping the public safe.
57
 This is a perception that has enjoyed 
longevity – it existed prior to the enactment of special measures for non-defendant witnesses, 
and arguably remains prevalent in the political realm today. 
As well as these reforms made for victims and witnesses I have delineated above, reforms 
were also made against defendants in order to redress the alleged imbalance in the system. 
Curtailments to defendants’ rights were thus delivered under the new face of victims’ rights.
58
 
Victims’ groups became ever more frustrated with the ‘privileged legal position of the 
defendant’ as a result of safeguards within the system which were perceived to unduly 
insulate guilty defendants from conviction.
59
 Furthermore, an increasingly prevalent view 
was that courts were acquitting criminals on the basis of ‘legal technicalities’,
60
 thus 
undermining the protection of the public and future victims. This view was one that Michael 
Howard endorsed in the mid-90s in his role as the then Home Secretary: ‘professional 
criminals, hardened criminals and terrorists … disproportionately take advantage of and 
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abuse the present system’.
61
 The re-balancing agenda thus resulted in the conflation of the 
desires to improve the position of victims and to curtail the defendant’s rights.
62  
In this vein, criminal justice policy became increasing oriented towards crime control.
63
 The 
defendant’s right to silence and to legal representation had become, as Quirk highlights, 
‘viewed with suspicion by some as a means by which ‘criminals’ could frustrate justice’.
64
 In 
the context of this quote, frustrating justice has to be interpreted as (guilty) defendants 
evading conviction. The belief was that ‘prosecutions and convictions were being thwarted 
by lawyers advising their guilty clients to make no comment interviews’.
65
 The right to 
silence was thus curtailed in 1994;
66
 a reform supported by Michael Howard who stated that 
‘the balance in the criminal justice system is tilted too far in favour of the criminal and 
against protecting the public’.
67
 The white paper No More Excuses
68
 paved the way for the 
abolishment of the defence doli incapax,
69
 removing the assumption that children under 14 
are ‘incapable of evil’ so that young defendants could be convicted more easily. Reforms also 
impacted defence disclosure rules
70
 to prevent ‘ambush defences’ which were again 
perceived as enabling criminals to escape conviction.
71
 Further, the reforms to the law of bad 
character meant that, while tightening its admissibility with regards to non-defendant 
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witnesses, the Criminal Justice Act simultaneously permitted more of a defendant’s bad 
character evidence to be admitted.
72
  
To understand with more ease this temporal landscape of the reforms for victims and against 
defendants, figure 5.1 provides a visual illustration of the depiction above. The Speaking up 
for Justice Report and the enactment of the YJCEA are highlighted to show where they fit in 
this myriad of reforms. 
 
It is clear from this discussion that the law of special measures was enacted amidst a period 
of time in which defence interests were looked upon unfavourably. This political context 
might go some way to explaining why defendants were excluded from provision of special 
measures under the 1999 Act and why this exclusion was not debated in the Houses of 
Parliament. Defence rights, and the provision of assistance to them, ran (and still runs) 
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counter to the popular policy. Some respondents perceived this as the underlying cause for 
the unequal commitment to equality in the legal provision of special measures
73
: 
…if you were to stand up in Parliament as David Cameron or whoever and say today I’m 
going to enact legislation to redress the balance between defendants and victims in 
criminal trials, there would be absolute uproar. I’m not saying that it’s something that 
should not be considered, but there’s no votes in it. Some of this is intensely political. 
[PS1] 
Successive governments have taken the view that this is all about redressing the balance. 
Why? Victims, in inverted commas – complainants – win elections. Defendants don’t. 
[DS3] 
 
Despite the political context, however, the fairness of the reforms to the law of bad character 
and hearsay for defendants in the Criminal Justice Bill did prompt parliamentary debate. 
Jones highlights how Parliament was persuaded to go ahead with the reforms on the basis of a 
different rationale: that the admissibility of more evidence (whether hearsay or bad character 
evidence) would facilitate truth-seeking.
74
 This same argument could have been made with 
regards to the exclusion of defendants from the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill. 
The provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants would 
increase the evidence obtained from them. This, so the argument goes, would enhance truth-
seeking; particularly given their privileged position with regards to information.
75
 
The provision of special measures could thus have been extended to defendants under the 
1999 Act without appearing to go ‘against’ victims in the zero-sum policy arena; something 
which would otherwise seem politically difficult to justify. However the truth-seeking 
argument was not made, and as noted in section 3.5.1.3, nor were any other concerns raised 
regarding the exclusion of defendants from the special measures scheme. One can only 
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assume that the Working Group’s position that defendants were already suitably protected in 
other ways satisfied those involved in drafting the Bill and passing it through Parliament. 
5.5.2. How the law developed 
The way that the law developed for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users relates to the 
political context set out in the previous section. Smith argues that the criminal reform process 
is typically made up of four stages which lead to legislative intervention. First, ‘a series of 
controversial incidents … give rise to public concern and raise questions with … the existing 
… system’.
76
 The second stage sees the government launch inquiries into these issues, 
followed by legislative reform (the third stage). The final stage is ‘inception’, which is the 
period in which the legal field is prepared for the implementation of the new legislation.
77
 
Naughton similarly illustrates this process with regards to miscarriages of justice. The 
Confait case (1975)
78
 led to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure. Their recommendations (1981) led to the enactment of PACE (1984), which 
formalised guidelines on police practice.
79
 This pattern occurred again following the high 
profile release of the Birmingham Six (1991). This led to the formation of the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice. Their report (1993) formed the basis of the establishment of 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission as per the Criminal Appeal Act (1995).
80
  
In the context of the development of non-defendant special measures, this cycle of reform can 
clearly be seen. As highlighted in section 3.3, a series of high profile acquittals of alleged 
child offenders and emerging research on the system’s perceived failure to convict those who 
                                                          
76
 Graham Smith, ‘A Most Enduring Problem: Police Complaints Reform in England and Wales’ (2005) 35(1) 
Journal of Social Policy 121, 125. 
77
 ibid 126. 
78
 The murder convictions of three boys were quashed. Their confessions were false and the police were 
criticised for their handling of the case contrarily to the Judges’ Rules. See Sir Henry Fisher, Inquiry into the 
Circumstances leading to the trial of three Persons on Charges Arising out of the Death of Maxwell Confait and 
the Fire at 27 Doggett Road, London SE6 (London Stationery Office 1977). 
79
 See Michael Naughton, ‘Miscarriages of Justice and the Government of the Criminal Justice System: An 
Alternative Perspective on the Production and Deployment of Counter-Discourse’ (2005) 13 Critical 
Criminology 211, 214. 
80
 Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s 8. 
172 
 
offend against children led to a loss of public confidence in the criminal justice system (stage 
one). In response to this, the government launched the Pigot inquiry, and later set up the 
Working Group who looked into the treatment of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses in the 
criminal justice system (stage two). The YJCEA was subsequently enacted on the basis of 
their Speaking up for Justice Report (stage 3), and guidance was drawn up and pilot studies 
conducted for the implementation of each measure contained within the Act (stage four).
81
  
Where the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants is 
concerned, the political context has meant there has been an absence of a ‘crisis’ or cause for 
public concern. The highest prolife case concerning the issue of defendant participation (and 
thus special measures) was T and V v United Kingdom in 1999, involving two 11 year old 
boys on trial for murder of a two year old boy.
82
 The case provoked public outrage about the 
‘evil nature’ of the boys and so there was limited public sympathy or concern for their ability 
to participate effectively in their trial as witnesses.
83
 There was thus no impetus for the 
government to launch an inquiry into the exclusion of defendants from special measures. This 
has remained the case in the almost twenty years which have passed since the enactment of 
the YJCEA. There is, therefore, a seeming absence of a basis from which to launch new 
legislation to reform the law in this area.  
Despite this, arguments based on the principle of equality, and for the law’s consistent 
commitment to this for all court users, have bubbled upwards. Some defence lawyers and 
members of the judiciary have manifested a concern for a vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendant’s ability to participate as a witness absent the provision of special measures. Such 
defendants were recognised as occupying disadvantaged positions by comparison to their 
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non-vulnerable counterparts. In addition, the operation of the ‘parity principle’
84
 revealed that 
some criminal justice agents, lawyers and members of the judiciary felt a sense of discomfort 
with the implications of providing special measures to vulnerable non-defendant witnesses 
but not to comparably disadvantaged defendant witnesses. The incoherence of the YJCEA as 
originally enacted was gradually exposed. An underlying concern for the law’s consistent 
commitment to the principle of equality was powerful enough to overcome much of the initial 
resistance (or, at least, indifference) to the provision of special measures to defendants. The 
reforms which have followed have, however, been piecemeal, inconsistent, and (one would 
hope) incomplete.  
The development of special measures law for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
witnesses has thus been driven almost entirely by the courts, with the government giving 
‘only grudging recognition [to the needs of defendant witnesses], when forced to do so on 
ECHR art.6 grounds’.
85
 As demonstrated in Chapter 4, it has been (and is) largely left to 
defence lawyers and the courts, therefore, to ensure that the law develops to enable 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants to participate effectively as witnesses in their trials 
and to promote equality between all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. An ability to 
do this is dependent on the specific facts of the cases which come before the courts, the 
particular conditions of the defendants, and the arguments posed by the lawyers involved. For 
this reason, the judgments sometimes appear to be in conflict with one another, causing 
confusion as to their legal effect and the justification for such. Furthermore, it means that 
defendants are still not privy to the same level of protection that non-defendant witnesses are; 
and thus that in some areas inequality prevails. On the occasions that Parliament has stepped 
                                                          
84
 Discussed in section 4.2.3. (p106-109). 
85
 Laura Hoyano, ‘Reforming the Adversarial Trial for Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants’ [2015] Criminal 
Law Review 107, 126-7. See also Joyce Plotnikoff and Richard Woolfson, Intermediaries in the Criminal 
Justice System: Improving Communication for Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants (Policy Press 2015) 248. 
174 
 
in, it has been to appease the ECtHR rather than to address the situation as a whole and 
properly reform the law. 
The political context and the subsequent ways in which the law of special measures has 
developed for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users affects the extent to which the legal 
profession is likely to be aware of the provisions. Those for non-defendant witnesses, 
emanating from multiple wide-ranging enquiries and ultimately authorised by an Act of 
Parliament, are likely to be firmly on the legal profession’s radar. The ad hoc, gradual 
development of the law for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses however, has 
left the law in a complex and uncertain state, with provisions for special measures for 
defendants buried in various authorities.
86
  
The fact that many measures are not statutorily available to defendants was cited by B4 as a 
reason for the lack of awareness of their existence. He stated that although he looks for 
support for his clients and is ‘quite proactive about [special measures] … not everybody 
would be’. Furthermore, R4 also felt that the absence of legislative provision for defendant 
special measures, notwithstanding the inherent power to permit them anyway, was likely to 
have a negative effect on defence counsel’s ‘attitudes and understanding’ of what is available 
for vulnerable defendant witnesses. This shows one way in which the source of law does 
matter, since it can affect the legal profession’s knowledge and comprehension of the 
measures available.  
5.5.3. Scrutiny regarding use of special measures  
The degree to which the use of special measures in practice is subject to scrutiny from within 
the surround is another factor which will likely affect the profession’s awareness of the 
provisions. As noted in the previous subsection, following the legislation for special 
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measures, pilot studies and implementation plans were put in place. Since then, the provision 
of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated prosecution victims and witnesses has 
been examined through a series of evaluation studies conducted both independently, and on 
behalf, of the Home Office.
87
 These have sought to ensure that special measures are used and 
are effective in improving the quality of victims’ and witnesses’ evidence and their treatment 
in trials. This has not only raised awareness of the special measures that are available to these 
witnesses, but also put the process through which special measures are applied for and 
secured under scrutiny. There is thus an expectation that special measures are applied for 
when a witness qualifies for their use,
88
 meaning that criminal practitioners need to know 
about their existence. 
The failure to provide special measures to those who qualify has been scrutinised when things 
have gone wrong.
89
 For example, a complainant of sexual assault (Mrs A) committed suicide 
after giving evidence at her abuser’s trial.
90
 She had been offered special measures but 
refused to use them. Instead she gave evidence unaided, out of a concern that using special 
measures would damage her credibility. The Serious Case Review which followed this case 
cast shadows on the CPS and the trial judge; stating that special measures should have been 
put in place even against the victim’s will.
91
 The importance of securing special measures for 
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those prosecution witnesses who qualify is symbolically reinforced through this kind of 
intense scrutiny from within the surround and the legal field. 
Where defendants are concerned, however, no research has been commissioned to measure 
the implementation of the statutory live link provision.
92
 The intermediary provision still 
remains dormant eight years after its enactment. As noted in section 2.3.2, there is a dearth of 
research into the use of special measures by vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
witnesses.
93
 This means that the use of defendant special measures, the provisions for which 
are already more sparse and scattered than is the case for non-defendant witnesses, are not 
subject to any external scrutiny. Defence advocates are thus free of the more pressing level of 
accountability experienced by those for the prosecution. This, may in turn, negatively affect 
their knowledge of the provisions available. 
It is the way in which the law has developed for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users, as 
a result of the context of the political surround in which this has occurred, which in part 
affects the level of scrutiny to which the use of special measures is subjected. For defendants 
(and defence witnesses), the uptake is largely seen as a private matter overseen by 
(supposedly) independent legal representatives. Responsibility for the uptake of non-
defendant (prosecution witnesses) special measures, however, is viewed as a public sector 
concern (and is thus subject to public sector forms of accountability). In short, there is a lack 
of consistency in the ‘policing’ of the implementation of available special measures, and the 
resulting commitment to equality within the system.  
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5.5.4. Subsequent organisation of legal field 
Developments in the surround, as noted in section 1.6, can impact both the legal field as well 
as directly influencing the way that criminal justice agents frame those with whom they come 
into contact and the situations they face. The pressure from within the surround, from the 
public and politicians to protect ‘victims and witnesses’ and the subsequent scrutiny of this 
through evaluation studies commissioned on the use of special measures, has thus shaped the 
organisation of the legal field. The absence of this pressure with regards to defendant 
witnesses has also affected the way the legal field is organised, but in a notably different way. 
These areas of the legal field are now discussed in turn. 
The Victims Code requires the police, the CPS, and other witness support agencies to be 
proactive in assessing witnesses for special measures eligibility.
94
 The process of applying for 
special measures for non-defendant witnesses begins with the police. When completing the 
witness statement form (MG11), the police should assess whether the witness ‘requires 
Special Measures Assistance as a vulnerable or intimidated witness’.
95
 If they conclude that 
potential grounds exist for special measures, an MG2 form
96
 is completed and submitted to 
the prosecutor with the case file. This records information regarding a witness’ vulnerability 
or the fear or distress (intimidation) they feel; the measures thought to be most appropriate to 
address these issues; and the views of the witness on these matters.  
The police are able, and encouraged, to request an early special measures discussion with the 
CPS.
97
 This can be carried out before or after charging decision, and even before a vulnerable 
witness has given their police statement. In the latter case, early special measures discussions 
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can ensure appropriate evidence is video-recorded effectively in anticipation of a contested 
trial,
98
 and can allow for the use of intermediaries in police interviews where required.
99
 If the 
CPS decides to charge the suspect, they complete an MG3 form with the charge details. On 
this form, the needs of vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses should be recorded so that 
special measures applications can be made.
100
 Further meetings can also take place between 
the CPS and a potential beneficiary of special measures. It is preferable that this takes place 
before the application has been made, but only once the defendant has been charged and the 
witness has made their statement.
101
 This enables the prosecutor to directly obtain the 
witness’ views on special measures and to prepare their application accordingly.  
All of this information should then be passed on to counsel for the prosecution in the brief. 
The completion of such forms and the potential for early meetings about the issue will 
heighten the legal profession’s awareness of the existence of special measures for vulnerable 
and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. 
The different agencies to which victims and witnesses are referred are also likely to increase 
the legal profession’s awareness and knowledge regarding the available and suitable special 
measures support. For instance, once a suspect has been charged with an offence, alleged 
victims and prosecution witnesses are referred to Witness Care Units (WCU), staffed by the 
police and CPS.
102
 The computer systems used by the CPS and WCU act as check-points for 
special measures discussions. Staff from both the CPS and the WCU should electronically 
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‘flag’ cases involving vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses.
 103
 This helps to ensure that 
information about the witness is shared between them, and ultimately that the witness is 
provided with the relevant information and support.  
Alleged victims and prosecution witnesses should also come into contact with Victim 
Support or Witness Services. Victim Support is a charity which supports all victims, 
including those who are required to testify against an alleged offender.
104
 The Witness 
Service, run by the Citizens Advice Bureau, operates in every criminal court to support 
witnesses before, during and after trial.
105
 Volunteers from both of these organisations will 
discuss the potential availability of special measures with alleged victims and witnesses, and 
can communicate the outcome of these discussions with those working within the WCU. In 
cases where vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses have not been identified early on,
106
 the 
existence of Victim Support and Witness Services should help to ensure that witnesses are 
spoken to about special measures and that they are applied for when it is appropriate. Again, 
this serves to increase the legal profession’s awareness and understanding of the special 
measures available to prosecution witnesses. 
There are four other features of the legal field that also call for comment in this regard. First, 
the Ministry of Justice has issued Achieving Best Evidence guidance for practitioners to assist 
them to utilise special measures for victims and witnesses in the most effective way. Second, 
the Criminal Bar Association has produced a training video for the legal profession, designed 
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to improve the questioning of vulnerable witnesses in court.
107
 Third, HHJ Rook QC, chair of 
the working group set up by The Advocacy Training Council in response to the Coalition 
Government’s paper ‘Our Commitment to Victims’
108
 has designed mandatory training for 
practitioners on the topic of vulnerable witnesses.
 109
 Fourth, The Advocate’s Gateway has 
also produced several toolkits for the legal profession on the topic of vulnerable witnesses 
which offer guidance regarding the available support.
110
 There is thus a high volume of 
administration and training which is required in the legal field, thus ensuring first and 
foremost that the legal profession is aware of the available special measures for non-
defendant (particularly prosecution) witnesses. 
The organisation of the legal field where defendant witnesses are concerned is not 
comparable. The absence of bureaucratic ‘communication formats’
111
 designed to capture 
information about defendant witnesses means that defence lawyers are not prompted to apply 
for special measures for defendants, and ultimately have more discretion about whether or not 
to do so. Furthermore, the support that is available to non-defendant witnesses through 
agencies such as Witness Services, Victim Support and Witness Care Units is not comparably 
available to defendants and defence lawyers. Again this minimises the exposure that defence 
lawyers and their clients have to external agencies that can raise awareness of available 
special measures provision.  
In addition, work such as Felicity Gerry’s article for The Justice Gap, ‘Vulnerable defendants 
and the courts’
112
 arguably embeds the lack of awareness. Gerry’s paper contains a section 
devoted to considering the measures that are available to assist vulnerable defendants. Within 
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this section, she asserts that ‘the courts have consistently refused the use of … TV link stating 
that it was Parliament’s clear intention that defendants should be excluded from the 
provisions of the YJCEA 1999’. Section 33A of the YJCEA permitting defendants to give 
evidence by live link is entirely omitted from discussion, despite its enactment some six years 
prior to the publication of this article. So too is the common law power to permit screens to a 
defendant as per the Divisional Court decision in Waltham Forest Youth Court.
113
 Those of 
the legal profession who read this article, written by a high-profile, practising QC, may thus 
remain unaware of the breadth of support available to vulnerable defendants.  
Following the insertion of section 33A into the YJCEA, and the affirmation from the courts 
that a power exists to permit a defendant to give evidence from behind a screen, there has 
been an absence of leadership offered by the appellate courts with regard to the use of these 
measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants.
114
 In addition, there is a lack of 
guidance regarding their use in, for example, The Advocate’s Gateway toolkits designed to 
assist practitioners who are working with vulnerable court users by highlighting best practice 
and raising awareness of the available measures.
115
 This is, of course, in stark contrast to the 
guidance available for non-defendant witnesses. It is likely that these factors all contribute to 
the legal profession’s inferior awareness of the special measures available to vulnerable 
and/or intimidated defendant and defence witnesses. 
To summarise, the legal field in which the legal profession operates is focused, as far as 
special measures are concerned, on protecting victims and witnesses in criminal trials. This is 
largely the consequence of the political surround in which the legal field sits. Special 
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measures have not been lauded and promoted in the same way for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants. Some criminal practitioners are thus unaware of the support that is 
available to such clients. While they may make decisions about whether their client is fit to 
plead, or whether ‘reasonable adjustments’ should be made to proceedings (such as taking 
regular breaks and using clear, simple language), it may not occur to some to consider 
whether measures such as live link or screens would be a helpful addition for their client. The 
system’s lack of commitment to the equality principle in the treatment of vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users, appears to go much deeper than the substance of the law itself. It is 
replicated and embedded in the implementation and support structures (or lack thereof) 
surrounding the special measures that do exist for defendants. 
This is not to say that none of the legal profession is aware of the availability of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses. For special measures to be 
secured for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users, however, it requires more than 
knowledge of the law. The legal profession must also recognise the vulnerability and/or 
intimidation from which a court user suffers and thus apply for special measures use on their 
behalf. The next section of this chapter explores this first issue – the identification of 
vulnerability and/or intimidation. This is a potential barrier to equal provision which, like 
awareness of the law, falls outside of Hawkins’ frame device. It is not about decision-making 
per se, but the awareness of the need to make a decision. The organisation of the legal field 
and surround remain significant to understanding the issues relevant to this matter.  
5.6. Identification of vulnerability  
As discussed in section 1.1, vulnerability within the general population is pervasive. One in 
four people in England suffers from a mental health problem per year; one in five suffers 
from anxiety or depression; and over one million people have a learning disability. As 
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discussed in Chapter 3, a significant number of those who are either a victim, a witness to, or 
accused of, a crime suffer from these conditions. This means that a significant number of 
victims, witnesses and defendants should qualify for the use of special measures to help them 
to give their evidence. In 2014-15, Victim Support helped 31,729 vulnerable or intimidated 
witnesses and 13,881 children to give evidence.
116
 This is only one set of figures, but they 
give an indication as to the frequency with which courtroom procedures should be adapted as 
per the YJCEA. For this to happen, the identification of vulnerability and/or intimidation is 
first required. Existing research indicates that despite knowledge of the prevalence of 
vulnerability in theory, the identification of vulnerability in practice remains deficient.
117
 This 
is explored in the following section.
118
 
The concept of vulnerability is assigned in both policy and practice in a variety of contexts to 
individuals and/or groups, and is used to justify their differential treatment. In the context of 
special measures, a witness’ or defendant’s status as vulnerable and/or intimidated paves the 
way to witnesses and defendants securing special measures to assist them to give their 
evidence in criminal trials. Brown has identified two types of vulnerability – innate and 
situational vulnerability.
119
 Innate vulnerabilities include factors such as age, physical or 
sensory impairments and issues of mental health. Situational vulnerability relates to the 
                                                          
116
 Victim Support, Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15 (Victim Support 2015) 6. 
117
 See Andrew Sanders and others, Victims with Learning Disabilities: Negotiating the Criminal Justice System 
(Occasional Paper No.17, University of Oxford Centre for Criminological Research 1997); Jessica Jacobson, 
No-one Knows: Police Responses to Suspects Learning Disabilities and Difficulties – A Review of Policy and 
Practice (Prison Reform Trust 2008) 27-28; Lord Bradley, The Bradley Report: Review of People with Mental 
Health Problems or Learning Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System (Department of Health 2009) 20; 
Jessica Jacobson and Jenny Talbot, Vulnerable Defendants and the Criminal Courts: a Review of Provision for 
Adults and Children (Prison Reform Trust 2009) 5-6, 13-14; Ali Wigzell, Amy Kirby and Jessica Jacobson, The 
Youth Proceedings Advocacy Review: Final Report (Institute for Criminal Policy Research 2015) 46. 
118
 I do not explore the identification of intimidation since there is no statutory authority for such for defendants, 
though as discussed in section 4.2.3. (p115) and section 4.3. (p140-41) this is not to say that intimidated 
defendants do not exist. 
119
 See Kate Brown, ‘“Vulnerability”: Handle with Care’ (2011) 5(3) Ethics and Social Welfare 313; Kate 
Brown, ‘Re-moralising Vulnerability’ (2012) 6(1) People, Place and Policy Online 41; Kate Brown, 
‘Questioning the Vulnerability Zeitgeist: Care and Control Practices with ‘Vulnerable’ Young People’ (2014) 
13(3) Social Policy and Society 371; Kate Brown, Vulnerability and Young People: Care and Social Control in 
Policy and Practice (The Policy Press 2015). 
184 
 
circumstances in which individuals finds themselves as a result of, for example, their own 
characteristics and their own or someone else’s actions. The ‘vulnerability’ criteria for special 
measures can be understood as a mixture of innate and situational vulnerability. 
Vulnerability for the purpose of special measures eligibility is defined in the YJCEA. Section 
16 defines vulnerability for non-defendant witnesses and section 33A for defendant 
witnesses.
120
 As discussed in section 4.2.3, there are differences between these sets of criteria, 
but broadly speaking they are concerned with the age of the court user, their mental and 
physical health, and their social and cognitive function. These are innate vulnerabilities.  
For adult
121
 non-defendant witnesses and all defendant witnesses to qualify for special 
measures, these innate vulnerabilities need to be considered to either risk diminishing the 
quality of their evidence (non-defendant witnesses) or to impede their ability to effectively 
participate as a witness (defendant witnesses). This requires a judgment to be made by 
criminal practitioners and ultimately the trial judge about whether or not the witness’ innate 
vulnerability will place them at a further disadvantage by hindering their ability to give 
evidence or participate effectively. In order words, is their innate vulnerability likely to put 
them in a position of situational vulnerability? If this is considered to be the case, the 
witness/defendant is eligible for special measures. The vulnerability criteria contained in 
section 16 and section 33A of the YJCEA therefore combine markers of both innate and 
situational vulnerability. The identification of vulnerability thus involves two stages – first 
identifying the existence of innate vulnerability and second recognising the effect that this 
will have on the ability of the court user to give evidence/its quality.  
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As outlined above, responsibility for identifying vulnerability and ensuring the appropriate 
applications for special measures are made falls initially with the police. McLeod et al’s 
research highlights that the police also often find it difficult to identify support needs due to 
both a lack of training and the combination of mental health problems or learning difficulties 
with signs drug and alcohol misuse.
122
 It was noted in a Home Office report that ‘[police] 
officers are heavily reliant on self-identification, particularly in the case of intimidation … 
[and] the pride of witnesses sometimes leads them to conceal their difficulties’.
123
 The same 




While the initial identification of children and complainants of sexual offences may be 
simple,
125
 it is often more challenging for criminal justice agents and members of the legal 
profession to identify those with learning disabilities and mental health problems. This is 
especially so when their condition is undiagnosed. Emerson et al demonstrate that this may 
be quite common, since of those projected to have learning disabilities it is thought that less 
than 20% of them are known to disability services.
126
 Furthermore, the 2015 review of 
advocacy in youth proceedings found that even in the youth court, which by definition only 
include defendants under the age of 18, the identification of children’s needs is deficient.
127
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That even child defendants may not be identified as vulnerable is indicative that the 
likelihood that an adult defendant with undiagnosed mental health problems or learning 
disabilities will be identified is slim. This is particularly so given that some of these problems 
are absent visual or behavioural cues.
128
 This means that some vulnerable and/or intimidated 
court users will often lack the provision of support to which they are entitled when giving 
evidence because their vulnerability has been left undetected. 
The evidence seems to suggest, therefore, that the identification of vulnerability and/or 
intimidation warrants some improvement at each stage of the criminal process. Some of my 
respondents confirmed this in interview in relation to the identification of defendant 
vulnerability: 
…there’s a problem generally about defence lawyers properly assessing the capability of 
their clients to engage with the trial process. I think there’s a real issue there; particularly 
with youths, but not just youths. [DS2] 
I don’t think the defendant is given sufficient consideration; because frequently they are 
young, vulnerable or whatever. [J5] 
 
The absence of sufficient screening procedures means that the police and legal profession are 
left inadequately supported in the task of identifying vulnerability among court users.
129
 
Worryingly, McLeod et al found that legal representatives and members of the judiciary often 
considered the identification of vulnerability as solely the police’s responsibility, and so were 
‘less inclined to consider identification to be within their remit’.
130
 This can mean that a 
failure to identify vulnerability at the early stages of the process can leave witnesses without 
adequate assistance. Evidence from Wigzel et al suggests that, even if barristers are willing to 
attempt to identify vulnerable witnesses, they often lack the skills required, even in the youth 
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courts where children are inherently vulnerable.
131
 Valuable work has been undertaken in 
recent years to attempt to combat the poor identification of vulnerable court users, by raising 
awareness of issues of vulnerability, (re)educating criminal practitioners, and highlighting 
examples of best practice.
132
 The emphasis of this work, however, has often been on 




The way that the legal field is organised increases the chances that a prosecution witness’ 
vulnerability will be identified. As discussed in relation to awareness in the previous section, 
the paper trail of various ‘MG’ forms and the process of electronic ‘flagging’ of vulnerable 
prosecution witnesses helps to ensure that vulnerability is identified among witnesses for the 
prosecution and applications are subsequently made for special measures support.
134
 
Furthermore, there is a multi-agency approach to identifying prosecution witness 
vulnerability. The police and CPS contribute to this, as well as agents from Victim Support, 
The Witness Service and Witness Care Units. These prompts at various stages of the process 
are thus likely to improve the identification of witness vulnerability. 
Where defendants are concerned, the organisation of the legal field does not lend itself in this 
same way to ensure the identification of defendant vulnerability. Comparable communication 
formats within and between agencies do not exist. The task of identifying defendant and 
defence witness vulnerability is left largely to defence lawyers,
135
 who already work under 
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immense pressures. For instance, McConville et al and Newman independently found in their 
studies of defence solicitors that resource and financial pressures result in discontinuous 
representation of clients.
136
 A client thus spends minimal, if any, time with the solicitor who 
ultimately represents them at trial. They may even have been interviewed in the first instance 
by unqualified staff from the solicitors’ office due to resource constraints.
137
 This means it 
can be left to such ‘articled clerks’ (trainee solicitors) to identify a defendant’s vulnerability 
ahead of trial in order for the defence to make a timely special measures application.
138
 If 
special measures are not applied for before the trial, then the solicitor or barrister often cannot 
correct many of the deficiencies in case preparation at trial.
139
  
McConville et al found that, even when clients did meet a lawyer, they often talked over 
clients without letting them tell their version of events.
140
 If this is considered in the context 
of special measures, a vulnerable defendant who may have been willing to disclose their 
vulnerability might not get the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, other vulnerable defendants 
are unlikely to be identified as such by the lawyer or legal clerk in a meeting in which the 
client is given little opportunity to speak. This is compounded by the absence of services for 
defendants comparable to Victim Support, The Witness Service and Witness Care Units to 
share the burden of identifying vulnerability.  
This may also be true where non-defendant defence witnesses are concerned. Studies 
undertaken exploring the use of special measures tend to focus on witnesses for the 
prosecution, despite non-defendant defence witnesses being equally eligible under special 
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 It is difficult, therefore, to ascertain whether defence witnesses are 
adequately supported when called to give evidence. However, the available statistics from the 
Witness Intermediary Scheme indicate that non-defendant defence witnesses are rarely the 
beneficiary of an intermediary by comparison to prosecution witnesses.
142
 Furthermore, 
McLeod et al found that defence witnesses are less well supported in court than prosecution 
witnesses.
143
 My own research appears to support this – my respondents reported that it is 
uncommon to see a defence witness use special measures.
144
  
The working conditions of lawyers may provide some explanation for this disparity. The 
absence of communication formats and the lack of inter-agency support mean that, as with 
defendants, the task of identifying vulnerability among defence witnesses is left to defence 
lawyers. Though the Witness Charter states that The Witness Service is available to provide 
free help and support to defence witnesses as well as prosecution witnesses,
145
 this seems to 
occur rarely.
146
 The Witness Service has attributed this to their prioritisation of prosecution 
witnesses, since defence witnesses have ‘the visible support of the defence legal team’.
147
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Defence lawyers’ working conditions are not conducive to the identification of vulnerable 
clients and/or witnesses or to ensuring that special measures are applied for and secured for 
such defendants and defence witnesses ahead of trial. In light of these considerations, one 
might argue that the poor identification of vulnerable defendants is simply an issue of 
awareness. In other words, the defence is sometimes unaware of the vulnerability of their 
clients and witnesses. However, evidence from the interviews adds some nuance to this, 
indicating that the poor identification of vulnerability might also be the result of the way in 
which the legal profession conceptualises vulnerability: 
People tend to prey on the vulnerable, so victims are more vulnerable than defendants 
generally. [R4] 
…I think we just have a preconception about defendants as being in a certain way and 
they won’t need them [special measures], do you know what I mean? [PS2] 
 
These respondents betray a very simplistic set of stereotypes about offenders and victims. 
These assumptions bring to mind Nils Christie’s work on ideal victims and suitable 
offenders.
148
 He states that an important attribute for the construction of the ‘ideal victim’ at a 
social level is weakness.
149
 In contrast, Christie describes an ideal offender as someone who 
‘differs from the victim . . . [and] is, morally speaking, black against the white victim’.
150
 
Dichotomising victims and defendants in this way is false, since victims are not always 
vulnerable and defendants often are.
151
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The depiction of ideal victims as vulnerable, and suitable offenders as the opposite of victims 
(and thus not vulnerable), may result in some criminal practitioners overlooking defendant 
vulnerability. Hawkins’ work can help to understand this.
153
 Changes in the surround and the 
legal field have resulted in the provision of special measures to defendant witnesses; 
measures traditionally associated with victims and witnesses. The way that some criminal 
justice agents frame vulnerability and the use of special measures may remain unaligned with 
the legal expansion in eligibility discussed in Chapter 4. The failure, in some cases, to 
adequately identify those in need of special measures assistance thwarts attempts to achieve 
equality among, and thus consistency in the treatment of, all potential and actual witnesses 
(both defendant and non-defendant) in criminal trials. 
The findings from my interviews were not, on their face, entirely discouraging, however. The 
respondents did confirm, in the abstract, that a cohort of defendants exists who are fit to plead 
but unable to effectively participate in the proceedings as witnesses. A vulnerable defendant 
was not, therefore, an alien phenomenon. Furthermore, the fact that several of my 
respondents had experience, albeit limited experience, of using special measures for 
vulnerable defendant witnesses provides evidence that vulnerability is, at least sometimes, 
identified. Most notably, over half of the respondents had used or were aware of others using 
an intermediary for a defendant witness.
154
 The limited available evidence also indicates that 
intermediary use among defendants is increasing
155




Special measures in terms of erm, intermediaries. That is quite common, actually. Well, 
becoming more common. [J2] 
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Reflection on their own practice also revealed other instances in which defendant 
vulnerability was identified: 
…if the defendant has an obvious vulnerability
157
 – if they’re very young or obviously 
not very smart. [J2] 
There are people [who are] vulnerable and you question whether they should even be 
there. [B2] 
I represent a very great number of very dim, disadvantaged and damaged defendants. 
[B1] 
 
It is commendable that these respondents were alert to the vulnerable defendants they had 
encountered. However, it is also concerning that these same respondents’ experiences of 
defendant special measures were so limited. For example, B1 recalled having applied for and 
secured an intermediary for a defendant on just one occasion, while B2 and J2 were aware of 
a case in which a defendant intermediary was sought, but not in a trial in which they were 
directly involved.
158
 In cases where vulnerability is identified, but special measures are not 
invoked, the next question to ask is why not? This is considered in the next two chapters. 
In summary, insights from the respondents on the identification of defendant vulnerability 
reveal three things. First, that the identification of vulnerability and/or intimidation is 
deficient across all court users, but seems particularly poor among those acting as defence 
lawyers. Second, that a defendant’s status as the accused might inhibit some criminal 
practitioners from viewing them as vulnerable. Third, even when defendants are considered 
vulnerable by criminal practitioners, special measures are not always applied for to assist 
them to give evidence.  
                                                          
157
 Henderson’s findings echoed this. She noted that several of the intermediaries she interviewed ‘reported that 
it became much more difficult to convince judges and advocates [of vulnerability and the need for an 
intermediary] if a witness was not obviously impaired’. Emily Henderson, ‘“A Very Valuable Tool”: Judges, 
Advocates and Intermediaries discuss the Intermediary System in England and Wales’ (2015) 19(3) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 154, 162. 
158
 In B2’s defence, she had an 80/20 prosecution/defence workload split, and so many of the vulnerable 
defendants of whom she spoke were likely encountered in her capacity as counsel for the prosecution. Her 
single anecdotal experience of special measures used by defendants, however, indicates that counsel for the 
defence in the trials in which she was prosecuting did not identify the vulnerability themselves, or did but did 




This chapter has presented an overall snapshot of the findings from the interviews on the use 
of special measures in Crown Court trials, as well as some cautionary notes on how the data 
should be regarded going forward. Furthermore, I have highlighted that the variations in the 
number of witnesses in each cohort presents a valid, yet partial, explanation for the 
differential uptake in special measures experienced by the respondents. This chapter has then 
turned to the issue of awareness. Evidence from the interviews revealed that not all criminal 
practitioners are aware of the special measures available in law to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant witnesses. Hawkins’ conceptual framework has helped us to 
understand the knowledge deficit as a likely effect of the socio-political context (or surround) 
in which special measures law was enacted; the way the law has developed; the scrutiny of 
the implementation of that law; and the organisation of the legal field in which practitioners 
operate. 
In addition, the identification of vulnerability is deficient across all witness categories. This 
is, again, at least in part, an issue of awareness. This problem seems magnified where the 
defence is concerned. The organisation of the legal field seems a likely contributor to this. 
The conditions in which defence lawyers work are not conducive to identifying vulnerability 
and the lack of support from other agencies in identifying vulnerability leaves the 
responsibility solely on them.  
The existence of practical differences and a lack of awareness are not the only reasons, 
however, for the differential uptake of special measures between vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendant and non-defendant witnesses. The respondents knew of the existence 
of all special measures for non-defendant defence witnesses, and yet uptake for them versus 
prosecution witnesses was reported as significantly different. Moreover, there were some 
criminal practitioners taking part in this research that did know that the provision of screens 
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and live link are available to vulnerable defendant witnesses, but had still neither sought nor 
witnessed their use. Similarly, some respondents were aware of vulnerability among their 
clients but still did not invoke special measures to assist them to give evidence. This suggests 
the existence of other factors which deter the defence from using these measures and thus 
inhibit the role that equality plays in their provision.  
In Chapters 6 and 7 I use Hawkins’ frame device to generate further insights from the data. 
We will explore how the legal profession may be framing special measures decisions and the 
influence that the legal field and wider surround have had on their attitudes, understanding 
and perceptions. In chapter 6 I consider the instrumental and moral frames which appear to be 
employed by members of the legal profession. This helps us to understand further the extent 
to which criminal practitioner are committed to the principle of equality in the uptake of the 










CHAPTER 6: INSTRUMENTAL 
FRAMES AND MORAL FRAMES 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I draw further on the interview data to consider insights obtained into issues 
which may affect criminal practitioners’ decisions about whether or not to apply for special 
measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. I explore whether, and if so how, 
decisions can vary depending on the particular special measure and the court user for whom it 
is considered. I use Hawkins’ instrumental and Oakley’s moral frame devices (see below) in 
this chapter to begin to develop an understanding of the competing tensions underpinning the 
decisions made. This chapter also continues to consider the effects and influences of the 
organisation of the legal field and the broader political, economic and social surround in 
which these decisions take place. The implications of all of this for equality and thus for the 
coherence of the law in practice are also drawn out throughout the chapter. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, for Hawkins, ‘framing is a prerequisite to deciding 
whether a regulatory agency should act, how they should act and for what purpose’.
1
 In the 
context of special measures framing is thus a prerequisite to deciding whether to apply for 
special measures; why (or why not); and if so, for which one(s). It is thus ‘a means by which 
factors are selected and their meaning in decision-making is organised’.
2
 Hawkins’ 
instrumental and symbolic frames require some reconceptualization for the special measures 
context. Hawkins noted that a decision maker who ‘seeks to achieve instrumental effects 
frames problems … in terms of the expected likelihood of correction, repair, or other 
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indicators of reductive effectiveness’.
3
 In other words, the decision-maker (in Hawkins’ 
context the regulatory agency) considers what impact or effect a particular intervention would 
have on both rectifying the health and safety breach and shaping the company’s subsequent 
behaviour. In this thesis, the instrumental frame embodies the perceptions of those working 
within the legal profession relating to the purpose of special measures, their effectiveness for 
different court users, and the impact that special measures use has on the perceived quality of 
the evidence elicited.  
In Hawkins’ research, the symbolic frame relates to the level of responsibility or 
blameworthiness that the decision-maker places on the individual or company responsible for 
the breach. Furthermore, it addresses the kind of enforcement that is considered to be 
deserved for the identified breach.
4
 Oakley reconceptualised this in her doctoral thesis as a 
‘moral frame’ to better fit the context of policing missing persons. This addressed decisions 
about the kind of action that the police felt was deserved when a person was reported 
missing.
5
 It is her approach that is adopted in this thesis. Thus, references to the moral frame 
address the kind of special measures support (if any) that actors within the criminal justice 
system feel a vulnerable and/or intimidated court user deserves when they give their 
evidence. 
This chapter begins with an exploration of the instrumental frames the legal profession 
appears to adopt when considering special measures. This involves examining their 
perception of the purpose of special measures and any differences between cohorts of 
witnesses which the profession views as relevant to their assessment of a witness’ or 
defendant’s need for them. In the same way that I did in Chapter 4 with regards to the 
differences identified as relevant for excluding defendants from special measures in the 
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Speaking up for Justice Report, I explore whether the differences to which criminal 
practitioners attribute importance justify the denial of special measures to some in practice. If 
not, then the operation of the law lacks a consistent commitment to the equal treatment of 
vulnerable and/or intimidated court users with regards to special measures use. 
6.2. Instrumental frames 
6.2.1. General purpose of special measures 
I started the interviews with my respondents by asking them what they saw as the purpose of 
special measures. Common responses consisted of a regurgitation of the policy goal of 
‘achieving best evidence’; the legal definition of this from section 16(5) of the YJCEA – 
‘complete, coherent and accurate’ evidence; and more general observations including ‘to put 
witnesses at their ease’ [R4]. Another recurrent response indicated that the job of special 
measures, at least some of the time, is to accomplish something less ambitious: 
It’s always easier to get a witness there if you tell them that they’ve got special measures. 
[PS2] 
There are clearly cases where … witnesses simply would not come to court unless they 
can be shielded. [DS3] 
There are … examples where I know people have said they wouldn’t co-operate if there 
were not special measures, and therefore I infer that special measures have made a 
critical difference. [J2] 
…[sometimes the] circumstances are such that you don’t have a case unless you get their 
evidence in one way or the other. [R3] 
 
When presented with the problem of a reluctant witness, some practitioners primarily frame 
special measures as a tool which persuades witnesses to come to court and give evidence. 
Securing defendant attendance does not present the same challenges. This is because the 
defendant is on trial, and so is ordinarily present
6
: 
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They [defendants] are there – it’s not like ‘well if I get the special measures I’ll come to 
court’. That’s really why most people have special measures for the prosecution – it’s to 
get the witness there. The defendant has no choice – they’re there whether they want to 
be or not. [B2] 
 
When special measures are framed as a device for securing attendance,
7
 the structural 
difference between defendants and non-defendants (meaning that defendants are already in 
court) is viewed as reducing the need for special measures for defendants. The reality, 
however, is that special measures are actually about more than attendance. The purpose of 
getting the witness to court is to secure their evidence:  
They’re [special measures] certainly useful at securing a witness’ attendance in the first 
place. And so I guess by definition they have to improve their evidence because it exists. 
I know when the police are trying to encourage people to come forward it does seem to 
be an important part of the dialogue they have – ‘look we can apply for special measures’ 
– and people do seem to cling on to that. [R4] 
I think when it enables someone to give evidence it is not about enhancing their 
evidence. If there’s someone so terrified to go into court and they know they’ll be given 
screens it can give them the confidence to do it. So it’s not actually making their 
evidence better; it’s enabling them to give evidence at all. [B2] 
 
As with non-defendant witnesses the fact that the defendant is already in court does not mean 
that they will give evidence.
8
 One might think, then, that the legal profession would view 
special measures as a way of encouraging otherwise reluctant (vulnerable and/or intimidated) 
defendants to give evidence. This is particularly so since, as discussed in section 5.3.2, in 
some trials (such as those for sexual offences) hearing from the defendant is seen as vital to 
the defence case. Curiously, however, the respondents in this research did not seem to view 
special measures as a tool to secure evidence from an already present defendant in the way 
that they did for compellable non-defendant witnesses. The approach adopted by criminal 
practitioners was thus inconsistent in this regard.  
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One reason for above view may be that counsel for the defence does not believe that the 
defendant will or should give evidence even with special measures, perhaps on the basis of 
their advice or otherwise.
9
 As highlighted above, however, this certainly is not always the 
case.
10
 Another reason may be that defence barristers know that, if they want their client to 
testify, it is highly likely that their advice to do so will be followed.
11
 This means that special 
measures are not needed as a ‘bargaining chip’ in the way they may be for non-defendant 
witnesses.
12
 This may mean that the defence views special measures – framed as tools to 
achieve any evidence from a witness – as purposeless.  
6.2.1.1. Guilty pleas 
Another reason why criminal practitioners for the defence might see special measures as 
redundant is due to an assumption that the trial will not go ahead. A defendant might plead 
guilty for a range of reasons. These include, but are not limited to: the defendant’s factual 
guilt and desire to take responsibility for their actions; learning the strength of the evidence 
disclosed against them; a reluctance to go through the trial process; a decision to take the 
sentence discount associated with a guilty plea; or the offer of a plea bargain from the 
prosecution.
13
 Existing research also suggests that criminal defence barristers often seek to 
crack cases before trial.
14
 McEwan notes that ‘[t]he early admission of guilt or plea of guilty 
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is widely seen as the salvation of a system under pressure’.
15
 Furthermore, McConville and 
Marsh highlight that some lawyers will ‘be subject to financial incentives to persuade their 




24% of cases ‘crack’.
17
 An assumption, therefore, that a percentage of defendants will 
ultimately plead guilty is neither unfounded nor unreasonable. Hawkins notes that decisions 
can have ‘a strong anticipatory or predictive character’.
18
 The relevance of this for the 
purposes of this thesis is that the assumption that the case will crack can affect the way a 
defence lawyer frames the usefulness of special measures. If a trial is assumed not to be 
going ahead, then an application for special measures for said trial becomes a useless 
endeavour. This could go some way to explaining the disparate uptake of special measures in 
practice as evidenced by my respondents.
19
 
In theory, the same considerations could also be invoked by prosecuting counsel, though the 
defence might have marginally more control over and foresight about which cases will crack. 
In other words, the prosecution could proceed on the assumption, in some cases, that the trial 
would not go ahead, and thus that special measures would be purposeless for their witnesses 
too. I suggest, however, that the effect of an assumption that the trial will not materialise 
plays out differently in practice between the defence and prosecution. This is because of the 
role of the organisational and legal frames in the decision-making process which are 
discussed in Chapter 7. Furthermore, as discussed in section 5.5.4, the criminal justice system 
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is geared to ensure that applications for special measures are made for prosecution witnesses 
in a timely fashion.  
In addition to these more general issues about criminal trials and the purpose of special 
measures, it is important to consider the way that the legal profession frames the specific 
purpose of individual special measures. As we shall now see, this contributes further to 
developing an understanding of the disparity in use between defendant and non-defendant 
witnesses, and prosecution and defence witnesses.  
6.2.2. Specific purpose of special measures – live link and screens 
The defendant’s presence in court influences the way that the respondents frame the 
usefulness of particular measures for them. The respondents perceived the live link’s greatest 
advantage as keeping non-defendant witnesses out of court.
20
 This view appears to have 
resonated with many criminal practitioners, who did not recognise the potential value of the 
live link provision for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants:  
If the defendant is going to be sitting there through the trial in the dock . . . just trying to 
think of a situation where, despite sitting there, he would feel more comfortable giving 
evidence by live link – I don’t know. [J3] 
[Defendants] never [give evidence] over live link because they’re in court for the entirety 
of the proceedings anyway, so it almost makes a mockery of them being in court and 
then going out to give their evidence over live link. That’s how the courts see it. [R2] 
If they [defendants] are there [in court] anyway then something like live link would be 
irrelevant. [B3] 
I mean, of course, they are there anyway. That’s the argument … I think because they are 
there and it is thought that it won’t be a particular strain on them other than giving 
evidence is a strain. [J5] 
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 identified the potential benefits of removing some vulnerable and/or 
intimidated defendants from the courtroom for the purposes of giving their evidence. The 
possible advantages of the live link for defendants suffering from ADHD or an anxiety 
disorder, which is magnified by the process of testifying in open court, were discussed in 
section 3.5.1.3. These issues were overlooked by most of the respondents, due to their belief 
that the defendant’s presence in court throughout the trial often nullified any potential need to 
leave. This belief was seemingly underpinned by an assumption that a familiarity with the 
courtroom and those within it, obtained by sitting through the prosecution case, would negate 
any need for them to leave: 
. . . when the defendant won’t be giving his evidence until at least half way through a 
trial . . . he’s had to sit and have the family [of the complainant]. . . making sure they get 
the best seats to stare at him, and so when he gets to the witness box . . . it’s almost a 
given that by then he will be used to all the staring, etc. The tomatoes have been thrown 
for three weeks; one more isn’t going to matter. [R3] 
. . . it is different because they [defendants] are there [in court] throughout. By the time it 
is their time to give evidence they are familiar with how it all works . . . [J5] 





 in court is a markedly different task, however, from actually giving 
evidence effectively.
23
 This difference is no doubt magnified if the defendant is vulnerable 
and/or intimidated. It is probable that this remains true even if the defendant is a repeat-player 
in the courtroom.
24
 Yet as a result of the attitudes documented above, many vulnerable and/or 
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intimidated defendants are likely to be left to (attempt to) participate in their trial without the 
assistance to which they are entitled.  
The way that criminal practitioners frame the role of screens also seems to be relevant to their 
uptake. In section 3.5.1.3 I argued that screens could also be used for a defendant suffering 
from ADHD or an anxiety disorder which was intensified by the presence of multiple people 
in the courtroom. Another reason a defendant might wish to use screens is if they feel 
intimidated by the presence of someone in the public gallery when giving their evidence. 
Screening such defendants from the public gallery may somewhat diminish these concerns 
and improve their ability to participate effectively as witnesses. Framing screens as a special 
measure which is primarily to hide the dock from view limits the circumstances in which this 
measure might be considered suitable for a defendant’s or defence witness’ use: 
I don’t think screens would help [defendants] because the whole idea of screens is you’re 
screened from the defendant. [R2] 
…screens weren’t about the public gallery they were about the dock. [R3] 
Hmmm, yeah – screens usually screen from the defendant. [J4] 
Screens – usually from the dock, but sometimes from the public gallery. But that’s to 
minimise embarrassment which aren’t [sic] often at play for the defendant. [R1] 
There’s very few instances where … well, I can’t imagine a situation where a defendant 
would call a witness who he couldn’t see, because that’s what, in effect, it would be. I 
think defendants would want to see witnesses giving evidence for them. [J4] 
Well, I mean, if screens are used because complainants say we don’t want to see and 
confront this man who’s been horrible to us … I suppose that situation isn’t likely to 
happen for a defendant. [J3] 
There’s no need to screen the defendant from the dock, unless there’s a cut throat 
defence involved. [B4] 
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One of the defence solicitors interviewed in this research found that screens being framed in 
this way acted as a barrier when he tried to secure the measure for a client in these 
circumstances:  
I have applied [for screens] and failed for a defendant. That was a case in which I wanted 
to screen a young person, who was giving evidence in a case with mixed adults, from the 
public gallery because they had a lot of hangers on of the complainant. It seemed to me 
that it was off-putting for the defendant who was utterly petrified of giving evidence in 
front of the family members. And the answer came back, ‘well he’s been sat in the dock, 
he’s already been identified, and if there were going to be any repercussions there would 
have been, I can’t see how it makes a difference to his evidence’. [DS3]  
 
In summary, the way that the legal profession seem to frame the purpose of special measures 
generally – as tools to secure witness attendance and testimony; the purpose of the live link – 
as a measure to keep witnesses out of the courtroom; and the purpose of screens – to protect a 
witness from the defendant, means that often they are not viewed as relevant to defendant 
witnesses. As I have shown, this is often misconceived, and marks a lack of commitment to 
the principle of equality in the protection and assistance of vulnerable and/or intimidated 
court users. The view that special measures are not relevant to defendant witnesses perhaps 
explains why Felicity Gerry (QC)’s article on assisting vulnerable defendants,
25
 discussed in 
section 5.5.4, does not discuss the availability of live link and screens.
26
 The absence of 
references to these measures may reflect her view (and a more general view) that these 
measures are of no practical benefit to defendant witnesses. 
The absence of guidance generally on when the live link and screens could be invoked for 
defendant witnesses could thus be a consequence of lawyers framing the measures as of no 
use to defendants. As per Hawkins’ framework, the way in which lawyers frame special 
measures and their utility can shape the organisation of the legal field.
27
 This, in turn, can 
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then affect the way that other lawyers frame the purpose and utility of special measures. As a 
result, there is a seeming lack of concern from within the legal field about the disparate 
provision of, for example, live link to defendant witnesses when compared with non-
defendant witnesses. Lawyers will not complain about the unequal provision of a measure 
which they generally perceive to be unwarranted and/or undesirable for defendant witnesses. 
Intermediaries, however, have been framed as the measure which is ‘more obviously useable’ 




I’ve got no issue with the intermediary scenario because if some people are vulnerable 
and have problems then they require assistance. [PS2] 
Intermediaries are seen to really help defendants; it’s helping him to understand the 
question and it’s helping the jury to understand the answer. It’s made us all so aware of 
what better advocates we’ve got to be. [B2] 
 
This goes some way to explaining why the intermediary was the measure which was most 
commonly used for defendants by respondents in this research. As per table 5.1, just under 
half (eight) of the respondents had been personally involved in at least one trial where a 
vulnerable defendant gave evidence with the assistance of an intermediary. A further two 
respondents were aware of trials in which this measure was invoked for the defendant, 
although they had not personally been involved. This was by comparison to only two 
respondents reporting involvement in trials where screens were used, and the same with live 
link. 
6.2.3. Nature of evidence 
Another instrumental frame that feeds into the use of special measures concerns the nature of 
the evidence that a witness is required to give, with regards to both its content and its ‘type’, 
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ie whether (or not) it is confrontational in nature. This was significant to some practitioners’ 
views as to who needs special measures, providing a further indication of their perception 
that special measures are for the prosecution. The relevance the respondents placed on the 
content of the evidence is considered first: 
 The thing you have to look at is what each person is giving evidence about. [B2] 
 
The assumption underpinning some of the respondents’ views was that the content of the 
evidence given by a prosecution witness is more distressing than that given by a defendant 
witness as it is: 
…the type of evidence that people feel uncomfortable about talking about or very 
frightened about the repercussions of talking about. [B2] 
 
In contrast, some respondents considered that the evidence given by a defendant was 
different: 
[a defendant] shouldn’t be embarrassed to say he’s done nothing or that he was under 
duress or intimidation [R1] 
…the nature of their [defendants’] evidence is less intimate; less horrible…the evidence 
they’ve got to give isn’t as awful. [B2] 
 
There are two issues here. First, the assumptions made by some criminal practitioners about 
the nature of the evidence given by various witnesses are inaccurate. Prior to conducting my 
interviews I observed a rape trial where the issue was one of consent between a young male 
defendant (aged 17) and a young female complainant (aged 16). When giving his evidence 
the defendant was required, both by the defence and prosecution, to recall in detail his sexual 
encounter with the complainant. This, according to the defendant, was his first sexual 
encounter. He gave his evidence in open court where the jury, many lawyers, and several 
spectators in the public gallery (including the defendant’s mother) were present. In these 
circumstances, the content of the evidence that the defendant was required to give was such 





also, in contrast with R1’s view, likely to have been embarrassing for the defendant. Raising 
this trial with the respondents prompted the following reflections from respondents: 
I can see that there because sometimes you’re looking at equality. Talking about 
something so incredibly intimate … maybe it would be easier if he didn’t have anyone 
looking at him. [B2] 
Where is the balance? … Yeah I don’t know. It’s not something you think about. [PS2] 
 
The second issue with the assumptions made in the quotes from R1 and B2 is that, 
notwithstanding the nature (or more specifically the content) of the evidence given by a 
witness, a defendant can still be vulnerable. Vulnerability as per the YJCEA should be 
identified by reference to a number of innate characteristics (for example their age, learning 
difficulties, mental health problems)
29
 which are likely to impede a defendant’s ability to 
participate effectively as a witness (and thus give their best evidence). There is no specific 
recognition in the statute for issues pertaining to the nature of the evidence to be taken into 
account when practitioners reach a decision on a witness’ or defendant’s eligibility for special 
measures.  
Some respondents also viewed the content of evidence as relevant to decisions about non-
defendant defence witnesses’ vulnerability and/or their need for special measures. This 
relates to the discussion held in section 6.3 on the conceptualisation of vulnerability. Perhaps 
the reason that vulnerability is seldom identified among defence witnesses and defendants 
(for special measures purposes) is that the way it is conceptualised excludes them from 
consideration:  
…what is the person likely to be giving evidence about? It is less likely that it is going to 
be the type of evidence that would require a screen or TV link, because a defence witness 
is unlikely to be coming on to talk about their rape experience. [B2] 
…generally, defence witnesses are, the vast majority are, either alibis witnesses, friends 
of the defendant who say he was attacked, or character witnesses. [J2] 
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Implicit in the latter quote is the view that giving evidence to provide an alibi or promote the 
defendant’s good character is not onerous or distressing for a defence witness. This may be 
true to an extent, but it is a fallacy to assume more generally that it is prosecution witnesses 
who will always have the most arduous time in court. This was illustrated by R3, who 
recalled acting as a prosecutor in a rape trial in which the complainant’s best friend was a 
witness summonsed by the defence, as her recollection was, in parts, contradictory to that of 
the complainant’s:  
This kid looked on the verge of vomiting the whole time … She was probably quite 
frightened about [the defendant] and his mates now because she clearly did not want to 
[participate in the trial] at all. …nobody even thought about [special measures] and in 
fairness I didn’t even think about it until she started to look really green. [R3] 
 
The content of the evidence given by the child defence witness in this case related to the 
behaviour of the complainant prior to the alleged rape. Its nature was not intimate or 
embarrassing and yet she still displayed visible indicators of distress. This demonstrates that 
the significance of the content of the evidence is over-played by some members of the 
profession. The content of the evidence is often irrelevant to whether the defendant or witness 
is vulnerable and requires special measures assistance. 
Another element of evidence which a recorder with 13 years’ PQE viewed as relevant to 
perceptions about vulnerability was whether the nature of the evidence a witness was 
required to give was confrontational. For alleged victims: 
…their attacker or rapist, whatever, is in the same room as them… The problem is the 
confrontation element and not just testifying in court. [R2]  
 
The defendant’s presence in the courtroom was considered by R2 as potentially impacting an 
alleged victim’s ability to testify. For alleged victims and other prosecution witnesses the 
defendant will almost always be present at trial.
30
 One way in which this confrontation can be 
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avoided is through the use of special measures.
31
 While the nature of a defence witness’ 
evidence might also be accusatory, R2 noted that a defence witness is not required to confront 
the person whom their accusation is against: 
…if you’re a defence witness and you’re accusing someone of doing something or acting 
in a reprehensible way, the person you are accusing is not going to be in the courtroom; 
whereas for a prosecution witness the defendant is there throughout… [R2] 
 
Similarly, R2 considered this to be a relevant factor where defendant witnesses are 
concerned: 
When it’s the defendant giving evidence there is nobody for them to be scared of – even 
if they are running self-defence, the person they claim is the attacker is not, by that point, 
sitting in the same room as them. [R2] 
 
In many cases, this is likely to be accurate. However, there are (at least) two exceptions. First, 
the person a defence witness or defendant is accusing of a crime may be sat in the public 
gallery, rendering their evidence confrontational in nature. Second, in cases where one co-
defendant testifies against another, they will do so in front of the person they accuse. This 
latter scenario was one in which one of my respondents had experienced special measures 
used by a defendant: 
…[if] there’s a cut throat defence involved. [The defendant] was 14 and had basically 
told the police in his interview who did it. He was out of the group but was still there on 
a joint enterprise trial with the group. When it came to him giving evidence he was 
essentially a prosecution witness. [B4] 
 
This mirrors the argument invoked by defence counsel in the Waltham Forest case before the 
Administrative Court. As discussed in section 4.2.3, the case involved a co-defendant who 
claimed to be unable to give evidence against her co-defendants while in their presence.  
As highlighted in section 5.6, the identification of vulnerability as per the YJCEA requires 
the recognition of an innate vulnerability which in turn is considered to put them in a position 
of structural vulnerability (by affecting the quality of their evidence/ability to give it). In 
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making this judgment, the nature of the evidence a witness/defendant is required to give 
could influence a criminal practitioner’s decision. A barrister may consider that the quality of 
the evidence a young witness with learning difficulties gives is likely to be diminished. This 
belief is all the more likely if the barrister considers that the nature of that evidence is 
intimate, embarrassing and confrontational. The kinds of misconceptions about this issue 
discussed above can therefore have implications for decisions over special measures, with the 
net result that defendants and defence witnesses will tend to lose out. 
A further quote from B2 highlights how, even if the profession appreciates that giving 
evidence can be a difficult experience for defendants (and by extension defence witnesses), 
instrumental frames about the purpose of special measures can still prevent their use: 
…of course the other way round the defendant probably found it very distressing when I 
was saying ‘you did this to the victim,’ etc. And I suppose if it wasn’t true he could say 
‘well I was being asked very difficult and intimate questions and I needed some 
protection’. But the difference is: who is he being protected from? They had screens so 
they didn’t have to see him – he doesn’t have to be screened from them and so I think 
that’s why it doesn’t work quite in the same way for defendants. [B2] 
 
B2’s musings on the distress of the defendant are bound up in a lack of understanding or 
awareness of which (and why) special measures might be beneficial to a vulnerable defendant 
in these circumstances. The use of screens to shield the defendant from the gaze of those in 
the public gallery, or the provision of live link to remove such a defendant from the direct 
sight of the jury, may help such a defendant to answer difficult and intimate questions absent 
the additional pressure of a large audience. However, the way that criminal practitioners 
frame vulnerability, the nature of evidence, special measures, and their purpose serve to 
mutually reinforce their perception that special measures are not for the defence. This is a 
further unjustified inconsistency in the approach to special measures and the commitment 





6.2.4. Tactical impact of special measures  
Another way in which special measures are instrumentally framed concerns their perceived 
impact on the quality of the evidence elicited — in many situations it is considered an unwise 
tactic to use special measures. This belief is common to the prosecution and the defence, but 
its influence on special measures decisions varies between the parties. Some potential reasons 
for this are discussed in Chapter 7. 
Due to the defendant’s presence in court, there was a clear concern among those interviewed 
that the defendant’s use of the live link, to leave the court and give evidence from elsewhere, 
would ignite jury distrust or misunderstanding of their client: 
It’s going to look odd if at trial you have a defendant sitting in the dock who then goes 
out of court to give evidence to the jury. [R1] 
. . . the jury would be thinking ‘why on Earth has he done that?’ [B2] 
If they’re watching you over a TV screen and they’ve seen you in court all week, I think 
the attitude would be ‘well what’s he playing at, what’s going on?’ I think that would 
take years to break down. I don’t think you’ll find many defence barristers who will be 
willing to call their client in that way. [J3] 
They’re in court the whole time anyway, so it would be strange to want live link. [R3] 
 
This concern arises from the legal profession framing the live link as a measure which keeps 
a witness out of court.
32
 Given the central role of the jury in Crown Court trials, the defence 
is naturally keen to avoid creating a negative perception of their client.
33
 The concern also 
stems from the legal profession’s seeming belief that they can read a jury, and thus have an 
indication of the jurors’ reactions to a defendant’s use of live link. Morison and Leith found 
that barristers generally accepted that trying to read a jury is ‘a dangerous exercise, a most 
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 It seems, however, that some defence lawyers are influenced by a 
concern for the possible impact of their actions on the jury, if nothing else. 
Similar tactical concerns were raised when prosecution witnesses gave their evidence by live 
link, or from behind a screen, and then sat in the public gallery for the remainder of the trial: 
I think there would be a perception that it’s an odd thing to do. If one of the grounds for 
using live link is that you don’t want to be in court, and then you go and sit in court and 
watch, it creates a question of how appropriate the use of the special measure was in the 
first place. [R1] 
The [prosecution witnesses] want this special measure, they want that special measure. 
And then they turn up in the bloody public gallery to watch [the defendant] give 
evidence. Some public galleries are upstairs and out the way so OK fine, but where the 
jury can see – urgh. And I swear to god [the jury] thinks ‘well what was all that about 
then? She can’t be that scared’. [R3] 
…if you have a witness who will sit there and be extremely vitriolic and then a day later 
sit in the public gallery watching, which happens surprisingly often, then you think ‘well 
why have you had a screen in that case and now you’re sat there’. [B2] 
It does look absolutely terrible. … I would rather … be tipped off that that is what they 
were planning to do; then you can tell everybody in advance and manage it and 
expectations accordingly. [B4] 
 
As is evident from these quotes, the legal profession considers the presence of a prosecution 
witness in court after they have used a measure designed (or perceived as designed) to keep 
them out of court as undesirable. This is based on the belief that the jury also views the 
purpose of the live link and screens as keeping witnesses out of the courtroom or from the 
view of the defendant. It is also based on the profession’s belief that they can predict the 
jury’s reaction to this. B4 spoke of how he had managed this issue previously by encouraging 
two complainants to give evidence live in court after they had disclosed their intention to sit 
in court for the remainder of the trial: 
I had recently … I did a trial prosecuting where two of the complainants were now 
adults. It was all about they’d been raped as children. They wanted to come into court 
after their evidence and watch the rest of the trial. With that in mind, even though they 
could have had screens … it would look a bit odd if they gave their evidence behind a 
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screen and then sat in court. They did … evidence in chief as videos [pre-recorded] and 
in-court cross-examination so that they could sit in court following their evidence. [B4] 
 
This indicates, therefore, that at least some criminal practitioners view the use of live link or 
screens by any witness who is going to then sit in the courtroom as ill-advised. This is 
because it is considered to risk kindling the jury’s distrust of the beneficiary of a measure in 
these circumstances. Since some criminal practitioners (the majority in this study) cannot see 
the benefit of such measures for defendants and defence witnesses anyway, their uptake for 
defendants is unlikely to be high. This was reflected in the findings of this research, with only 
two uses of screens and four of live link recalled among all respondents. Even if a criminal 
practitioner does identify a benefit of these measures for defendant or defence witnesses, 
however, their perception that the jury will view their use suspiciously may further deter an 
application for their use. 
In relation to the live link, this seems to be further compounded by the legal profession 
considering evidence received via this medium as diminished in quality. 
6.2.4.1. ‘Best evidence’ 
Some disagreement exists as to what constitutes ‘best evidence’.
35
 In the YJCEA, references 
to the quality of the evidence are to its ‘completeness, coherence and accuracy’.
36
 Special 
measures were enacted with a view to improving these attributes of the evidence. However, 
the predominant belief among the legal profession is that best evidence constitutes that which 
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is extracted live, in court, in front of the jury.
37
 It was this latter position which was well 
supported by the respondents in this research: 
…the perception by trial lawyers is that the best evidence possible is to have somebody 
in court, giving evidence, in front of the jury, without a special measure. [J4] 
 
The use of the live link to remove a court user from the courtroom while they give their 
evidence, so that they are not physically present before the jury, is thought to diminish the 
evidence’s impact
38
 and thus its quality and persuasiveness. This is true whether the witness 
involved is for the prosecution or the defence, including the defendant: 
A witness giving evidence by TV link doesn’t have as much impact as one giving 
evidence in court. [DS2] 
…the cynical approach and the way I sometimes adopt it is you get much more impact 
when the witness is in the room. The colloquial way of putting it is the jury can actually 
get a sniff of her; smell her. It’s much more impactful. [B2] 
In my view we all react when watching a human describe something to us more critically 
and even more sympathetically the more body language we can observe and the special 
measure whereby people give evidence on the video link, I think, tends to sanitise and 
abstract some of the interaction. [J2] 
Anything that comes across on a screen is like just watching television and doesn’t have 
the impact of actually seeing the witness in the flesh. [J5] 
In my experience I’ve found that witnesses giving their evidence over live link don’t 
come across well, because juries are desensitised from them. They haven’t got a living, 
breathing person in front of them in the witness box. [R2] 
I think when you see someone there and you see the whites of their eyes and the sweat on 
their palms, it sounds cruel but as a prosecutor there’s no way to convey that. [B3] 
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The legal profession’s perception that the live link reduces the impact of evidence on jurors 
thus results in practitioners viewing this measure as producing evidence inferior to traditional 
evidence. It is difficult to discern whether this perception is accurate. Evidence from Ellison 
and Munro’s study of mock jurors indicates that the medium through which a witness 
testified was rarely referred to by the mock jurors in their deliberations
39
 and thus presumably 
had minimal effect. The study had attempted to minimise any variance in the performers’ 
delivery of the evidence, so that the only variable was the condition it was given in.
40
 This 
contrasts with earlier research which found that child witness credibility and believability is 
reduced when evidence is given by video link as opposed to live in court.
41
  
Ascertaining the ‘truth’ of this matter presents serious challenges, since every case and juror 
is different, and the subconscious effects of special measures on a juror’s perception of a 
witness and the subsequent impact on their evidence seems near impossible to measure. 
Either way, as a result of the profession’s belief that live link does diminish the impact of 
evidence it is perhaps unlikely that counsel for the defence will apply for a defendant to give 
their evidence in this way: 
I don’t think defence barristers would ever consider giving evidence via live link because 
you lose that personal connection. What you want your client to do is to have that 
connection with the jury and have them feel some form of empathy. [R2] 
I think there may be a reluctance, however, to make an application because the 
defendant, however vulnerable he may be, or his lawyers, would perceive there would be 
a [loss of] impact on the jury because they haven’t given their evidence in court. [J1] 
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I used to say to clients when I was defending that if the jury liked them that would be 
half the battle, and that is true, sentiment plays a huge part in your prospect of being 
acquitted . . . But if [the idea of live link] does arise [the defence] probably think well I 
want this person to present themselves sympathetically and it’s going to be much harder 
for them to do that if they do it on a live link. [J2] 
I’ve been pretty firmly of the belief that you best establish someone’s credibility by 
seeing into the whites of their eyes. If someone is giving evidence you want to be able to 
see their whole body language, the tone of their voice, the way they look at you. Trials 
are often won or lost on whether they like the defendant and whether they seem truthful 
or not. I think that comes across much better in open court. [DS1] 
I doubt that many lawyers will apply for defendants to give evidence by live link … 
Because you are going to – there’s something very useful in humanising the defendant 
and taking them off the page, off the indictment, off the case summary, off the 
antecedents if those have gone in. And sometimes, the best way to do that is stick them in 
the witness box opposite the jury and have them be themselves. [DS3] 
 
The perception that the live link diminishes the impact and thus quality of evidence also 
appears to prevent the defence from opposing prosecution applications for their witnesses to 
give evidence in this way. Instead, the defence consider it advantageous to their case if 
prosecution witnesses give evidence by live link: 
I don’t know what defence practitioners have told you but I’ve spoken to enough of them 
to know that they don’t really have many issues with [prosecution] live link applications 
because they think … that having someone give evidence from a television is remote to a 
jury, and I think a jury asks itself more questions about why the victim isn’t there – ‘why 
are they on TV – can they not be bothered to give evidence in this [court]room?’ [PS1] 
I would rather they [prosecution witnesses] use the live link. Why? Because it 
dehumanises people. The complainant on a screen – it’s like watching Eastenders. It’s 
not like watching the real world. [DS3] 
 
The desire to achieve the best (ie the most impactful) evidence from witnesses, as well as 
beliefs about the inferiority of live linked testimony, affects decisions about which special 
measures, if any, are applied for. For counsel for the prosecution, it often seems to result in 
the encouragement of prosecution witnesses to give evidence from behind a screen instead of 
via live link: 
I think that prosecution advocates, even though they know live link is available, if they 





Not that I ever have any sort of definitive ruling on it, but if I’m involved in a case from 
the start I always say ‘any chance he or she [prosecution witness] will be cross-examined 
with a screen, please’. … Screen is my preference than live link. Most people I know, if 
they’re prosecuting, prefer screens. [R3] 
I know that there are barristers, for example, who will think ‘don’t give evidence on the 
live link, it distances you and the power of your evidence is diluted, please go into the 
witness box and give evidence behind screens’. There definitely is that school of thought 
– I’m not adherent to it personally – but there definitely are these kind of conversations 
between barristers and witnesses. [R4] 
I always, when I’m prosecuting, go and see them [the witness] and say what I’d like. … 
And sometimes what persuades them to come into court as opposed to being on a TV 
screen is that their motivation is that they don’t want the defendant to be able to see 
them. So obviously if they stay on the TV link the defendant can still see them just like 
everyone else. So it works quite well. I use that tactically when I think it would be better 
for them to come into court, and of course it’s true, but sometimes that helps motivate 
them to come in. [B4] 
…I sometimes, when you get an application to give evidence by live link, I write back 
and say ‘why won’t screens be sufficient?’ Because in the flesh they are more effective. 
[J2] 
My personal preference is that they give evidence from behind a screen. [PS1] 
Among my respondents, there seemed to be two main exceptions to this general approach. 
The first is where there is a difficulty with securing the attendance of a witness at all without 
the promise of live link: 
Now I accept it’s a price that’s got to be paid [that the evidence’s quality is diminished 
using live link] if it makes the difference as to whether the witness can give evidence or 
not. But let’s not kid ourselves; it isn’t as good as if they are in court. [J2]  
 
This fits with the instrumental frame outlined at the start of this chapter – that the purpose of 
special measures is to secure witness testimony at all. It also consistent with Hoyano and 
Keenan’s finding that in some cases ‘live link is the only means to enable many vulnerable 
witnesses to testify’.
42
 In these cases something of a trade-off is accepted between ‘best 
evidence’ (evidence carrying with it the most impact) and ‘any evidence’. The second 
exception to the hard preference for screens over live link was where the victim or 
prosecution witness is particularly young: 
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For children that’s [live link] absolutely fine and everyone understands that. [R3] 
With youngsters it … the court is too intimidating – that’s fine. [B4] 
With youths … nobody bats an eyelid, and quite rightly so. [PS1] 
With children I suspect the balance is in favour of TV link. [J5] 
This may be hangover from the, now rebuttable, but still persuasive, primary rule in the 
YJCEA; that pre-recorded evidence will be used as a child’s evidence in chief and they will 
be cross-examined by live link.
43
 Furthermore, the legal profession perhaps thinks the jury 
will have a better understanding of why the measure has been used by a child witness, and 
thus that it will not damage their case. The fact that it is a child giving evidence may mean 
that sufficient sympathy will be evoked without needing the extra impact perceived to be 
attained from live, in court testimony. 
These exceptions to the general preference for screens partly explain why all of my 
respondents had used the live link for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses, 
notwithstanding the perceived issues surrounding the evidence obtained as a result. A further 
reason for why the live link might still be used despite the profession’s dislike of it is that the 
police, CPS and The Witness Service liaise with (prosecution) witnesses with regards to the 
measure they would like to secure for trial. Thus, if the witness opts for live link, a barrister’s 
attempts to alter this pre-trial might be unsuccessful. As discussed in section 5.5.4., the 
organisation of the legal field means that the defence lawyer has a much greater role in 
securing special measures for their clients and witnesses. They may, therefore, have more 
ability to steer them away from the live link. These issues are returned to in Chapter 7 amidst 
a discussion of the organisational frames employed by different criminal practitioners. 
As my respondents highlighted, the defence are not keen to choose the live link to assist a 
vulnerable defendant to give evidence. The perception that screens are designed to shield a 
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witness from the dock (as discussed above) means that they are unlikely to be sought as an 
alternative for defendants/defence witnesses in the way that they are for prosecution 
witnesses. Instead, the preference is for defendants (and defence witnesses) to give their 
evidence in court without a special measure. As well as ensuring that the impact of their 
evidence is not lost, it also means that the defendant’s vulnerability is showcased in court: 
If you’ve got a defendant there who is vulnerable and has one difficulty or another – 
emphasising that to the jury by having them there in front of them for them to see, in 
open court, may give you another chance at the jury saying ‘well he may be technically 
guilty but we won’t convict him because we feel bad for him’. [DS2] 
You want to create an impression that excites sympathy . . . I’ve seen defendants do 
really badly, be in tears, virtually admit the offence, and the jury feel sorry for them and 
acquit them. [J2] 
I’m forever saying to clients ‘look, you can’t pretend to be something you’re not, the jury 
just want to hear from you’. . . . and you say to the jury ‘he’s just dim! Don’t convict him 
because he’s stupid’. [B1] 
I have won trials based on the fact that clearly the jury and/or court have identified with 
the defendant and thought, ‘no, this woman? Really? I can’t see that’. It’s that effect that 
you can achieve. It’s much harder when they’re on a live link. [DS3] 
 
These respondents discuss various incidents where they would exhibit the defendant’s 
vulnerability by having them testify live in court. This can be used as a ploy to tempt the jury 
into an acquittal even if the prosecution has discharged the burden of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. It can also be used, as in DS3’s example, to persuade the jury that the 
necessary case to convict the defendant has not been made, causing them to acquit. The only 
special measure open to the defence which is in keeping with this tactical approach is an 
intermediary:  
Researcher: Do you think defence counsel would be more inclined to apply for an 
intermediary than live link? 
J4: Yes, yes I do. They’re still in court. And the defendant is presented as vulnerable to 






Showcasing vulnerability further with the use of an intermediary may further entice the jury 
into acquitting a defendant. One barrister highlighted what he suspected to be an example of 
this from a case in which he (unsuccessfully) prosecuted a vulnerable defendant: 
At a trial I prosecuted recently where the defendant had an intermediary, he was 
acquitted. I think because the jury made more allowances than you might have wanted 
them to when you’re prosecuting. [B1] 
 
Whether there remains a proper place for ‘tactics’ such as these in criminal trials is debatable. 
As I have demonstrated, the respondents in this research suggest that the approach adopted in 
criminal trials is often contingent on the views of the advocates regarding ‘best evidence’ and 
its perceived tactical advantages. Given the move towards ensuring that a criminal trial is a 
well-managed forensic examination of the defendant’s guilt,
44
 defence advocates should 
perhaps avoid using such tactics in an attempt to secure an ‘unjustified’ acquittal. It certainly 
seems that this approach runs counter to Lord Justice Auld’s view that ‘the criminal trial is 
not a game under which a guilty defendant should be provided with a sporting chance’.
45
 It is 
also contrary to the overriding objective,
46
 which as McConville and Marsh discuss, results in 
defence lawyers sharing the task of convicting the guilty as well as acquitting the innocent.
47
  
This is further complicated when the purpose of special measures for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users is considered. I have argued throughout this thesis that the provision 
of special measures is underpinned by a concern for the humane (and thus equal) treatment of 
all participants. The availability of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court 
users thus seeks to ensure that each participant has equal opportunity to give their best 
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evidence in the criminal trial. The conflict between ‘winning’ and protecting witnesses was 
outlined by a defence solicitor in interview: 
… I’m sure they [special measures] do make the ordeal much better for [witnesses], I’m 
sure they all do. But that has the opposite effect, to an extent, than what they ultimately 
want from the trial [winning]. That’s the curious paradox of the whole thing, I think. 
[DS2] 
 
It is clear that in some cases criminal practitioners place much more emphasis on tactics 
(winning) rather than forensic examination and/or the well-being of vulnerable 
defendants/defence witnesses. Whether or not tactics should trump these considerations is 
debatable, but a full review of this falls outside of the scope of this thesis.
48
 
In summary, special measures decisions are instrumentally framed in accordance with both 
their practical and tactical effects. For defendant witnesses, their presence in court means 
defence counsel sees the live link and screens as unsuited to them, since the measures’ 
practical benefits are considered as keeping a witness out of court and/or from the view of the 
dock. Due to this perception, these measures for defendants are thought to be tactically 
detrimental, as the legal profession believes that jurors would view it with suspicion. In 
addition, the nature of the evidence given by prosecution, defence and defendant witnesses 
also affects the way in which the legal profession perceive their need and suitability.  
Finally, the legal profession seems to consistently view evidence given via live link as less 
powerful than live evidence given in court. Thus, even if the live link was considered to have 
some practical benefit for a defendant (for example, for a defendant with ADHD) it is 
unlikely to be invoked. Instead, defence counsel may prefer to showcase the defendant’s 
vulnerability by putting them on the stand without special measures (or maybe with an 
intermediary) to increase the impact of their evidence and evoke sympathy among the jury. 
For prosecution witnesses, the distaste for live linked testimony results in a preference for 
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screens so that the impact of the evidence is not lost. Counsel for the prosecution seem 
willing to trade their desire for best (most impactful) evidence with the ability to secure any 
evidence when the live link is the only way to persuade a witness to attend, or when the 
witness in question is a young child. The result of these instrumental frames is that the 
provision of special measures in practice lacks a consistent commitment to the principle of 
equality. 
Evidence from my respondents also suggests that a moral frame may be applied by some 
criminal practitioners when special measures decisions are made. As outlined at the start of 
this chapter, the moral frame has regard to the kind of special measures support (if any) that 
actors within the criminal justice system feel a vulnerable and/or intimidated court user 
deserves. It is this issue that the remainder of this chapter explores. 
6.3. Moral frames 
Existing research indicates the prevalence of a presumption of guilt within the legal 
profession. McConville et al argued that ‘for most advisers the presumption of guilt … 
assume[s] a universalistic character and is unthinkingly applied to the client population at 
large’.
49
 This was mirrored in Newman’s observations of legal aid solicitors. He noted that 
clients were ‘routinely discussed and approached … as if they were guilty’.
50
 This was found 
to remain the case even following meetings with clients who had protested their innocence.
51
 
Similarly, Alge found that some members of the legal profession she interviewed also 
exhibited a dismissive attitude towards defendants and perceived them as guilty.
52
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Consistent with these findings, my respondents also indicated that there is a widespread 
factual presumption of guilt within the legal profession. They considered it to affect the 
willingness of the defence to apply for special measures, as well as the (perceived) 
willingness of judges to permit special measures: 
…if it’s in the Crown Court then they’re [judges] not particularly sympathetic. They’re 
of the view ‘well you’ve committed a serious offence; you can’t be that vulnerable’. 
That’s the prevailing view. [R2] 
Erm, yeah … but live link [for defendants] – why not, I suppose? But it’s just not. 
Because they’re baddies! [laughs] [J3] 
 
These responses indicate that the presumption of guilt may manifest itself in the view that 
defendants are undeserving of the vulnerability status and undeserving of special measures. 
R2’s view is that judges see those on trial as guilty (‘well you’ve committed a serious 
offence’) and thus conclude that they ‘can’t be that vulnerable’. This indicates the relevance 
of a behavioural dimension to the vulnerability concept in relation to special measures. This 
was similarly conveyed in J3’s quote. It is important to emphasise that J3 was joking when he 
remarked that defendants are ‘baddies’ and so his response could be subject to a variety of 
interpretations. In the context of his interview as a whole, however, it would seem that J3 was 
not, in fact, joking at all.
53
 The attitudes of J3 and R2 have similarities with Kate Brown’s 
findings in her research on vulnerability and young people and behaviour.
54
 In an interview 
with a senior manager of the Youth Offending Services, she found that young offenders are 
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This is also similar to trends identified by Goodey in her work on victimhood. She found that 
‘ideas about … victims are restricted by social constructions of appropriate victimhood’
56
 – 
to be assigned status as a victim one needs to be viewed as deserving and innocent and in no 
way blameworthy for the situation resulting in their victimisation.
57
 This may explain why 
R2’s experience is that defendants are not thought to be ‘that vulnerable’ – because the 
reason for the criminal trial, within which they may be in a position of vulnerability when 
giving evidence, is their own (presumed) misconduct. Thus, according to Brown, such 
transgressive activity or behaviour can potentially lead to the withdrawal of vulnerability 
status,
58
 or even a difficulty attaining the status of vulnerable at all.
59
 This may further 
explain the poor identification of defendant vulnerability discussed in section 5.6 – the 
defendant’s status as the accused may prevent some criminal practitioners from recognising 
their vulnerability at all. 
The second way in which my respondents indicate the presumption of guilt operates among 
the profession is that, regardless of their vulnerability status, defendants are not viewed as 
deserving of special measures assistance:  
Either he’s guilty of all this [the indictments] and so doesn’t deserve special measures, or 
he’s innocent in which case he doesn’t need any of this [special measures]. That is, I 
suspect, the approach. [J3] 
The problem with special measures [for defendants] is two-fold. One, he’s the defendant 
… ‘If he’s old enough to commit the crime, he’s old enough to do the time’ attitudes. 
This sort of thing is inescapable, but not enough is done to neutralise it. [R3] 
But obviously, if he’s [the defendant’s] been accused of doing something, should he be 
afforded the benefits of the people who are alleging they have been assaulted or raped or 
whatever? I’ve a tendency to say no; but maybe that’s because I’m a prosecutor. [PS2] 
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J3’s understanding of the approach towards defendants was that if they are guilty (which 
many are presumed to be) they do not deserve special measures and if they are innocent they 
do not need them. This demonstrates that some members of the profession may 
misunderstand the purpose of special measures, since a vulnerable defendant, guilty or 
otherwise, may be both entitled to and need special measures to participate effectively as a 
witness in their defence. PS2’s view of defendants was that they should not be privy to the 
same assistance as ‘victims’, even prior to conviction. Their position as the accused was 
sufficient, in her view, to render them undeserving of special measures support. PS2’s 
position seemed to come with an interesting and yet equally damning caveat: 
You could have a vulnerable defendant who has just found himself in the wrong place at 
the wrong time. [PS2] 
 
The situations in which PS2 may feel that a vulnerable defendant is deserving of special 
measures assistance were those in which the defendant was wrongly accused or caught up in 
something unlawful for which she perceived them to have only marginally involvement. For 
this CPS solicitor, therefore, the innocent, and perhaps those who have ‘fallen into’ playing a 
minor role in a criminal offence, deserve special measures. The guilty, or those with more 
than a minor role in the criminal activity in question, do not.  
Another interesting angle to this issue is derived from the following quote: 
…the problem is young people of good character where more consideration should be 
given. [J5] 
 
The inverse of this is that the lack of provision of special measures to defendants of bad 
character is not as concerning to this respondent. This can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
the very fact that a defendant has previous antecedents may, itself, render them undeserving 
of special measures assistance for some criminal practitioners. Second, the existence of a 





character evidence can result in unfair prejudice against the defendant.
60
 For example, it can 
cause prejudicial reasoning, which involves jurors placing too much weight on bad character 
evidence and thus concluding that the defendant ‘must have done it this time’ too.
61
 
Alternatively (or perhaps additionally) bad character evidence can cause moral prejudice, 
where the jury abandons the commitment to convict the defendant on the evidence 
presented.
62
 Instead, on the basis of the evidence of bad character, they conclude that the 
defendant is a ‘bad person’ and convict regardless of the strength of the prosecution case in 
the present trial.
63
 These prejudices might also creep into the way that criminal practitioners 
frame their decisions about whether to apply for special measures for defendants, and affirm 
the presumption of guilt which is seemingly already present within the criminal justice 
system. 
As discussed in section 3.4, the presumption of innocence requires that the defendant should 
be treated as if s/he is innocent pre-conviction (including pre-trial).
64
 This is irrespective of 
their previous criminal record. The above quotes indicate quite clearly that this approach is 
not always adopted and the subsequent effect this has on defendant use of special measures. It 
is perhaps unsurprising that the defendant’s position as the accused is influential in this 
negative way in practitioner’s decisions at ‘street-level’
65
 – ie where decisions about 
vulnerability and special measures are made in practice. This is because the initial exclusion 
of defendants from special measures legislation was based on an attitudinal presumption of 
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 The political context has been one in which defendants are viewed as ‘criminals’ 
attempting to evade conviction in criminal trials.
67
 This shows how, as per Hawkins’ 
conceptual framework, action and attitudes in the surround can influence the way in which 
criminal practitioners frame decisions about special measures and vulnerability.
68
  
McConville et al have previously identified the existence of the deserving/undeserving 
dichotomy in relation to the treatment of those accused of crimes. They highlighted the 
criminal defence’s perception that their legally aided clients did not deserve to go to trial.
69
 
This was because the defence viewed them as a particular class of poor people and the fees 
received from legal aid were not thought to warrant the work associated with a trial.
70
 A large 
proportion of defence work is still funded by legal aid.
71
 If a lawyer is representing a client in 
a trial that they do not believe they deserve to have (because of their poverty and assumed 
guilt), then it is yet less likely that they will consider them deserving of special measures to 
assist them to participate in that trial.  
My interviewees also indicated that the presumption of guilt can affect special measures 
decisions more widely than just with regards to defendants. For example, presuming that the 
accused is guilty may serve to bolster a prosecution witness’ (particularly complainant’s) 
application for special measures: 
…the court ought to apply the same criteria, but it’s easier for the prosecution to prove it 
[vulnerability], because they can say ‘this is what happened to my client’. [B2] 
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This demonstrates that it may be easier to make the case for a prosecution witness’ need for 
special measures on the basis of an assumption that the ‘victim’ or witness is telling the truth. 
I discussed in section 6.2.3 the role that the nature of a witness’ evidence may play in the 
legal profession’s judgment as to whether the quality of that evidence is likely to be 
diminished if special measures are not used. The structural positioning of the witness in the 
proceedings may also feed into this decision. This is because an assumption of the 
defendant’s guilt may result in a belief that the victim is telling the truth. Special measures 
thus become warranted to avoid what would otherwise be an almost inevitable diminution in 
the quality of evidence elicited from the ‘traumatised’ victim. 
The presumption of guilt may thus have the dual effect of making the defendant undeserving 
of special measures and the victim and/or prosecution witnesses deserving. Defence 
witnesses may also be lumped in with defendants in the undeserving category, simply 
because they are not: 
 …a ‘victim’ [said sarcastically] or a friend of a victim… [R3] 
The defence witness’ association with the (guilty) defendant may further taint the way in 
which they are viewed by the legal profession. This is evident in reasons offered for why 
defence witnesses seldom use special measures, including that they are: 
 …friends of the defendant … [J2] 
 …there to help the defendant. [B4] 
The implication here may be that defence witnesses are less deserving of special measures as 
a result of the purpose for which they are giving evidence. If the defendant is presumed 
guilty, and a witness is giving evidence in their defence, then their cause is not one to which 
the profession is sympathetic. This may also transpose onto considerations of the defendant’s 





considered deserving of assistance. B4 recalled a case in which a child defendant was 
permitted to use special measures to give evidence: 
 When it came to him giving evidence he was essentially a prosecution witness. [B4] 
I discussed this quote previously in this chapter in relation to the effect that the nature of the 
evidence may have on way that criminal practitioners instrumentally frame special measures 
and a witness’/defendant’s need for such. In light of considerations about the moral framing 
of special measures, the profession might additionally view such a defendant, who testifies 
against a co-defendant, as deserving of special measures assistance to do so. 
6.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored insights from my interviews on how the legal profession 
frames special measures from instrumental and moral perspectives. Instrumentally, some of 
my respondents framed special measures as tools which secure witness attendance. Among 
many of the practitioners I interviewed, there seems to be a perception that special measures 
are for the prosecution. There seems to be a difficulty seeing beyond the idea that special 
measures are to keep a witness outside of the courtroom and/or out of the defendant’s sight, 
which in turn negatively affects the perceived benefit of them for defendant or defence 
witnesses. This seems to be further embedded by the view that the nature of the evidence 
given is intrinsically related to one’s status as vulnerable and in need of special measures.  
In other words, this and other structural differences between the defendant and non-defendant 
witnesses is used by criminal practitioners as a justification for their differential treatment 
with regards to special measures. Framing special measures in this way might appear to be 
premised on the principle of equality — that different groups should be treated differently. 
However, as demonstrated in this chapter, neither the fact that the defendant is already 





screens completely for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants. The principle of equality is 
thus erroneously applied by the legal profession in this regard. They are seeing only the 
differences, and not the similarities, between vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants and 
other such witnesses. This results in a lack of coherence in the provision of special measures 
in practice. 
The perceived deservingness of a witness or defendant for special measures assistance seems 
to be heavily influenced by the existence of a presumption of guilt. This affects the way in 
which criminal practitioners morally frame their decisions on whether or not to apply for 
special measures. My respondents indicate that a defendant, presumed guilty, is viewed as 
undeserving of special measures. Thus, even if a defence solicitor is aware of the existence of 
special measures, has identified their client’s vulnerability, and can see how special measures 
could ensure that the defendant can effectively participate in the trial as a witness, their view 
that the defendant does not deserve such assistance (due to an attitudinal presumption of 
guilt) can act as a further barrier to the equal provision of special measures to all court users. 
The same is true of defence witnesses who may, by extension, be viewed as undeserving of 
assistance due to their role in assisting ‘guilty’ defendants. 
This chapter has also demonstrated the various ways in which the legal profession may frame 
special measures decisions with regards to tactics – ie with regards to the effect of special 
measures on the impact of the evidence elicited and the jury’s perception of the beneficiary of 
the measure. This instrumental frame seems to play a significant role in decisions about 
defendants and defence witnesses use of special measures, by further deterring the profession 
from invoking the available assistance. This issue is developed further in the next chapter. As 
we shall see there, the application of organisational and legal frames feeds into understanding 






CHAPTER 7: ORGANISATIONAL 
AND LEGAL FRAMES 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This is the final substantive chapter in this thesis. Within it, I continue to draw on my 
interview data and to apply Hawkins’ conceptual framework to explore other issues which 
appear to affect criminal practitioners’ decisions about whether to apply for special measures 
for vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. This draws on Hawkins’ organisational and 
legal frames. The effects and influences of the broader political, economic and social 
surround and the organisation of the legal field in which decision-making takes place are vital 
to understanding the role that the organisational and legal frames play in special measures 
decisions. All of this serves to further depict the poor commitment to equality that is 
embodied in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. 
Organisational frames relate to the legal profession’s desire to meet external expectations and 
to demonstrate competence within the constraints of the available resources.
1
 In Hawkins’ 
health and safety context, organisational frames concern the action that a decision-maker 
views as expected of them within a regulatory agency, or as personally desirable for them to 
take.
2
 It is about displaying competence on both an organisational and a personal level by 
meeting wider expectations from the surround and within the legal field. With regards to 
decision-making around special measures, organisational frames also relate to what is 
expected of the legal profession within the legal field and the surround, and how a ‘competent 
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lawyer’ is viewed in this environment. The available funding is also relevant to this, as well 
as how this may shape the expectations of lawyers within the system.   
Hawkins’ final frame is the legal frame, which for him concerned whether a prosecution for a 
health and safety breach can be made in accordance with the legal requirements.
3
 In the 
context of special measures the legal frame is the eligibility criteria contained within the 
YJCEA or relevant parts of the common law. These criteria outline when a court user should 
be considered vulnerable and/or intimidated and thus a special measures is available for use.
4
  
It is the legal frame that is discussed in this chapter first. This is followed by a consideration 
of the various organisational frames which may be relevant to criminal practitioners. It is 
difficult to truly separate the legal and organisational frames, as in reality they seem to be 
bound up together in a complex relationship. This becomes evident throughout the chapter. 
7.2. Legal frame 
The role that the legal frame plays in decisions about the use of special measures appears 
rather different depending on whether the criminal practitioner in question (and thus the 
vulnerable and/or intimidated court user under consideration) is for the prosecution or the 
defence. Understanding why this is requires a look back at the socio-political surround in 
which the law of special measures was enacted and has developed. This was discussed in 
depth in section 5.5 to explain why some criminal practitioners were unaware of the special 
measures assistance available to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses. The 
surround is geared towards protecting victims and prosecution witnesses and enabling them 
to give their best evidence in court. Special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-
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defendant witnesses were thus enacted in the YJCEA to achieve these aims.
5
 Defendants 
were excluded from this statutory scheme. This left it largely to the courts, with occasional 
‘grudging’
6
 recognition from Parliament, to try to achieve some equality for vulnerable 
and/or intimidated defendant witnesses in the provision of special measures.
7
  
As a result of the markedly different ways in which the law has developed for non-defendant 
and defendant witnesses, the implementation of that law is subject to a disparate degree of 
scrutiny from within the surround.
8
 The level of scrutiny has differed between the prosecution 
and the defence parties generally, rather than mirroring that of the developmental disparity 
between defendants and non-defendants. This, of course, reflects the socio-political 
preference for the prosecution over the defence. The use and effectiveness of special 
measures for prosecution witnesses has thus been the subject of several evaluation studies.
9
 
Furthermore, the failure of the courts to ensure that sexual assault victims use special 
measures when giving evidence (such as Mrs A)
10
 has received public and official criticism. 
The level of scrutiny to which the provision of defendant and defence witness special 
measures use has been subject has been comparably negligible.
11
  
As a result of the above variables, the legal frame appears to be prioritised rather differently 
by the prosecution and defence. It is logical that the primacy of the legal frame is connected 
to the level of scrutiny of the implementation of special measures to which the parties are 
subjected (and the subsequent organisation of the legal field). This is because it affects the 
level of discretion which each party enjoys in this regard. Thus, the legal frame appears to be 
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the dominant frame for the prosecution. This means that they first consider the eligibility 
criteria
12
 in the YJCEA
13
 and second whether the ‘victim’ or witness in question meets these 
criteria. If so, then an application for special measures is likely to be made.  
For the defence, I suggest that the legal frame is often, though not always,
14
 the penultimate 
frame that a criminal practitioner applies. The extent of their discretion, due to the absence of 
scrutiny, permits the instrumental and moral frames to be the dominant frames that a defence 
practitioner employs.
15
 These address, as discussed in Chapter 6, whether the defendant or 
defence witness needs special measures, whether they are tactically advantageous, and 
whether they deserve them. If it is concluded that the defendant/defence witness does need 
and deserve special measures support then the legal frame will be applied. The practitioner 
will assess whether the court user in question is eligible under the legal test and endeavour to 
frame the case within the confines of the legal provision of special measures to these groups 
of court users. Following this, there may then be a consideration of the organisational frame, 
which is discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
The different role that the legal frame plays in the decision for special measures helps us to 
understand why the instrumental frame regarding guilty pleas may play a more central role 
for the defence than for the prosecution.
16
 Similarly, it may explain why the defence can also 
give more weight to tactical concerns, such as those for achieving ‘best evidence’ in impact 
                                                          
12
 See section 3.2. (p44-47). 
13
 The organisational ‘bureaucratic frame’ plays an important role here and is discussed in section 7.3. 
14
 I return to this later in this chapter in section 7.4. (p252-54). 
15
 Prioritising the instrumental frame over the legal frame might, from a more cynical viewpoint, simply mean 
that the defence lawyer can avoid the additional work that a decision to apply for special measures creates. 
Tata’s ‘ethical indeterminacy’ concept is useful to understanding this. If there is ‘a range of reasonably 
defensible ways’ in which a lawyer can approach a situation, Tata argues that ‘the lawyer will tend to advise the 
client to decide in the lawyer’s own interests’. In the special measures context not using special measures in 
order to protect the impact of their client’s evidence is in keeping with a lawyer’s own goals of avoiding extra 
work. The discretion that the defence enjoys in the legal field may thus permit them to act in this way unscathed. 
See Cyrus Tata, ‘In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid, Supply, Demand, and ‘Ethical 
Indeterminacy’ in Criminal Defence Work’ (2007) 34(4) Journal of Law and Society 489, 491-96.  
16





terms than can the prosecution.
17
 The discretion to which the defence is privy leaves them 
free to take the above issues, and others discussed in Chapter 6, into account in their special 
measures decisions. The lack of prosecutorial discretion means that such options are not open 
to them in the same way.  
All of this bears strong relation to the organisational frames at play. The organisational 
frames are discussed in the next section of this chapter. I first outline broadly what the 
organisational frame is, showing why it is so bound up and intertwined with the legal frame. I 
then move on to discuss more specific organisational frames which criminal practitioners for 
the prosecution and for the defence may invoke. 
7.3. Organisational Frames 
As outlined at the start of this chapter, organisational frames in this context are those which 
define what is expected of a criminal practitioner and how they demonstrate their competence 
within the confines of the available resources. I have shown at various junctures in this 
thesis
18
 that there is an expectation that counsel for the prosecution will ensure that special 
measures are applied for on behalf of vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses. However there 
is no comparable expectation on the defence. This is because the way each party frames the 
expectations of them is intrinsically related to the organisation of the legal field and the wider 
surround.  
In the previous section I recapped the lack of discretion that the prosecution has over special 
measures use because of the high level of external scrutiny to which their decisions are 
subjected. The primary application of the legal frame in this context can thus be interpreted as 
a response to the expectation that they secure special measures for vulnerable and/or 
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intimidated witnesses. In turn, one way in which a criminal practitioner for the prosecution 
demonstrates their competence is by ensuring that special measures are in place for such 
witnesses ahead of trial. This shows how intertwined the legal and organisational frames are 
– applying for special measures due to an absence of discretion (applying the legal frame) 
simultaneously meets the expectations on the prosecution that they do so (thus fulfilling their 
organisational frame). This relationship between the legal and organisational frames is 
explored in the next section on the ‘bureaucratic frame’.  
7.3.1. Bureaucratic frame 
The bureaucratic frame is an organisational frame which is employed to assist the prosecution 
in demonstrating their competence and meeting those external expectations of them. As 
discussed in section 5.5.4, the socio-political surround and the scrutiny of special measures 
implementation has influenced the way that the legal field is organised. In order to ensure that 
the prosecution meets the external expectations from the surround – by securing special 
measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses – various processes have been created 
for those working in this area. 
To briefly recap,
19
 the application process for special measures for non-defendant witnesses 
starts with the police, who are prompted to consider whether the witness requires such 
support when completing their witness statement.
20
 If they do think special measures are 
needed, they then complete an MG2 form detailing why they are required and which one(s). 
In the process of fulfilling this role, the police seek the witness’ views on their state of 
vulnerability and/or intimidation and the potential measures available to them. This 
information is then handed over to the CPS with the case file. If the CPS decides to charge 
the suspect, then the details of this are recorded on the MG3 form along with any information 
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about vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses and their special measures preferences. This 
enables special measures to be applied for ahead of trial. 
Ericson and Haggerty note that ‘communication formats’ limit police discretion in decision 
making.
21
 Applying this idea to the special measures context means that the paper trail of 
‘MG forms’ will limit the ability of those involved in the application process to decide not to 
apply the legal frame. The requirement that these forms are completed strengthens the 
expectations on criminal practitioners, this time emanating from within the legal field, to 
apply for special measures for eligible prosecution witnesses. This ‘communication format’ is 
thus likely to ensure that cases are set up along a track on which special measures are 
secured.  
For the prosecution, therefore, the legal frame seems embedded within the bureaucracy 
frame. The eligibility provisions contained within the YJCEA for non-defendant witness 
special measures are complex. In reality, those making special measures assessments and 
decisions are unlikely to ever turn to the legislative provisions themselves. A simplified 
version of the eligibility criteria contained within the Act is reproduced in the special 
measures application forms used in practice. Young notes in the context of legal aid that such 
prompt-laden form-filling ‘focus[es] the attention of [those applying] on the factors which the 
law states must be taken into account’.
22
 The bureaucratic process through which special 
measures are secured mirrors this. The ‘MG’ forms thus flatten the legal criteria making their 
application more manageable. The legal frame thus becomes subsidiary to the bureaucracy 
frame. 
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The fact that this bureaucratic process commences so early in the criminal process serves to 
limit the little choice that counsel for the prosecution has with regards to special measures. 
For example, counsel may have been of the view that a witness on the cusp of vulnerability 
could give evidence sufficiently well without the use of special measures.
23
 Since the primary 
responsibility for making such assessments falls on the police and CPS, a decision may 
already have been made by them contrary to this: 
In one sense, special measures, once it gets to counsel, is always a fait accompli. You’re 
instructed to ask… [R3] 
 
This may also be the case in terms of which special measure counsel would choose. The 
prosecution has a degree of choice, mindful of the witness’ preferences,
24
 as to the special 
measure for which it applies. The selection may be made without counsel’s input, again due 
to the police and CPS setting the special measures process in motion:  
Not usually counsel that applies, usually someone from the CPS … usually taken out of 
our hands… [B2] 
Not really counsel that applies; usually someone from the CPS. [R3] 
As far as the police and CPS go there is an assumption that a particular special measure, 
usually giving evidence by way of live link, will be applied for . . . [J1] 
I don’t think it is thought about [which special measure] at an early enough stage. They 
[prosecution witnesses] have often already been promised something else. [J5] 
 
Once the initial decisions have been made it may be difficult for counsel to reverse them. 
This was illustrated by one of my respondents: 
I think that whilst special measures can be changed at any stage, once a decision has been 
made people are very reluctant to readdress it. [J5] 
 
This is in keeping with the unreported case of R v C which was discussed in section 4.2.3. 
The complainant in this case had been promised special measures, and the trial judge felt he 
could not reverse this decision as her expectation, based on previous discussions, was that she 
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would be awarded such support to give evidence.
25
 Early conversations between the police, 
CPS and the witness as to the special measure(s) they think would be most beneficial may 
thus make it challenging for a barrister to alter or refuse to make the application ahead of 
trial. Even when one of my respondents thinks there is no merit in an application, their 
approach to dealing with the ‘over-promising’ to a witness is ostensibly to keep to the ‘deal’:  
The best thing, in practice, to do is to make an application and let the judge refuse it. 
Because then the practical reality is you can turn round to a witness and say ‘we made 
that application, we gave it our best shot.’ [PS1] 
 
The division of labour between those who set the special measures application in motion and 
those who ultimately represent the client in court helps us understand why counsel might 
wish to change the type of special measures applied for. Securing special measures for 
vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses is a process Hawkins would describe 
as ‘serial decision-making’.
26
 This is because the power to make the decision about special 
measures is dispersed across individuals in the process: 
[A] decision by an individual frequently does not settle matters (though a 
particular individual may set a case on a particular course which will lead, 
inexorably, to a particular destination), but merely makes a decision that leads to 




As a result, the ‘decision makers acting at different points might be expected to have different 
priorities’.
28
 For instance, the police and CPS appear to operate through a dominant 
bureaucratic frame to ensure that special measures are secured when needed to meet the 
external expectation of protecting the vulnerable. While this is a concern that counsel shares, 
they have additional instrumental factors to consider such as the impact of the evidence 
secured from a witness.
29
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There appears, then, to be an element of ‘prosecutorial momentum’
30
 at play in the special 
measures process; whereby counsel for the prosecution essentially becomes a decision 
confirmer rather than a decision maker. This is because it is more difficult to reverse a 
decision made by the police/CPS than to reach a different decision in the first place. Early 
decisions made thus ‘close off or profoundly restrict the choices open to a later decision 
maker.’
31
 This, and the different priorities held by those at the various stages of the serial-
decision making process, help us to understand why prosecution witnesses still give their 
evidence by live link despite the large consensus within the profession that the best, most 
impactful, evidence is that delivered live in court.
32
  
An additional factor limiting prosecuting counsel’s discretion with regards to special 
measures is the role of Victim Support and The Witness Service.
33
 A witness’ contact with 
these agencies acts as a further check to ensure that all vulnerable and/or intimidated 
witnesses have the support that they need to give their evidence effectively. My respondents 
showed how this process can, again, mean that counsel for the prosecution finds that their 
witnesses have been ‘promised’ various special measures support ahead of the trial:  
Well it’s very easy isn’t it? If you’re sitting at the end of the phone and you’re employed 
in a witness care capacity, and you’ve got a domestic violence victim saying I don’t want 
to come to court and give evidence – what is the biggest thing in their armour? The best 
thing for them to do is to turn round and go ‘well actually we can offer you special 
measures’. [PS2] 
I think they [prosecution witnesses] can be over promised things by certain agencies, to 
be honest. I think they are told ‘don’t worry you’ll get special measures, you won’t have 
to see him, you won’t have to be in the same room as him’ sort of thing. … I think where 
our fault as an organisation comes is sometimes, unless it’s patently obvious, we do not 
think about the special measure we are trying to obtain. [PS1] 
 
In summary, all of these factors hugely limit the discretion counsel for the prosecution enjoys 
in terms of whether, and which, special measures are applied for. Not only are they 
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constrained because of the scrutiny from within the socio-political surround, but the very 
existence of that scrutiny and the procedures set up to ensure that it is met further constrain 
barristers’ decisions. This is because the special measures process starts so early, involving 
meetings with the witness themselves, thus setting cases up along a track on which special 
measures will be secured. One respondent speculated in interview that: 
I think that they [prosecuting counsel] would rather, given a choice, being brutal, they 
would rather sacrifice the victim to give them the chance of winning. [DS2] 
 
Instead, it seems that counsel for the prosecution must affirm the decision for special 
measures in order to meet the expectations on them from within the legal field. Such 
expectations come from the police, the CPS, Victim Support, The Witness Service, and the 
witness themselves. Meeting these expectations is thus one way in which the barrister 
subsequently demonstrates their competence as a lawyer, and this is so notwithstanding any 
private misgivings they may have about using special measures.  
The absence of scrutiny from the surround on defence uptake of special measures means that 
the way in which the legal field is organised for the prosecution is not mirrored for the 
defence. This means that there are no set forms to complete to demonstrate that special 
measures have been considered. As a corollary, the bureaucratic frame is not relevant when 
dealing with defendants or defence witnesses. The defence team has sole responsibility, aside 
from an initial needs assessment conducted by the police,
34
 for considering special measures 
for the defendant and defence witnesses
35
: 
I think perhaps we [defence counsel] need to be more acute to the idea of telling the 
defence witnesses you can have it [special measures assistance] because they don’t get 
sat down by the police and they don’t have Witness Services calling them all the time. 
[B2] 
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…defence witnesses aren’t as easily served by The Witness Services and Victim Support, 
and that’s partly the fault of defence lawyers not putting them in touch with those 
services. … If you sit someone down with someone from Witness Services for twenty 
minutes the question, ‘have you applied for special measures?’ will get asked. They will 
tell them, ‘these measures exist; do you think you need them?’ [DS3] 
 
This leaves the defence with much more discretion over how to proceed. They are able to 
leave a vulnerable defendant without special measures assistance in favour of instrumental 
goals such as enhancing the impact of their evidence by ensuring it is heard live, in court in a 
way that the prosecution cannot. The context in which special measures operate – both within 
and outside of the legal system – places a disparate emphasis on the importance of special 
measures for the vulnerable. Such an inconsistent approach in the way that lawyers frame 
their decisions for special measures in practice thus further embeds the law’s incoherence 
with regards to equality. 
7.3.2. Special measures as an ‘insurance net’ 
Given the comparative absence of expectations on defence advocates to secure special 
measures for their witnesses and clients,
36
 some defence lawyers may believe (perhaps 
correctly) that something different entirely is expected of them within the legal field. One of 
the defence solicitors interviewed in this research suggested that a competent defence lawyer 
should adequately prepare their clients for trial without needing to invoke special measures: 
I usually have gauged whether my client will be robust and the clients I think will be 
particularly nervous – I have already assessed that well in advance and talked them 
through it, reassured them, and explained the process. … So special measures are an 
insurance net, just in case they aren’t very good and because the lawyer can’t deal with 
[the defendant’s vulnerability] personally. So I think that’s why I think less about special 
measures; because I would like to think that any competent defence lawyer will prepare a 
client they think is vulnerable well for giving evidence. [DS1] 
 
This respondent frames special measures as a device for incompetent defence lawyers. To 
demonstrate competence, therefore, a lawyer would presumably need to avoid applying for 
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special measures. There are several issues with his view. First, his perception is based on an 
idealised notion of defence lawyering, whereby there is continuous representation of a client 
from the beginning of the process through to the trial. He notes how he will ‘have already 
assessed’ the client and ‘talked them through it, reassured them’. The existing research 
suggests,
37
 however, that the reality of defence lawyering is somewhat different. Instead, 
unqualified legal clerks may be sent to interview clients. Lawyers often juggle multiple cases 
at once and thus have to return briefs
38
 which other lawyers must pick up at short notice. As 
discussed in section 5.6, the discontinuous representation of clients can make it difficult to 
identify vulnerability. It seems unlikely therefore that these conditions are conducive to 
lawyers adequately preparing clients with vulnerabilities for trial.  
A further issue with DS1’s view is whether lawyers have the expertise to adequately prepare 
a vulnerable client to give evidence. As discussed in section 4.2.6., a client with a learning 
disability or mental health problems is best assisted by a trained intermediary. As noted in the 
Court of Appeal in the Sevenoaks Youth Court case, ‘it is in the highest degree unlikely that 
this level of help can be given by a lawyer, however kind and sympathetic she may be’.
39
 
Hoyano reiterated this, stating that ‘sympathy and compassion cannot compensate for the 
cognitive deficits of defendants with comprehension as well as communication difficulties’.
40
  
It is perhaps unsurprising that lawyers might believe that they can deal with a defendant’s 
vulnerability themselves given the Court of Appeal’s lead on this in R v Cox.
41
 The court 
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ruled that when an intermediary cannot be obtained for a vulnerable defendant the trial judge 
can compensate for this by adapting their role.
42
 The Lord Chief Justice went further than this 
in the case of R v Rashid.
43
 Under the subheading ‘The duties of the competent advocate and 
of the court’, it was ruled that ‘in all but the rarest of cases’ an advocate will be able to ensure 
that a vulnerable defendant can fully participate in the trial without an intermediary.
44
  
In addition to this, it was suggested that an advocate lacking the requisite competence to do 
this would be replaced, rather than the alternative of ‘providing an intermediary for the 
defendant for the whole trial.’
45
 As discussed in section 4.2.6, the suggestion that a 
(competent) criminal practitioner can negate the need for an intermediary when a defendant 
has serious communication difficulties is problematic. The position that the Court of Appeal 
has adopted, however, may reinforce the view that a competent defence lawyer should be 
able to conduct a case absent the use of special measures. Defence advocates may thus be 
deterred from making applications for intermediaries (and perhaps other special measures) at 
risk of it calling their professional competence into question.  
Special measures are not framed as an ‘insurance net’ in this way with regards to counsel for 
the prosecution. As discussed above, to demonstrate competence as counsel for the 
prosecution, it seems that the complete opposite approach is taken – that they must ensure 
special measures are secured when required. This dichotomous approach to framing special 
measures is thus likely to further undermine any attempt to foster a coherent commitment to 
the principle of equality in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated 
court users in practice.  
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Whether or not a substantial number of defence practitioners frame special measures as an 
insurance net, as DS1 did (above), is not discernible from the data in this project. This 
qualitative study merely provides an insight
46
 into the way that some defence lawyers may 
frame competence and the expectations of them within the legal field. However, it is 
reasonable to assume, following the guidance from the Court of Appeal in Rashid, that DS1 
will not be alone in this view. 
7.3.3. Resources – funding 
There are specific resource issues relating to intermediary provision. These relate to both the 
funding arrangements and sourcing an appropriately qualified intermediary who matches the 
needs of the vulnerable court user requiring assistance. It is these matters which are discussed 
in the remainder of this section. 
As highlighted in section 4.2.6, all vulnerable court users with communication difficulties can 
secure the use of an intermediary for the purposes of giving evidence. I have already 
discussed the disparities in the frequency of this provision between defendants and non-
defendants. I also highlighted that intermediaries for these groups are secured via different 
means: non-defendants via statute and defendants via the common law.
47
 The Witness 
Intermediary Scheme is managed by the National Crime Agency on behalf of the Ministry of 
Justice and provides and funds intermediaries to non-defendant witnesses.  
Initially, via the Witness Intermediary Scheme, the Ministry of Justice funded the use of 
intermediaries for vulnerable defendants on an ad hoc basis. The Court of Appeal in C v 
Sevenoaks Youth Court was clear that the Ministry of Justice had no obligation to do so in the 
absence of statutory power.
48
 This funding was withdrawn for defendant intermediaries in 
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August 2011 ‘because of the pressure of requests for witnesses’.
49
 Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeal disallowed payment of the costs of an intermediary for a defendant out of the central 
funds.
50
 A difficulty in sourcing adequate funding for defendant intermediaries has since 
plagued the provision of them to vulnerable defendants.
51
 My respondents affirmed this in 
interview: 
Funding is quite awkward at the moment. It’s a whole chapter in its own right, sadly. 
[R3] 
It’s [funding] a bit of a problem actually, if I’m honest with you. [J2] 
Yes there are huge funding issues. [J3]  
…funding is an issue, sadly. I’ve seen it before where people we think are vulnerable, 
and they say no you’re fine get on with it – issue about defence paying for it or the court 
paying for it. [R2] 
 
As is indicated in the above quotes, the lack of funding in this area is a factor which may 
diminish a vulnerable defendant’s chance of securing an intermediary to assist them to give 
evidence. This is particularly so since there seemed to be some uncertainty among the 
respondents about where funding would be sought in the event that an intermediary was 
granted for a vulnerable defendant:  
…it comes down to funding – who is going to pay for it? [B4] 
…they would never get the money [for a defendant intermediary] from the Legal Aid 
Agency, would they? [J5] 
The difficulty you then get is how you fund it. Because it’s not yet in statute form there’s 
this desperate, stupid fudge where I think the Legal Services Commission pay for the 
preparatory work (the preliminary interview with the intermediary getting to know you, 
the intermediary’s report) and when it gets to court the Ministry of Justice have an 
agreement in place to pay for that chunk of the cost. But I think that’s a pretty informal 
arrangement; I don’t think it’s set in stone. [B1] 
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B1’s understanding of funding process seems accurate. In response to a freedom of 
information request by Cooper and Wurtzel, the Legal Services Commission (LSC) provided 
the following statement on the issue of defendant intermediary funding:  
The LSC have an agreement with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and Her 
Majesty’s Court and Tribunal Service (HMCTS) regarding the funding of an 
intermediary in Crime matters. In publicly funded Crime matters the LSC will 
bear the cost of an intermediary’s initial conference with the client/solicitors 
whilst HMCTS will pay for an intermediary’s attendance at trial. Prior authority 
can be sought in the usual manner for the fees of an intermediary for the initial 
work with the client and any conferences prior to the trial … Prior authority 
cannot be granted for an intermediary to attend court. Costs for the intermediary 
to attend court should be submitted to HMCTS in the same manner as any other 




The Ministry of Justice guidance on expert witness fees also states that ‘where an 
intermediary is required for a hearing an application could be made to HMCTS where 
appropriate’.
53
 Triangle, an intermediary provider for children and young adults up to the age 
of 25, states that it is the Legal Aid Agency (the successor to the Legal Services Commission) 
which funds intermediary assessments of suspects and defendants.
54
  
The funding arrangements for defendant intermediaries are thus complex and vary depending 
upon for which stage(s) of the process they are required. The subsequent disparity caused in 
its availability was highlighted by some of my respondents as problematic:  
I have difficulty in justifying it. I have difficulty in understanding why there are different 
regimes that are responsible for the funding of an intermediary regarding a defendant and 
regarding a prosecution witness. I do believe that the matter needs to be reviewed. [J1] 
One matter that struck me when I was thinking in advance before coming to see you is in 
terms of funding. Intermediaries, for example – it’s not cheap. Criminal Justice Services 
have to survive on scraps of funding as it is. There’s a huge imbalance there. So even if 
they want to make intermediaries available to defendants and non-defendants equally, the 
problem of funding will still inhibit this regardless of the status of the law. [R4] 
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The denial of intermediaries to defendants via the Witness Intermediary Service creates 
further problems. The service provides registered intermediaries to witnesses eligible via the 
statutory scheme (ie non-defendant witnesses), but not to defendant witnesses.
55
 Instead, 
defendant witnesses can only secure non-registered intermediaries. As discussed in section 
4.2.6 in the context of R(OP),
56
 there is a concern that quality of support provided by a non-
registered intermediary is inferior to that from registered intermediaries. Registered 
intermediaries are subject to a Code of Practice and Code of Ethics, as well as required to 
undertake Continuing Professional Development.
57
 While some registered intermediaries act 
as non-registered intermediaries for defendants,
58
 many non-registered intermediaries have 
not had comparable training to those working within the Witness Intermediary Service.
59
 This 
can mean, for example, that they do not understand the importance of impartiality or 
professional privilege, potentially jeopardising the fairness of the trial.
60
  
The unregulated provision of non-registered intermediaries for vulnerable defendant 
witnesses may have a further impact in terms of their fee. Henderson found that some of the 
judges and advocates she interviewed about intermediaries suggested that some non-
registered intermediaries were ‘over-charging’.
61
 This further accentuates existing difficulties 
with funding arrangements for the defence and is thus likely to further embed inequalities in 
their provision. 
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The absence of a regulated scheme for non-registered intermediaries also presents an issue in 
matching intermediaries to defendants’ needs.
62
 Historically, there has been limited guidance 
available to defence lawyers on securing an intermediary for a vulnerable defendant.
63
 The 
establishment of the intermediaries’ professional organisation, Intermediaries for Justice, 
launched in December 2014,
64
 may improve this. It has introduced a defence referral system 
with the aim of ‘creat[ing] a more level playing field, by providing solicitors with access to a 
range of intermediaries who may be able to assist with their vulnerable clients’.
65
 The 
existing inequality thus influenced this development. The intermediaries offered have 
received specialist training from the Ministry of Justice (if they also act as registered 
intermediaries for non-defendant witnesses), Communicourt or Triangle.
66
 While this 
improves the accessibility (and training) of intermediaries for defendant witnesses, it seems 
unlikely to substantially increase their use, since funding the intermediary remains a 
challenge. 
There is no principled justification for these differences, but their existence offers at least a 
partial explanation for why defendants use intermediaries to assist them in giving their 
evidence less frequently than non-defendant witnesses. The operation of two intermediary 
schemes for defendant and non-defendant witnesses arises solely from the different legal 
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authorities for their use. This shows that the source of law can have a significant bearing on 
the support that is available and sought in practice. The piecemeal process through which 
intermediaries are secured for defendant witnesses, if indeed they can be, may reasonably be 
assumed to result in a lesser expectation on the defence that they engage with this process. 
This is particularly so since the appellate courts have said that not securing an intermediary 
will not necessarily jeopardise the fairness of the trial.
67
  
To summarise, the defence and the courts have several practical hurdles to overcome to 
secure an appropriate intermediary for a vulnerable defendant witness. Defence lawyers 
funded by legal aid, already overburdened with work, may be disinclined to seek 
intermediaries because of the additional work that securing funding generates. Different 
lawyers from different firms (and types of firms) may frame the expectations of them 
differently. Solicitor at firms which McConville et al would describe as managerial firms
68
 
and Newman would describe as ‘sausage factory’ firms
69
 are encouraged to demonstrate 
competence through efficiency. Spending time applying for (and, in the case of 
intermediaries, funding and recruiting) special measures for vulnerable defendants when, 
instead, the lawyer could use that time to deal with another case file is not in keeping with the 
aim of efficiency or the expectations placed on them to secure the fee for multiple cases.
70
 
This seems particularly relevant if the lawyer proceeds on an assumption that the case will 
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crack and the trial will not go ahead.
71
 Negotiating the bureaucracy associated with securing 
an intermediary is an entirely poor use of a lawyer’s time for a trial that does not materialise.  
In addition, obtaining funding and finding an appropriate intermediary in these circumstances 
is likely to be a source of delay. This could deter judges who are mindful of their duty to 
effectively manage cases to ensure ‘speedy justice’
72
 from granting an intermediary for a 
defendant. Furthermore, it could deter defence lawyers themselves from applying for such 
support in a bid to avoid annoying the judge for causing such a delay in proceedings. The 
courtroom workgroup concept can help explain this latter point. This concept is used to 
understand the ‘decisions produced by, and dynamics within, criminal trial courts’ through an 
appreciation of ‘the relationships and norms that develop between those working repeatedly 
together in these settings’.
73
 The four shared goals of courtroom workgroups are: handling 
cases swiftly; maintaining group cohesion; ‘doing justice’; and reducing or controlling 
uncertainty in the courtroom.
74
  
A defence application for a defendant intermediary may thwart the shared goals of the 
courtroom workgroup. Seeking funding for an intermediary as well as actually finding one 
with skills that match the defendant’s needs will cause an inevitable delay in the proceedings. 
It could also add uncertainty in the courtroom with regards to when the case should be listed 
for trial and for how long. These uncertainties and delays may, in turn, diminish workgroup 
cohesion. Whether the intervention of special measures is viewed as furthering the aim of 
‘doing justice’ is perhaps also a matter of uncertainty following the Court of Appel’s ruling in 
Cox that the absence of an intermediary will not render the trial unfair. In contrast, 
applications for special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant 
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prosecution witnesses may be accepted within courtroom workgroups as unavoidable and 
desirable. Their necessity for the prosecution to demonstrate competence by meeting the 
expectations from within the surround and the legal field might mean that it is accepted 
within the courtroom workgroup as normal procedure.  
To summarise, inequalities in terms of the primacy of the legal and organisational frames, as 
discussed throughout this chapter, may affect the norms within courtroom workgroups. As a 
result, this may further diminish the defence’s willingness to apply for defendant 
intermediaries. Regrettably I do not have any data from my interviews to support this. 
However, since I did not take this concept into account when designing my interview 
schedule, absence of evidence does not necessarily mean evidence of absence.  
The final section of this chapter explores how the legal and organisational frames may 
operate with regards to special measures for vulnerable defendant witnesses. This may be 
problematic in the context of intermediary provision for defendants.  
7.4. Potential conflation of legal and organisational frames 
It is impossible, certainly from this small study, to discern which frames are dominant for the 
prosecution and defence when making decisions about special measures. The reality is that 
the various decision frames I have discussed are part of an entangled web of decision-
making. Different cases, defendants and circumstances are likely to produce diverse 
approaches by criminal practitioners. Furthermore, the way individual practitioners frame 
their decisions will also vary. Having said this, I have shown how the legal and organisational 
frames seem to be particularly entwined. For those dealing with prosecution witnesses, the 
legal frame appears embedded within the dominant bureaucratic frame. For the defence the 





the starkly different defence organisational frame; where the expectation of a competent 
lawyer is to prepare their client without special measures.  
A conflation of the legal and organisational frames thus seems somewhat inevitable in this 
regard. However, one area in which I think this conflation may present a real threat to 
upholding adequate protection and support of defendants is in relation to resources. The 
available resources (or lack thereof) should not result in a conclusion that a defendant is not 
eligible for special measures. Henderson highlights that guidance in The Advocate’s Gateway 
toolkit on Intermediaries is that ‘cost must not be a factor in deciding whether to request an 
assessment.’
75
 The legal test should always be considered before resources are taken into 
account. The following quote may suggest, however, that the available resources influence a 
decision about eligibility: 
They [intermediaries] are horrendously expensive to the public. …you feel that it’s your 
responsibility to consider [funding] when allowing a defendant to use an intermediary. 
[J2] 
 
This approach has seemingly been endorsed by the Lord Chief Justice. In the appeal case R v 
Rashid,
76
 Lord Thomas ruled that the trial judge had been correct to refuse an application for 
an intermediary for the entire trial
77
 because ‘he considered all the relevant matters, including 
the scarcity of intermediaries and of other resources…’
78
  
This marks a subtle, yet important, shift in position from that of the Court of Appeal in R v 
Cox. Here, the court ruled that where an intermediary had been granted, if one was not 
available, then the intermediary may not be necessary to continue the trial fairly.
79
 The Court 
of Appeal in Rashid, however, seems to factor the lack of resources into the initial judgment 
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about whether or not an application for an intermediary should be granted at all. This 
conflates matters of principle and policy,
80
 thus permitting the judicial denial of an 
intermediary to a vulnerable defendant for reasons other than their legal ineligibility. The lack 
of resources for vulnerable defendants thus infects the legal test. 
Given the prior discussion in section 7.3.3, this conflation of the legal and organisational 
frames where defendants are concerned will further diminish the number of successful 
applications made. This, in turn, may also reduce the number of applications that the defence 
makes at all given their knowledge of the scarcity of resources. The lack of commitment to 
equality is again evident here. It is to be regretted that the Lord Chief Justice did not, instead, 
take this opportunity to condemn the lack of adequate intermediary funding for vulnerable 
defendants. 
7.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the organisational and legal frames which the defence and the 
prosecution may apply when reaching their decisions about whether to apply for special 
measures for a vulnerable and/or intimidated court user. I have shown how the level of 
scrutiny within the surround seems to relate directly to the primacy of the legal frame in 
special measures decisions. For the prosecution, the legal frame is embedded within the 
dominant bureaucratic frame which ensures that special measures are applied for when 
required. The discretion enjoyed by the defence, due to the absence of scrutiny of their 
decisions, instead allows them to prioritise instrumental and moral concerns. The lack of 
coherence in the approach to special measures in the surround has thus impacted the 
organisation of the legal field and been further embedded in the way the legal profession 
frames special measures decisions as a result. 
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I have also shown how the expectations on the defence appear wholly different to those of the 
prosecution regarding special measures. This again affects the way that such lawyers frame 
their decisions and the subsequent commitment to equality in special measures provision. 
Competent defence lawyers are expected to manage their cases effectively without reliance 
on special measures provisions to help them with vulnerable participants; relegating special 
measures to nothing more than an ‘insurance net’. The prosecution, however, is expected to 
apply for special measures to show their compliance with the YJCEA in the protection of 
vulnerable and/or intimidated witnesses. 
At least so far as intermediaries are concerned, there is also a vast disparity in the available 
resources.
81
 The source of this disparity is the source of the authority for intermediary 
provision: for non-defendants it is via statute and so they are served by the accompanying 
Witness Intermediary Service from which defendants are excluded due to their authority for 
intermediaries emanating from the common law. Enacting the dormant statutory criteria for 
defendant intermediaries may go some way to remedying these issues and promoting equality 
of access to intermediaries for the vulnerable. Alone, however, it seems unlikely to change 
the organisational frames adopted or subsidiary role of the legal frame in decision-making. 
In the final section of this chapter I highlighted the dangers with conflating the lack of 
resources for defendants with the legal test for intermediaries. To deny an intermediary to a 
vulnerable defendant in law on the basis of the scarcity of resources in practice does not 
adequately protect their right to participate effectively in their trial as a witness if they wish to 
do so. 
                                                          
81
 Though screens and live link are already available in all court centres at no extra cost, see Samantha 
Fairclough, ‘“It doesn’t happen … and I never thought it was necessary to happen”: Barriers to Vulnerable 
Defendants Giving Evidence by Live Link in Crown Court Trials’ (2017) International Journal of Evidence and 





The next chapter is the conclusion, which summarises the answers to the research questions, 
acknowledges the limitations of this research and the scope for further research. It concludes 
with some recommendations for reform, which seek to put defendants on a more equal 






CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This thesis has explored the law’s commitment to the principle of equality in the provision of 
special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users who give evidence in Crown 
Court trials. In considering this, I adopted a socio-legal approach to uncovering the reality of 
special measures law in books and law in action. The standard of equality invoked in this 
thesis was derived from that which underpinned the development of the law of special 
measures for non-defendant witnesses. As summarised in section 3.4, this notion of equality 
requires that like people are treated in a like manner and different people are treated 
differently.
1
 It thus follows from this that absent a sufficient reason for unequal treatment the 
only rational option is to proceed on the basis of equality.
2
  
I subsequently used this principle of equality to assess whether the initial exclusion of 
defendants from special measures and the existing disparity in their provision to vulnerable 
and/or intimidated court users in law and practice is consistent with the notion of equality that 
the law itself has espoused. I then explored the extent of the commitment to equality in the 
provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users in practice.  
This is the first study which has systematically interrogated the law’s commitment to this 
standard of equality in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated 
court users. This thesis does not argue that equality should be prioritised in the provision of 
special measures above all other things (eg tactics). Nor does it commend the notion of 
equality to which the law subscribes as the best version of this principle. Instead, it looks at 
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the role that equality should play in the provision of special measures to all vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users in order for the law to embody internal coherence in this regard. This 
is a subtle but important restriction on the normative reach of this thesis.  
Equality has been considered in this thesis in two contexts. The first was with respect to a 
vulnerable and/or intimidated court user’s need for special measures to give evidence by 
comparison to a non-vulnerable and/or non-intimidated court user. The second, and more 
contentious issue, was equality in the context of a vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
witness’ need for special measures by comparison to their non-defendant witness 
counterparts.  
I found that the law’s commitment to the principle of equality in the provision of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users is inconsistent. It is inhibited by a 
combination of the way the law has developed, the organisation of the legal field, and the 
way that criminal practitioners frame special measures decisions.  
This chapter summarises the answers to the research questions that have been addressed in 
this thesis. It also makes the limitations of the research clear. This is followed by a 
consideration of future research projects that could be conducted to meet some of these 
limitations. In the final section of this chapter I consider how reform could be achieved to 
overcome the barriers to a more coherent application of the principle of equality in the 





8.2. Answers to the research questions
3
 
I first sought to ascertain the extent to which the notion of equality played a role in the 
development of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses. 
I have argued that while the language in which the development of special measures was 
framed was rarely that of equality, the notion of equality nevertheless underpinned the 
debates.
4
 The recognition that adaptations would need to be made to the standard way of 
giving evidence (live, in court) in order to accommodate the needs of the vulnerable and/or 
intimidated when giving evidence embodies the ideal of equality – treating different people 
differently in order to achieve overall equality.
5
 The provision of special measures can thus 
be understood as underpinned by the goal of providing witnesses of different ages and 
abilities an equal opportunity to give their best evidence
6
 in court. 
The exclusion of defendants from the provision of special measures was not in keeping with 
this goal. I have argued that differences between defendants and non-defendants, arising from 
their different structural position in the criminal trial, do not negate the need for special 
measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants.
7
 The exclusion of such defendants 
from the statutory scheme thus jeopardised their ability to participate effectively in the 
proceedings; as well as potentially amounting to a violation of the principle of equality of 
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arms and the presumption of innocence.
8
 This left the law in an incoherent state with regards 
to its commitment to equality in the provision of support to vulnerable and/or intimidated 
court users giving evidence in Crown Court trials. 
The notion of equality has, however, underpinned the development of the law of special 
measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses in the years following the 
YJCEA.
9
 Lawyer’s concerns about the position in which vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendants were left absent the provision of special measures led to a series of judicial review 
and appeal cases. These related to both vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants’ positions 
by comparison to ‘normal’ defendants and compared to those of non-defendant witnesses to 
whom special measures were available. The judiciary, and on occasion Parliament, has thus 
authorised the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
witnesses on these bases, in particular so that they can participate effectively in the trial as 
witnesses.
10
 This captures the essence of equality; since it ensures that disadvantaged 
defendants are provided extra assistance to give their evidence. The current state of the law, 
however, leaves the law’s commitment to the equality principle inconsistent. An unjustifiable 




The initial exclusion of defendants from the statutory special measures scheme can be 
understood with reference to the surround in which special measures were enacted.
12
 With the 
emphasis on ‘re-balancing the criminal justice system’ a zero-sum policy game dominated the 
political arena, where defendants were (and remain) pitted against victims in the quest for 
rights. This means that providing vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants with special 
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measures was (and still is) not in keeping with the ‘rebalancing’ agenda.
13
 The provision of 
them to non-defendant witnesses however, and especially to those for the prosecution, was. 
The context in which special measures were enacted has thus acted as a barrier to achieving 




The distinct absence of any impetus from within the surround to redress the non-provision of 
special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants means that reform is driven by 
defence lawyers and the courts. This means that the nature of the reform is ad hoc and 
inconsistent. The pace of change is largely determined by defence lawyers’ willingness and 
ability to challenge the law through judicial review and appeals.
15
 An appreciation of the 
organisational field in which lawyers work begins to reveal why this process is likely to 
remain sluggish. The conditions in which lawyers work, as a result of substantial cuts to legal 
aid and increasingly demanding caseloads, are likely to diminish their motivation to embark 
on future appeals. This is a further barrier to equality playing a more prominent role in the 
provision of special measures.  
The attitudes of criminal practitioners towards vulnerable and/or intimidated court users and 
special measures also affect the rate at which the law is challenged and develops, as well as 
its commitment to equality. The insights I obtained from my interviews with members of the 
legal profession indicate that the uptake of special measures in practice is even more unequal 
than the provision of special measures in law.
16
 The respondents had been involved in, and 
had heard of, far fewer trials where special measures were invoked for defendant witnesses 
by comparison to non-defendant witnesses. In addition, this was true when defence witness 
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use was compared with prosecution witness use. The respondents had notably less experience 




The interviews with the criminal practitioners brought to the surface several barriers to the 
equal uptake of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant and non-
defendant defence witnesses. The legal profession’s awareness of the available special 
measures to defendants appears to be deficient.
18
 At least in part, this likely to be a result of 
the way in which the law has developed.
19
 The scattered authority for defendant special 
measures in statute, the common law and the Criminal Procedure Rules can make it difficult 
for overstretched legal practitioners to keep abreast of the changes. I have also shown how 
the legal field is organised around the importance of securing special measures for 




The way that the legal field is organised also affects the likelihood that vulnerability and/or 
intimidation will be identified in court users so that special measures can be secured.
21
 Well-
established communication formats ensure that vulnerable and/or intimidated prosecution 
witnesses are identified by the police and that this information is passed on to the CPS. 
Furthermore, the fact that prosecution witnesses come into contact with Witness Care Units 
and The Witness Service further enhances the chances of the identification of any 
vulnerability and/or intimidation and a concomitant application for special measures. By 
contrast, the defence may be notified of any obvious vulnerability in the defendant’s custody 
record but otherwise the onus for identifying vulnerability and securing special measures 
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rests on defence lawyers.
22
 Again, the conditions in which defence lawyers work are often not 
conducive to the identification of vulnerability and the subsequent application for special 
measures.  
This is not to say that the legal profession is entirely unaware of special measures or of the 
status of some defendant or defence witnesses as vulnerable and/or intimidated. Even when 
this is appreciated, however, the way that defence lawyers frame special measures decisions 
can act as a further barrier to achieving equality in their uptake. Many of those interviewed 
saw special measures as tools which are for prosecution witnesses and thus instrumentally 
framed them as superfluous to defendants and defence witnesses.
23
 Again, I have shown how 
this is likely to be the result of the surround in which they were enacted, the way in which the 
law has grudgingly developed for defendants, and the organisation of the legal field. The 
nature of the evidence that defendants and defence witnesses give
24
 and the fact that 
defendants are already in the courtroom for the duration of trial means that defence lawyers 
cannot always see the benefit of special measures for defendants (and often by extension 
defence witnesses).
25
 This misconceived notion of what are relevant bases from which to 
differentiate between witnesses for the prosecution and the defence is thus a further barrier to 
the role of equality in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court 
users. 
Another insight obtained from the interviews was that some criminal practitioners adopt a 
moral frame when making special measures decisions.
26
 The defendant’s position as the 
accused and the operation (among some practitioners) of a presumption of guilt may lead 
some to conclude that the defendant does not deserve special measures assistance. Similarly, 
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a perception of defence witnesses as the defendant’s ‘mates,’ scheming to avoid the 
conviction of ‘the guilty,’ may render them too as undeserving of assistance to give their 
evidence.
27
 These views can thus act as additional barriers to achieving equality in the 
provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users giving evidence. 
In keeping with existing research findings, those interviewed believed that evidence elicited 
by video-recording is inferior to live evidence in court.
28
 I have shown that the role that such 
tactical concerns are able to play in special measures decisions is affected by both the 
organisation of the legal field and the scrutiny to which special measures decisions are 
subjected within the surround.
29
 For the prosecution their organisational frame or, in other 
words, the expectation on them to apply for special measures combined with the perception 
that they will otherwise be viewed as incompetent, is likely to trump this tactical (or 
instrumental) concern. The defence, in the absence of these expectations, has much more 
discretion.
30
 As a result, tactical issues such as the belief that special measures have a 
negative impact on the evidence’s quality can play a more dominant role in special measures 




The dominance of the bureaucratic organisational frame for the prosecution was clear.
32
 This 
is, in part, the result of the surround in which the law was enacted and the continued scrutiny 
from within it. The legal field has been organised to ensure that special measures are thus 
secured, which in turn influences the way that criminal practitioners frame special measures 
decisions for prosecution witnesses. The result of this is that the legal frame has become 
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nested within the bureaucratic frame.
33
 It seems rare that this frame would be applied 
independently, and instead the special measures forms ensure that a simplified version of the 
relevant statutory criteria is considered.  
For the defence, however, there is no corresponding bureaucratic frame. The dominant 
frames are instrumental and moral, followed by competence and resources frames.
34
 This is 
because the absence of scrutiny of the defence’s special measures decisions leaves them 
much more discretion to approach a decision in terms of a court user’s need for special 
measures and their deservingness. In relation to their need for special measures, this is likely 
to be decided on the basis of assumptions about whether or not the trial will go ahead. The 
fact that so many cases crack may strongly affect the special measures decision, since to 
apply for assistance for a defendant or defence witness at a trial which is not going to 
materialise would be nonsensical.
35
 The huge disparity in resources for intermediaries is 
likely a significant cause of inconsistent commitment to equality in their provision.
36
 This 
does not, contrary to the approach the senior judiciary appears to be taking, justify the denial 
of intermediary provision to defendants who might otherwise qualify or the subsequent lack 
of coherence in the law in this regard.
37
   
To summarise, a combination of the way in which the law has developed (and the surround in 
which this has taken place), the organisation of the legal field, and the way criminal 
practitioners frame special measures decisions, has inhibited the law’s commitment to 
equality in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users 
giving evidence in Crown Court trials. The relationship between these different factors is 
symbiotic – each element influences the others in a non-hierarchical and non-linear fashion. 
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8.3. Limitations of this research 
This thesis does not engage in debate about whether or not equality should play a more 
prominent role in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court 
users over and above all other competing issues. Instead, it looks at the law’s commitment to 
equality in the provision of special measures to all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. 
Given its role in justifying the development of such support for non-defendant witnesses, the 
normative position adopted in this thesis is that the law should consistently abide by the 
principle of equality in the provision of special measures to all.  
I have not engaged in questions such as whether the defence’s tactical concerns about ‘best 
evidence’ should trump welfare concerns addressed by special measures. Furthermore, this 
project focuses on equality of opportunity to give evidence rather than equality of outcome. 
As a result the effectiveness of special measures at protecting vulnerable and/or intimidated 
court users and enabling them to give their most complete, coherent and accurate evidence 
are issues which are also extraneous to this project.  
The empirical element of this research provides an insight into the uptake of special measures 
in Crown Court trials and the attitudes and views underpinning this. It is the first such study 
that explores the use of special measures by vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant 
witnesses. The small sample of 18 criminal practitioners on which it is based, however, 
means it is not representative, and so the findings cannot be generalised to legal practice more 
broadly. Some court centres may embody different workgroup cultures
38
 and thus special 
measures uptake may vary across England and Wales.  
The findings provide a snapshot of a series of barriers which inhibit the commitment to 
equality in the provision and use of special measures among this set of respondents, and 
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which may do so more widely among the profession. This study was about uncovering some 
of the relevant issues. It was something of a learning process – as the interviews progressed I 
realised that I needed to ask slightly different questions and adapted my approach in future 
interviews accordingly.
39
 Even throughout the process of analysis and writing up I identified 
questions that I wished I had asked but had not. These lessons can now be taken forward in 
the design of a future project. 
8.4. Scope for further research 
Further research could be conducted into the issue of whether the concerns for equality which 
underpinned the initial enactment of special measures should trump other concerns 
surrounding the impact of evidence in the adversarial context. This would need to explore 
competing claims to tactics and welfare issues, and perhaps also begin to examine the true 
impact of special measures on the receipt of evidence by the jury. Another project could 
examine whether the evidence obtained using special measures with vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users is of equal quality to that of ‘normal’ court users. Put differently – it 
would assess whether special measures promote equality of outcome in terms of the 
evidence’s quality and the protection of the vulnerable and/or intimidated court user. This 
would move the focus away from equality of opportunity to give evidence. Another 
interesting research project would explore whether the conception of equality as espoused in 
non-defendant special measures law and applied throughout this thesis is the ‘best version’ of 
equality to which to subscribe. 
This small scale qualitative study has set the groundwork for a larger scale study to be 
conducted. The insights obtained from this research could now be used to broaden the scope 
of the research (geographically and numerically) in a future project, to uncover trends in the 
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use of special measures across multiple court centres in England and Wales. Such a project 
would take a mixed method approach, combining survey, observation and interview data. It 
would also incorporate additional respondents: the police, Victim Support, and The Witness 
Service. These agencies can provide first-hand accounts into processes and issues at the 
beginning of the criminal justice process, which as I have demonstrated, are often influential 
to later decisions. Such a research project could also go beyond the Crown Court setting and 
into the magistrates’ courts.  
The addition of an observational element would strengthen the data collected. This is 
because, as noted in section 2.6.1, there is often a discrepancy between what people say they 
do in interview, and what they actually do in practice. An ethnographic study would thus 
produce a more rounded insight into the uptake of special measures for vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users and the factors which affect this. 
Further research could also be conducted into the provision of special measures in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. The approach in these jurisdictions to the provision of special measures 
in law has differed to that in England and Wales.
40
 Defendant witnesses are privy to many of 
the same legal provisions as non-defendant witnesses in these legal systems. It would be 
interesting to see whether the uptake of special measures in practice has thus been more 
equality driven, or whether the same barriers exist to the uptake in practice notwithstanding 
the statutory parity. The result of this type of comparative work could inform the approach 
taken to reform in England and Wales. This could help to determine whether, for example, 
statutory change is enough to foster a coherent commitment to equality in the provision of 
special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users giving evidence.
41
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The experiences of vulnerable and/or intimidated court users were not obtained in this 
research project. The focus of this thesis was the role that equality plays in the provision of 
special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. This makes the views of those 
who develop and engage with the law most relevant. It would nonetheless be interesting in 
future research to ascertain defendants’ and defence witnesses’ views about the lack of 
provision of special measures to them relative to that for prosecution witnesses. This non-
provision (whether in law, practice, or both) could put the legitimacy of the courts in question 
in their eyes. Further aspects, such as the ability and willingness of a defendant to give 
evidence in their trial, and how this might have differed if there was greater availability of 
special measures, would be another interesting angle to explore. This could be done via a 
survey to defendants whose trials are complete, asking whether they gave evidence in their 
trial, whether they used special measures, and if they did not, why not.  
8.5. Recommendations for reform 
As I have noted, in order for the law of special measures to be internally consistent, the 
provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses should be 
the same as that for non-defendant witnesses.
42
 This is because many of the arguments 
deployed to justify the current inequality are bogus.
43
 Equality should, as a result, play a 
greater role in the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated court users 
giving evidence in Crown Court trials in practice. Although other goals and aims might 
legitimately trump concerns for equality at various points, the notion of equality nonetheless 
seems apt as a broad justification for the provision of special measures to vulnerable and/or 
intimidated court users. In order that the barriers to equality can be overcome the viability of 
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the following models of law reform are considered: continued judicial reform; 
‘piggybacking’ on a current issue; and, targeting the legal field. 
8.5.1. Continued judicial reform 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the law of special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated 
defendant witnesses has largely developed through the common law. The absence of special 
measures provisions to such defendants has led to defence lawyers challenging the law on the 
basis of the defendant’s inability to participate effectively in their trial, the inequality of arms 
between the prosecution and defence and claims of a violation of the presumption of 
innocence. Some such appeals have gone all the way up to the ECtHR, and required the 
government to intervene in order to remain ECHR compliant.
44
 As a result, statutory 
provisions for defendant live link and intermediaries have been enacted (though the latter 
remains unimplemented). The common law has bridged other gaps in the provision of special 
measures to defendants, such as screens, communication aids and the removal of wigs and 
gowns. As highlighted in section 4.3, however, the provision of special measures to 




This ongoing method of law reform has proved partially effective. The provision of special 
measures to vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants has improved as a result of judicial 
law-making. It seems reasonable to speculate that in another, say, twenty years this model of 
law reform might result in equal legal provision of some special measures to all court users.
46
 
However, where intermediaries are concerned the regressive step by the Court of Appeal in 
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Rashid calls into doubt the judiciary’s commitment to equality in this regard.
47
 Furthermore, 
problems with funding are likely to persist. The continued lack of statutory authority would 
leave the issue of funding largely unresolved and it would thus remain somewhat cobbled 
together by various agencies.
48
 This method of reform also risks leaving the law’s 
development poorly known about among the profession. Defence lawyers cannot invoke 
special measures for defendants unless they are aware of their existence.
49
 The multiple 
sources of law for defendants makes keeping up-to-date more challenging. 
Perhaps most significantly, this method of law reform risks maintaining an impression that 
defendant special measures are something of an after-thought. This thesis has shown that the 
way in which the law has developed for defendant witnesses has impacted the way that the 
legal profession appears to frame special measures decisions. It has also affected the 
organisation of the legal field – much of the policy in place in the legal system is the result of 
the statutory scheme for non-defendant special measures. Continuing law reform through the 
judiciary thus risks maintaining this problematic context in which the law operates. It does 
not seem likely that parity in legal provision alone will remedy these attitudinal differences. 
8.5.2. ‘Piggybacking’ on a current issue 
The Law Commission’s recent report on the law on unfitness to plead includes some 
recommendations about the provision of special measures to defendants. These are that the 
statutory provision for defendant intermediaries is implemented; a registration scheme is 
introduced for defendant intermediaries; and that the eligibility criteria for defendant live link 
is brought into line with that for witnesses.
50
 The purpose of these recommendations is to 
facilitate the participation of defendants who would otherwise be unable to do so effectively. 
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It is not unduly cynical to suggest that the statutory extension of special measures to 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses is likely to be better received in the 
surround if its rationale is not to promote the interests of defendants but rather to increase the 
likelihood of trials going ahead.  
If these recommendations are accepted and the Criminal Procedure (Lack of Capacity) Bill is 
introduced into Parliament, this could provide the opening from which to advocate for 
defendant special measures. Presenting my own evidence to the Home Affairs Committee 
and/or the Justice Committee could help to muster support for these provisions in 
Parliament.
51
 I could suggest further amendments to these Committees such as the inclusion 
of the statutory provision of measures such as screens and the removal of wigs and gowns to 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses too. 
This kind of ‘piggybacking’ may be necessary given that it seems unlikely that a ‘random’
52
 
‘policy-window’ will open and the issue of defendant special measures be recognised as a 
problem; extended statutory provision be viewed as a viable solution; and the political 
climate be ripe for such change to occur.
53
 Unless (and even if) a general election is called 
early the independent opening of a policy window on this issue seems unlikely; particularly 
given the current (and foreseeable) preoccupation with Brexit. The piggyback option is 
subject to much the same forces of course, and it is worth noting that the interim response 
from the government to the Law Commission indicates that any accepted recommendations 
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are unlikely to be included in the next ‘legislative window’ due to the ongoing 
implementation of an extensive programme of court reform.
54
 
8.5.3. Target the legal field 
While legislative change would provide a firmer legal basis from which to apply for special 
measures (and to acquire funding for such) it is unlikely that it would be sufficient alone to 
effect the attitudinal change required for equality to prevail in the provision of special 
measures. This is evident from the low uptake of special measures for non-defendant defence 
witnesses. Absent the scrutiny from the surround and within the legal field, the defence do 
not have the same expectations placed on them to apply for special measures for their 
witnesses. Statutory parity for all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users is likely, 
therefore, to be of limited effect. 
Instead (or as well), the organisation of the legal field should be targeted. Awareness of the 
available special measures for defendant witnesses, and as importantly how they may benefit 
a defendant who is already in court is more likely to increase their use. This could be done 
via a series of training workshops on vulnerable defendants and defence witnesses; similar to 
those HHJ Rook QC has designed for vulnerable witnesses.
55
 Additional toolkits for The 
Advocate’s Gateway could also be introduced, highlighting the available special measures to 
vulnerable and/or intimidated defendants and defence witnesses and their potential benefits 
for those with particular conditions (eg ADHD, anxiety disorders). Writing articles for The 
Justice Gap
56
 and The Criminal Law and Justice Weekly
57
 and other texts circulated among 
the legal profession would also raise awareness and may alter perceptions. 
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Another area to consider is judicial directions.
58
 The direction that is issued if a defendant 
uses a measure such as live link or screens should be amended, to ensure that the reasons for 
the use of the measure and its benefits are explained to the jury. This should abate some of 
the legal profession’s concerns that the use of such measures will be tactically detrimental to 
the defendant. Interestingly, this was an approach suggested by two of my respondents. Once 
prompted to think about how the live link may benefit a vulnerable defendant, one respondent 
[J1] considered that they could give a judicial direction to explain that there’s a difference 
between giving evidence in court and ‘sitting in the court in the dock doing nothing, saying 
nothing’. J2 also said that he could ask the jurors to consider: 
[H]ow you feel watching the case as compared to the time you had to stand up in 
front of everyone and give your oath – how much more nervous you felt at that 
point. 
 
This demonstrates that raising the awareness of criminal practitioners about the potential 
benefits of live link for defendants could change their attitudes towards its use.  
Another way in which the existence and benefits of special measures such as live link and 
screens for defendants can be promoted to the legal profession is via intermediaries. 
Additional training of intermediaries (and indeed any training of non-registered 
intermediaries for the defendant) could highlight the availability of these measures in law to 
intermediaries who may otherwise be unaware. This would increase the likelihood of 
intermediaries recommending in their initial assessment of a vulnerable defendant that their 
evidence is given from behind a screen or via the live link. The ‘promotion’ of screens and 
live link by intermediaries, who are highly regarded among the legal profession,
59
 could 
facilitate the increased recognition of other special measures which are available to the 
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defence and eradicate some of the barriers to their use. Targeting defendant intermediary 
groups, such as Triangle, would be a way to begin this work. 
Another area of the legal field that could be addressed is the absence of communication 
formats.
60
 For the defence, they are virtually non-existent. The police could be required to fill 
out an MG2 equivalent for the suspect and potential defence witnesses for inclusion in the 
custody record, providing an assessment of the their vulnerability and the details of a 
preliminary discussion with them about special measures. Putting special measures on the 
defendant’s (and defence witness’) radar in this way might increase the chance of the defence 
applying for them, as it may create an expectation from the defendant/witness that they are 
applied for ahead of the trial. The creation of a ‘Defendant Support’ organisation, comparable 
to ‘Victim Support’, could also help to create an expectation of the defence (comparable to 
that on the prosecution) to apply for special measures in a similar way. Such a charitable 
organisation could offer support to the defendant in the form of advice about the special 
measures which are potentially available. 
8.6. Conclusion 
This thesis has found that the principle of equality which underpinned the development of 
special measures for vulnerable and/or intimidated non-defendant witnesses – advocating for 
treating different people differently – is not consistently adhered to in the legal and practical 
provision of special measures to all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users. Its role is 
inhibited by a combination of the way the law has developed, the organisation of the legal 
field, and the way that criminal practitioners frame special measures decisions. The result is 
that vulnerable and/or intimidated defendant witnesses, and non-defendant defence witnesses, 
are often left inadequately assisted to give their evidence in Crown Court trials. 
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In order to begin to remedy this, there needs to be parity in the legislation for special 
measures to all vulnerable and/or intimidated court users via identical provisions. The 
removal of ‘other than the accused’ from sections 16 and 17 of the YJCEA would solve this. 
Furthermore, the organisation of the legal field would need to be adapted so that processes 
are set up to ensure that special measures are secured by the defence as well as the 
prosecution. This would all need to be accompanied by a re-education of the police and 
criminal practitioners on the uses of special measures and the needs of the vulnerable. This 
would help to foster a more consistent commitment to the principle of equality in the 
provision of special measures in both law and practice.  
For the law to be compatible with equality and human rights legislation, it is pertinent that 
these issues of inequality are addressed. This is particularly so given the basic yet 














1. How much involvement do you have in making applications for SM?  
 
2. Special measures were introduced to help facilitate a vulnerable/intimidated 
witness’ best evidence. The YJCEA considers best evidence to be evidence that is 
complete, coherent and accurate. 
- Are there any other qualities that you would attribute to a witness’ best evidence?  
 
3. How appropriate and/or useful do you consider the use of special measures to be 
in securing the best evidence from a witness?  
- Can you provide an example of a witness who was greatly assisted by the use of 
special measures?  
 
4. Do you think that the counsel for the prosecution are motivated to apply (or not) 
for special measures, or perhaps which special measure(s) to apply for, by 
anything other than a desire to achieve the most complete, coherent and accurate 
evidence? 
 
5. The 1999 legislation governing the use of special measures provides parity of 
access for all non-defendant witnesses, regardless of whether they are testifying 
for the defence or the prosecution.  
 
- In your experience, is it as likely that an application is made for special measures 
for a vulnerable or intimidated non-defendant defence witness as it is one for a 
prosecution witness? 
 
- How often are SM applied for for defence witnesses? 
 
- Why do you think that this is? 
 
- Is it of equal likeliness, in your experience, that an application is granted for 
defence and prosecution non-defendant witnesses? 
 






- (Are vulnerable defence witnesses not called because they’re vulnerable or 
because they won’t be granted special measures?) 
 
6. In your experience, is decision making about the application for, and resulting 
success of, applications for special measures for a vulnerable witness affected if 
the defendant in the case is of comparable vulnerability?  
- Can you provide an example of where this has happened? 
 
7. Do you find that the counsel for the defence, where the defendant is vulnerable, 
frequently employs the use of special measures available to them?  
 
- Have you been involved in a case where a defendant has been assisted by the use 
of a live-link or intermediary? 
 
- Are you able to speculate as to why defendants use special measures so 
infrequently?  
 
8. How often, in your experience, do vulnerable defendants, who are deemed to be 
fit to plead, go on to be witnesses in their defence?  
 
9. Based on your experience, do you think that defendants would be more likely to 
testify if the special measures provisions available to non-defendant witnesses 
were available in the same capacity to them? 
 
- Would counsel be likely to advise the defendant not to testify regardless of the 
assistance available? 
 
- What of the situation where counsel would like the defendant to testify, but D is 
reluctant to – would special measures be likely to assist here? 
 
10. How do you think it can, or indeed can it, be justified that special measures are 
more accessible to non-defendant witnesses than to defendant witnesses? 
 
Judicial Directions 
1. How effective do you perceive judicial directions about both bad character evidence 
and its significance, and a non-defendant witness’ use of special measures to be in 
limiting their potentially prejudicial effect? 
Is there anything that we have discussed that you would like to expand upon, or anything we 











APPENDIX 2: CONSENT FORM 
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
The Potential for Miscarriages of Justice to Occur as a Result of Non-defendant Witness 
Biased Evidence Laws 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in an interview in relation to this project which has 
been funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and is being undertaken 
as part of my doctoral studies. The aim of the project is to explore the effects of the unequal 
treatment of witnesses in criminal trials and the potential for this to result in miscarriages of 
justice. I am particularly concerned with the following research questions: 
 
1. How should individual rights be prioritised in criminal trials in order to ensure that 
justice is delivered?  
2. How does the operation of evidentiary rules affect the balance of competing interests 
in criminal trials? 
3. Do evidentiary rules which are ‘biased’ against defendants increase the possibility of 
miscarriages of justice occurring and if so, how? 
 
The interviews will be recorded and transcribed so that I can analyse what has been said. The 
transcripts will be anonymised so that you cannot be identified from them. The recordings 
will be deleted once the transcripts have been typed up. The research findings will be used 
alongside policy documents and case judgments to analyse the effects of the laws and their 
employment within the criminal trial. Quotes will be used from the transcripts to evidence 
analysis, but you will not be identified by name, pseudonyms being utilised instead.   
If you have any concerns about confidentiality issues then please do speak to me about this. 
Your withdrawal from this project will be granted for up to 2 months from the date of the 
interview, and in such an event all information already collected from you will be destroyed 








Declaration by the Participant 
I have read and understood the explanation of the project above and I am willing to 
participate in the project. I understand that I may withdraw from the project within the 2 
months following the interview. 
Name   _________________ 
Signature  _________________ 
Date  _________________ 
 
If you require further information about the project, please don’t hesitate to contact me: 
Samantha Fairclough, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham: 
 
 
Supervised by:  
Dr Imogen Jones, Birmingham Law School:   
Professor Hilary Sommerlad, Birmingham Law School:   
  [In the original, this gave the name and contact details 







APPENDIX 3: OUTLINE OF LAW 
 
Special Measures Legislation, YJCEA 1999 
 
Section 16 – Witnesses eligible for assistance on ground of age or incapacity 
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter a witness in criminal proceedings (other than the 
accused) is eligible for assistance by virtue of this section –  
(a) If under 18 
(b) Quality of evidence likely to be diminished because… 
(2) (a) the witness –  
(i) Suffers from mental disorder 
(ii) Otherwise significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning 
(iii) Witness has a physical disability or is suffering from a physical disorder  
 
Section 17 – Witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear/distress about testifying 
(1) Witness is eligible (other than the accused) if quality of evidence likely to be 




Section 23 – Screens 
Section 24 – Live-link  
Section 25 – Evidence given in private 
Section 26 – Removal of wigs and gowns 
Section 27 - Video recorded evidence-in-chief 
Section 28 – Video-recorded cross-examination or re-examination 
Section 29 – Examination of witness through intermediary 







Section 33A – Live-link directions 
(4) Accused under 18, conditions are that –  
(a) His ability to participate effectively in the proceedings as a witness giving oral 
evidence in court is compromised by his level of intellectual ability or social 
functioning, and 
(b) Use of a live link would enable him to participate more effectively in the 
proceedings as a witness (whether by improving the quality of his evidence or 
otherwise) 
(5) Accused over 18 –  
(a) He suffers from a mental disorder, or otherwise has a significant impairment 
of intelligence and social functioning 
(b) He is for that reason unable to participate effectively in the proceedings as a 
witness giving oral evidence in court, and 
(c) Use of a live link would enable him to participate more effectively in the 
proceedings as a witness (whether by improving the quality of his evidence or 
otherwise) 
PLUS s33A(2)(b) – it is in the interests of justice for the accused to give evidence through a 
live link 
 
Section 33BA - examination of the accused through intermediary [not yet in force, common 
law applies] 
(5) Where D is under 18 the condition is that the accused’s ability to participate 
effectively in the proceedings as a witness giving oral evidence in court is 
compromised by the accused’s level of intellectual ability or social functioning  
(6) where D is 18 –  
(a) the accused suffers from a mental disorder or otherwise has a significant 
impairment of intelligence and social functioning 
(b) the accused is for that reason unable to participate effectively in the 






APPENDIX 4: RESPONDENT 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The Potential for Miscarriages of Justice to Occur as a Result of Non-defendant 
Witness Biased Evidence Laws 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
It is requested that you complete this short questionnaire to help distinctions be made 
between the opinions and experiences of professionals from different backgrounds. Your 
answers will be kept confidential. 
 
Date of interview (so that I can match up with the confidential transcript of your interview): 
…………………………………………………… 
 
Age:  20-30  









Post-qualified Experience (PQE): ……… years 
 
Length of time practising criminal law: ………………………. 
 





 Barrister  
 Defence solicitor 
 CPS solicitor 
 
Do you prosecute and defend? (Please provide a rough estimation of the split between the 
two): ………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 









─ ‘10 Easy Steps to Intermediary Support’ (Communicourt) 
<http://www.communicourt.co.uk/intermediary-for-vulnerable-witnesses/10-easy-steps-to-
intermediary-support/ > accessed 15 January 2017 
─ A Death that Shocked the Nation’ BBC News (16 December 1999) 
─ ‘New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better’ (Labour Party 1997) 
<http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm > accessed 17 October 2015 
─ Registered and Non-Registered Intermediaries for Vulnerable Defence and Prosecution 
Witnesses: Guidance for HMCTS Staff (Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service 2014) 
─ ‘Special Measures’ (Crown Prosecution Service) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/special_measures/> accessed 14 August 2016 
─ ‘Why has IfJ Introduced the Defence Referral System’ (Intermediaries for Justice) 
<http://www.intermediaries-for-justice.org/why-has-ifj-introduced-the-defence-referral-
system/>accessed 24 November 2016 
Aderbach J and Rockman B, ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews’ (2002) 35(4) Political 
Science and Politics 673 
Alge D, ‘The Effectiveness of Incentives to Reduce the Risk of Moral Hazard in the Defence 
Barrister’s Role in Plea Bargaining’ (2013) 16(1) Legal Ethics 162 
Ashworth A, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (2
nd
 edn, OUP 1998) 
─ ‘Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure’ in Crawford A and Goodey 
J (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice (Ashgate 2000) 
─ ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10(2) International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 241 
Auld R, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (Ministry of Justice 2001) 
Baldwin J, ‘Research on the Criminal Courts’ in King R and Wincup E (eds), Doing 
Research on Crime and Justice (OUP 2000) 
─ and McConville M, Negotiated Justice (Martin Robertson 1977) 
Bar Standards Board, Bar Standards Board Handbook (includes 9
th
 edn of Code of Conduct, 
2
nd
 edn, April 2015) 
Barnard C and Hepple B, ‘Substantive Equality’ (2000) 59(3) The Cambridge Law Journal 
562 
Baverstock J, Process evaluation of pre-recorded cross-examination pilot (Section 28) 
(Ministry of Justice 2016) 





Beitz C, ‘Procedural Equality in Democratic Theory: A Preliminary Examination’ (1983) 25 
Liberal Democracy 69 
Bennion F, ‘Practice Directions: A Need for Order?’ (8 July 2005) Justice of the Peace (Now 
Criminal Law and Justice Weekly) 508. <http://www.francisbennion.com/pdfs/fb/2006/2006-
029-jpn051a-need-for-order.pdf> accessed 10 November 2016 
Berg M and others, ‘The Victim-Offender Overlap in Context: Examining the Role of 
Neighbourhood Street Culture’ (2012) 50(2) American Society of Criminology 359 
Birch D, ‘A Better Deal for Vulnerable Witnesses?’ [2000] Criminal Law Review 223 
─ ‘Evidence: Evidence via Television Link and Video Recording of Interview with Child’ 
[2001] Criminal Law Review 473 
Bottoms A and McClean J, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976) 
Braun V and Clarke V, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qualitative 
Research in Psychology 77 
─ Successful Qualitative Research (SAGE Publications 2013) 
Brereton D, ‘How Different are Rape Trials? A Comparison of the Cross-examination of 
Complainants in Rape and Assault Trials’ (1997) 37(2) British Journal of Criminology 242 
Brinkman S and Kvale S, InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing (3
rd
 edn, SAGE Publications 2015) 
Brooker C and others, An investigation into the prevalence of mental health disorder and 
patterns of health service access in a probation area (Lincoln: Criminal Justice and Health 
Research Group 2011) 
Brown H, ‘The Death of Mrs A: A Serious Case Review’ (Surrey County Council: 
Safeguarding Adults Board 2014) 
Brown K, ‘”Vulnerability”: Handle with Care’ (2011) 5(3) Ethics and Social Welfare 313 
─ ‘Re-moralising Vulnerability’ (2012) 6(1) People, Place and Policy Online 41 
─ ‘Questioning the Vulnerability Zeitgeist: Care and Control Practices with ‘Vulnerable’ 
Young People’ (2014) 13(3) Social Policy and Society 371 
─ Vulnerability and Young People: Care and Social Control in Policy and Practice (The 
Policy Press 2015) 
Bryman A, Social Research Methods (4
th
 edn, OUP 2012) 
Bunting L, Hayes D and Clifford G, Special Measures for Vulnerable Witnesses in Northern 
Ireland (Department of Justice, Northern Ireland 2013) 
Burton M and others, Are Special Measures for Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses 
working? Evidence from the Criminal Justice Agencies (Home Office Online Report 01/06, 





─ Evans R and Sanders A, ‘Protecting Children in Criminal Proceedings: Parity for Child 
Witnesses and Child Defendants’ (2006) 18(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 397 
─ ‘Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses and the Adversarial Process in England and Wales’ 
(2007) 11(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1 
Cairney P and Jones M, ‘Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach: What is the Empirical 
Impact of this Universal Theory?’ (2016) 44(1) The Policy Studies Journal 37 
Cashmore J, ‘The Use of Video Technology for Child Witnesses’ (1990) 16(2) Monash 
University Law Review 228 
Charles C, Special Measures for Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses: Research Exploring 
the Decisions and Actions taken by Prosecutors in a Sample of CPS Case Files (Crown 
Prosecution Service Research Team, April 2012) 
Charmaz K, ‘Grounded Theory’ in Hesse-Biber S and Leavy P (eds), Approaches to 
Qualitative Research: A Reader on Theory and Practice (OUP 2004) 
Choo A, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Criminal Justice (Hart Publishing 
2013) 
Christie N, ‘On Society and the Victims of Crime’ in Ezzat Fattah (ed), From Crime Policy to 
Victim (Macmillan Press Ltd 1986)  
Cooper P and Wurtzel D, ‘A day late and a dollar short: In search of an intermediary scheme 
for vulnerable defendants in England and Wales’ [2013] Criminal Law Review 4 
─ ‘Better the Second Time Around? Department of Justice Registered Intermediary Schemes 
and Lessons from England and Wales’ (2014) 65(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 39 
Corcoran H, Lader D and Smith K, Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2014/15 (Statistical 
Bulletin 05/15, Home Office 2015)  
Council of Her Majesty’s Circuit Judges, Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims: A 
Consultation Response of the Council of Her Majesty’s Circuit Judges (Council of HM 
Circuit Judges 2006) 
Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, A Joint Inspection of the Treatment of Offenders with 
Learning Disabilities within the Criminal Justice System – Phase 1 from Arrest to Sentence 
(HM Inspectorate of Probation 2014) 
Crown Prosecution Service, No Witness, No Justice (NWNJ) Pilot Evaluation – Final Report 
(Criminal Justice System 2004) 
─ Code for Crown Prosecutors (CPS 2013)  
─ Annual Report and Accounts 2014-15 (HC20, London: The Stationary Office 2015) 
Cunliffe C and others, Estimating the Prevalence of Disability Amongst Prisoners: Results 
from the Surveying Prisoner Crime Reduction (SPCR) Survey (Ministry of Justice 2012) 
Curen R, ‘Vulnerable Adults and the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales: Some 





Dalrymple J, ‘The Dark Vortex that Emerged from this Murder to Destroy so Many Lives’ 
The Independent (16 March 1999) 
Darbyshire P, ‘Judicial Case Management in Ten Crown Courts’ [2014] Criminal Law 
Review 30 
Davies G, ‘The Impact of Television on the Presentation and Reception of Children’s 
Testimony. (1999) 22(3-4) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 241 
─ and Noon E, ‘An evaluation of the live link for child witnesses’ (Home Office 1991) 
Dehaghani R, ‘He’s just not that vulnerable: Exploring the Implementation of the 
Appropriate Adult Safeguard in Police Custody’ (2016) 55(4) Howard Journal of Crime and 
Justice 396 
Dennis I, The Law of Evidence (5
th
 edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2013) 
Department of Justice Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Registered Intermediary Schemes 
Pilot Project: Post-Project Review (Department of Justice 2015) 
Dexter L, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (ECPR Press 2006) 
Dingwall R, ‘Accounts, Interviews and Observations’ in Miller G and Dingwall R, Context 
and Method in Qualitative Research (SAGE Publications 1997) 
Dixon D and others, ‘Safeguarding the Rights of Suspects in Police Custody’ (1990) 1 
Policing and Society 115 
Doak J, ‘Child Witnesses: Do Special Measures Directions Prejudice the Accused’s Right to 
a Fair Hearing? – R v Camberwell Green Youth Court, ex p. D; R v Camberwell Youth 
Court, ex p. G’ (2005) 9 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 291 
─ Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third 
Parties (Hart Publishing 2008) 
Dowds L and Budd T, Victim and Witness Intimidation: Findings from the 1994 British 
Crime Survey (Unpublished Report for the Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate 
1997) 
Drew S and Gibbs L, 'A United Approach' (March 2017) Counsel Magazine 
Dworkin R, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1977) 
─ Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1978) 
─ A Matter of Principle (first printed 1985, Clarendon Press 1986)  
─ Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 1998) 
─ Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press 2000) 
Easterday L and others, ‘The Making of a Female Researcher: Role Problems in Fieldwork’ 





Eaton T and others, ‘Child-Witness and Defendant Credibility: Child Evidence Presentational 
Mode and Judicial Instructions’ (2001) 31(9) Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1845 
Edwards I, ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision 
Making’ (2004) 44 British Journal of Criminology 967 
Eisenstein J and Jacob H, Felony Justice: An Organisational Analysis of Criminal Courts 
(Little Brown 1977) 
Ellison L, The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness (OUP 2001) 
─ and Munro V, ‘A ‘Special’ Delivery? Exploring the Impact of Screens, Live-Links, and 
Video-Recorded Evidence on Mock Juror Deliberation in Rape Trials’ (2014) 23(1) Social 
and Legal Studies 3 
Emerson B, Ashworth A and Macdonald A, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (Sweet and 
Maxwell 2007) 
Emerson E and others, People with Learning Disabilities in England 2011 (Department of 
Health 2012) 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, Hidden in Plain Sight: Inquiry into Disability-
Related Harassment (April 2016) 
Fairclough S, ‘“It doesn’t happen … and I never thought it was necessary to happen”: 
Barriers to Vulnerable Defendants Giving Evidence by Live Link in Crown Court Trials’ 
(2017) International Journal of Evidence and Proof (forthcoming) 
─ and Jones I, ‘The Victim in Court’ in Walklate S (ed), The Handbook of Victims and 
Victimology (2
nd
 edn, Routledge 2017) (forthcoming) 
Fenwick H, ‘Procedural ‘Rights’ of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the 
Criminal Justice Process’ (1997) 60(3) Modern Law Review 317 
Ferguson E, ‘How the Death of Bulger Hardened us to Pity’ The Guardian (31 October 1999) 
Finnis J, ‘Equality and Difference’ (2012) 2(1) Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social 
Thought and Sexual Ethics 1 
Fisher H, Inquiry into the Circumstances leading to the trial of three Persons on Charges 
Arising out of the Death of Maxwell Confait and the Fire at 27 Doggett Road, London SE6 
(London Stationery Office 1977) 
Franklyn R, Satisfaction and willingness to engage with the Criminal Justice System. 
Findings from the Witness and Victim Experience Survey, 2009-10 (Ministry of Justice 
Research Series 1/12, MOJ 2012) 
Freud S, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (translated by James Strachey, WW 
Norton Company 1960) 
Fuller L, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1964) 
Garland D, ‘The Culture of High Crime Societies: Some Preconditions of Recent “Law and 





─ The Culture of Control (OUP 2001) 
Garland F and McEwan J, ‘Embracing the Overriding Objective: Difficulties and Dilemmas 
in the New Criminal Climate’ (2012) 16(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 233 
Gerry F, ‘Vulnerable Defendants and the Courts’ (2012) The Justice Gap 
<http://thejusticegap.com/2012/04/vulnerable-defendants-and-the-courts/ > accessed 17 June 
2015 
Gibbs G, Qualitative Data Analysis: Explorations with NVivo (Open University Press 2002) 
Ginsberg M, On Justice in Society (Penguin Books 1965) 
Goffman E, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (first published 1959, Penguin 1990) 
Golafashani N, ‘Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’ (2003) 8(4) 
The Qualitative Report 597 
Goodey J, Victims and Victimology: Research Policy and Practice (Pearson 2005) 
Goodman G and others, ‘When a Child Takes the Stand: Jurors’ Perceptions of Children’s 
Eye Witness Testimony’ (1987) 11 Law and Human Behaviour 27 
Gosepath S, ‘The Principles and the Presumption of Equality’ in Fourie C, Schuppert F and 
Williamn-Helmer I (eds), Social Equality: On What it Means to be Equals (OUP 2015) 
Grace S, Lloyd C and Smith L, Rape: from recording to conviction (Research and Planning 
Unit Paper 71, Home Office 1992) 
Green H and others, Mental Health of Children and Young People in Great Britain, 2004: 
Summary Report (National Statistics 2005) 
Green S, Crime, Victimisation and Vulnerability’ in Walklate S (ed), Handbook of Victims 
and Victimology (Willan Publishing 2007) 
Guest S, Jurists: Profiles in Theory: Ronald Dworkin (Edinburgh University Press 1997) 
Guldbrandsson K and Fossum B, ‘An Exploration of the Theoretical Concepts of Policy 
Windows and Policy Entrepreneurs at the Swedish Public Health Arena’ (2009) 24(4) Health 
Promotion International 434 
Haggerty K and Ericson R, Policing the Risk Society (Clarendon Press 1997) 
Hajdin M (ed), The Notion of Equality (Ashgate 2001) 
Hall M, ‘Children Giving Evidence through Special Measures in the Criminal Courts: 
Progress and Problems’ (2006) 21(1) Child and Family Law Quarterly 65 
─ Victims of Crime: Policy and Practice in Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing 2009) 
Hallet LJ, Equal Treatment Bench Book, Children and Vulnerable Adults (Judicial College 
2013, with 2015 amendments) (Equal Treatment Bench Book) 
Hamlyn B and others, Are Special Measures Working? Evidence from Surveys of Vulnerable 





Harris J, The Processing of Rape Cases by the Criminal Justice System: Interim Report 
(Unpublished, Home Office 1997) 
Harvey W, ‘Methodological Approaches for Interviewing Elites’ (2010) 2(6) Geography 
Compass 1 
Hawkins K, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision Making in a Regulatory Agency (OUP 
2002) 
Hedderman C, Children’s Evidence: The Need for Corroboration, Home Office Research and 
Planning Unit Paper 41 (Home Office 1987) 
Henderson E, ‘“A Very Valuable Tool”: Judges, Advocates and Intermediaries discuss the 
Intermediary System in England and Wales’ (2015) 19(3) International Journal of Evidence 
and Proof 154 
─ ‘Bigger Fish to Fry: Should the Reform of Cross-Examination be Expanded Beyond 
Vulnerable Witnesses?’ (2015) 19(2) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 83 
─ ‘Taking Control of Cross-Examination: Judges, Advocates and Intermediaries Judicial 
Management of the Cross-Examination of Vulnerable People’ (2016) 3 Criminal Law Review 
181 
Henderson H and Lamb M, ‘Pre-recording Children’s Testimony: Effects on Case 
Progression’ [2017] Criminal Law Review 345 
Henderson L, ‘The Wrongs of Victims’ Rights’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 937 
Hennink M and others, Qualitative Research Methods (SAGE Publications 2011) 
Hepner I, Woodward M and Stewart J, ‘Giving the Vulnerable a Voice in the Criminal 
Justice System: The Use of Intermediaries with Individuals with Intellectual Disability’ 
(2015) 22(3) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 453 
Hesse-Biber S and Leavy P (eds), Approaches to Qualitative Research: A Ready on Theory 
and Practice (OUP 2004) 
Home Office, No More Excuses (Home Office 1997) 
─ Speaking up for Justice: Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Treatment 
of Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System (Home Office 1998)  
─ Justice for All (Cm 5563, The Stationary Office 2002) 
─ A New Deal for Victims and Witnesses: National Strategy to Deliver Improved Services 
(Home Office 2003) 
─ Delivering Simple, Speedy, Summary Justice (Criminal Justice System 2006) 
─ Guide for Appropriate Adults (Home Office 2011) 
House of Commons, Guide for Witnesses Giving Written or Oral Evidence to a House of 





Hoyano L, ‘Variations on a Theme by Pigot: Special Measures Directions for Child 
Witnesses’ [2000] Criminal Law Review 250 
─ ‘Striking a Balance between the Rights of Defendants and Vulnerable Witnesses: Will 
Special Measures Directions Contravene Guarantees of a Fair Trial?’ [2001] Criminal Law 
Review 948 
─ ‘The Child Witness Review: Much Ado about too Little?’ [2007] Criminal Law Review 
849 
─ ‘Coroners and Justice Act 2009: Special Measures Directions Take Two: Entrenching 
Unequal Access to Justice?’ [2010] Criminal Law Review 345 
─ ‘Reforming the Adversarial Trial for Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants’ (2015) 2 
Criminal Law Review 107 
─ ‘R (on the application of OP) v Secretary of State for Justice: Intermediaries – Claimant 
Having Learning Difficulties – Claimant Charged with Criminal Offence’ [2015] Criminal 
Law Review 79 
─ and Rafferty A, ‘Rationing Defence Intermediaries under the April 2016 Criminal Practice 
Direction’ [2017] Criminal Law Review 93 
Hoyle C and Zedner L, ‘Victims, Victimisation and Criminal Justice’ in Maguire M, Morgan 
R and Reiner R (eds), Oxford Handbook of Criminology (4
th
 edn, OUP 2007) 
Hughes N, ‘Understanding the Influence of Neurodevelopmental Disorders on Offending: 
Utilizing Developmental Psychology in Biosocial Criminology’ (2015) 28(1) A Critical 
Journal of Crime, Law and Society 39 
─ and others, Nobody made the Connection: The prevalence of Neurodisability in Young 
People who Offend (Children’s Commissioner Report 2012) 
I CAN, Speech, Language and Communication in Secondary Aged Pupils (I CAN Talk 
Series, Issue 10 2011) 
Jackson J, ‘Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal Justice?’ (2003) 30(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 309 
Jacobson J, No-one Knows: Police Responses to Suspects Learning Disabilities and 
Difficulties – A Review of Policy and Practice (Prison Reform Trust 2008) 
─ Hunter G and Kirby A, Inside Crown Court: Personal Experiences and Questions of 
Legitimacy (Policy Press 2015) 
─ Hunter G and Kirby A, ‘Structured Mayhem: Personal Experiences of the Crown Court’ 
(Criminal Justice Alliance 2015) 
─ and Talbot J, Vulnerable Defendants and the Criminal Courts: a Review of Provision for 
Adults and Children (Prison Reform Trust 2009) 
Jeffery B, Independent Criminal Advocacy in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice 2014) 
Jenson D, ‘Access’ in Given L (ed), The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research 





Jones I, ‘A Political Judgment? Reconciling Hearsay and the Right to Challenge’ (2010) 14 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 232 
Jong F and van Lent L, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Counterfactual Principle’ (2016) 
1(12) Utrecht Law Review 32 
Judiciary of England and Wales, Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999: Pre-recording of Cross-examination and Re-examination (Judicial Office 2014) 
─ The Lord Chief Justice’s Report (Judicial Office 2016)  
Kirby A, Jacobson J and Hunter G, ‘Effective Participation or Passive Acceptance: How Can 
Defendants Participate more Effectively in the Court Process?’ (Howard League What is 
Justice? Working Papers 9/2014) 
Kress K, ‘Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, 
and the Linear Order of Decisions (1984) 72 California Law Review 369 
Law Commission, Unfitness to Plead Volume 1: Report (Law Com No 364, Law 
Commission 2016) 
Lawson A, ‘Disabled People and Access to Justice: From Disablement to Enablement?’ in 
Blanck P and Flynn E (eds), Routledge Handbook of Disability and Human Rights 
(Routledge 2017) 
Lees S, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (Penguin 1996) 
Legal Aid Agency, Guidance on Remuneration of Expert Witnesses (Version 4, Ministry of 
Justice 2015) 
─ Legal Aid Statistics in England and Wales: April to June 2015 (Ministry of Justice 2015) 
─ Criminal Legal Aid Manual: Applying for Legal Aid in Criminal Cases in the Magistrates’ 
and Crown Court (Ministry of Justice 2016) 
Legard R, Keegan J and Ward K, ‘In-depth Interviews’ in Ritchie J and Lewis J (eds), 
Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications Ltd 2003) 
Leveson B, Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings. Judiciary of England and Wales 
(2015) 
Lewis C and Tapley J, ‘Victims’ Rights or Suspects’ Rights?’ in Ellis T and Savage S (eds), 
Debates in Criminal Justice: Key Themes and Issues (Routledge 2012) 
Lewis J, ‘Design Issues’ in Lewis J and Ritchie J (eds), Qualitative Research Practice 
(SAGE 2003) 
─ and Ritchie J, ‘Generalising from Qualitative Research’ in Ritchie J and Lewis J (eds), 
Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications Ltd 2003) 
Lieberman J and Ardent J, ‘Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions. Social 
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and 
Other Inadmissible Evidence’ (2000) 6(3) Psychology, Public Policy and Law 677 





Lord Bradley, The Bradley Report: Review of People with Mental Health Problems or 
Learning Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System (Department of Health 2009) 
Lord Carlile Independent Parliamentarians’ Inquiry into the Operation and Effectiveness of 
the Youth Court (June 2014) 
Lord Judge LCJ, ‘The Evidence of Child Victims: the Next Stage’ (Bar Council Annual Law 
Reform Lecture, 21
st
 November 2013) 
Lord Thomas Pigot, Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence (Home Office 1989) 
Loucks N, No One Knows: Offenders with Learning Difficulties and Learning Disabilities – 
a Review of Prevalence and Associated Needs (Prison Reform Trust 2007) 
Marshall M, ‘Sampling for Qualitative Research’ (1996) 13(6) Family Practice 522 
Maxwell J, A Realist Approach for Qualitative Research (SAGE 2012) 
Maynard W, Witness Intimidation: Strategies for Prevention (Police Research Group Crime 
Detection and Prevention Series Paper 55. London: Home Office 1994) 
McConville M and Chung WH, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 
2007) 
─ Hodgson J, Bridges L and Pavlovic A, Standing Accused: The Organisation and Practices 
of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Clarendon Press 1994) 
─ and Marsh L, Criminal Judges: Legitimacy, Courts and State-Induced Guilty Pleas in 
Britain (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 
─ ‘Adversarialism goes West: Case Management in Criminal Courts’ (2015) 19(3) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 172 
McDowell L, ‘Elites in the City of London: some methodological considerations’ (1998) 
30(12) Environment and Planning A 2133 
McEwan J, ‘In Defence of Vulnerable Witnesses: The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999’ (2000) 4(1) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1 
─ ‘Youth Court: Whether Legislative Provisions Requiring Special Measures Direction to be 
Given in Relation to Child Witness in Need of Special Protection in Manner Compatible with 
Convention Requirement for a Fair Trial’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 497 
─ ‘Vulnerable Defendants and the Fairness of Trials’ [2013] Criminal Law Review 100 
McLeod R and others, Court Experiences of Adults with Mental Health Conditions, Learning 
Disabilities and Limited Mental Capacity Report 1: Overview and Recommendations 
(Ministry of Justice Research Series 8/10, Ministry of Justice 2010) 
McManus S and others (eds), Mental Health and Wellbeing in England: Adult Psychiatric 
Morbidity Survey 2014 (Leeds: NHS Digital 2016) 
Miller J and Glassner B, ‘Interviews and Focus Groups’ in Silverman D (ed), Qualitative 
Research (3
rd





Miller W and Crabtree B, ‘Depth interviewing’ Hesse-Biber S and Leavy P (eds), 
Approaches to qualitative research: a ready on theory and practice (OUP 2004) 
Ministry of Justice, Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on 
Interviewing Victims and Witnesses, and Guidance on Using Special Measures (Ministry of 
Justice 2011) 
─ The Witness Charter: Standards of Care for Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System 
(Ministry of Justice 2013) 
─ Our Commitment to Victims (Ministry of Justice 2014) 
─ Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Ministry of Justice 2015)  
─ The Registered Intermediary Procedural Guidance Manual (Ministry of Justice 2015) 
─ Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly, England and Wales: January to March 2016 
(Ministry of Justice 2016) 
─ Efficiency in the Criminal Justice System (National Audit Office 2016) 
─ Home Office and the Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Sexual Offending in 
England and Wales: Statistics Bulletin (MOJ, HO, ONS 2013)  
Morison J and Leith P, The Barrister’s World and the Nature of Law (OUP 1992) 
Mulcahy L, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Routledge 2010) 
National Appropriate Adults Network, There to Help: Ensuring Provision of Appropriate 
Adults for Mentally Vulnerable Adults Detained or Interviewed by the Police (Institute for 
Criminal Policy Research 2015) Paper A: Literature Review 
Naughton M, ‘Miscarriages of Justice and the Government of the Criminal Justice System: 
An Alternative Perspective on the Production and Deployment of Counter-Discourse’ (2005) 
13 Critical Criminology 211 
Negri S, ‘The Principle of “Equality of Arms” and the Evolving Law of International 
Criminal Procedure’ (2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review 513 
Newman D, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 
News Online Poll, ICM as cited in <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1006201.stm> accessed 9 
February 2014 
NHS England’s Liaison and Diversion Standard Service Specification 2015 (version 8C—in 
draft) 
Nourse V and Shaffer G, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt 
a New Legal Theory?’ 95 Cornell Law Review 61 
NSPCC, Child Abuse Trends in England and Wales 1983-1987 (NSPCC 1989) 
O’Mahony B, Smith K and Milne B, ‘The Early Identification of Vulnerable Witnesses Prior 





Oakley E, ‘Policing the Missing: Negotiating Absence’ (PhD thesis, University of Bristol 
2014) 
Odendahl T and Shaw A, ‘Interviewing Elites’ in Gubrium J and Holstein J (eds), Handbook 
of Interview Research: Context and Method (Sage 2002) 
Office for Criminal Justice Reform, Early Special Measures Discussions between the Police 
and the Crown Prosecution Service: Practice Guidance (CJS January 2009) 
─ Special Measures Meetings between the Crown Prosecution Service and Witnesses: 
Practice Guidance (CJS January 2009) 
─ Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly, England and Wales: April to June 2015 (Ministry of 
Justice 2015) 
─ Crime in England and Wales: year ending Mar 2016 (ONS July 2016) 
─ Personal Well-being in the UK: 2015-2016 (Statistical Bulletin, ONS 2016)  
Owen J and Campbell J, Court Responses to Rape and Sexual Assault in the UK (Institute for 
Policy Research, University of Bath, Policy Brief 2015) 
Owusu-Bempah A, ‘Judging the Desirability of a Defendant’s Evidence: An Unfortunate 
Approach to s.35(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994’ (2011) 9 Criminal 
Law Review 690 
─ ‘Defence Participation through pre-trial Disclosure: Issues and Implications’ (2013) 17(2) 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 183 
─ ‘Vulnerable Defendants and the Right to Silence: O’Donnell v United Kingdom [2015] 
ECHR 16667/10’ (2015) 79(5) The Journal of Criminal Law 322 
─ Defendant Participation in the Criminal Process (Routledge 2017) 
Packer HL, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’ (1964) 113(1) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1 
Padfield N, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2008) 
Payne S, Rape: The Victim Experience Review (Home Office 2009) 
─ Redefining Justice: Addressing the Individual Needs of Victims and Witnesses (Ministry of 
Justice 2009) 
Picinali F, ‘Innocence and Burdens of Proof in English Criminal Law’ (2014) 13(4) Law, 
Probability and Risk 243 
Plotnikoff J and Woolfson R, Measuring up? Evaluating implementation of Government 
commitments to young witnesses in criminal proceedings (NSPCC 2009) 
─ Intermediaries in the Criminal Justice System: Improving Communication for Vulnerable 
Witnesses and Defendants (Policy Press 2015) 
Quirk H, ‘Twenty Years on, the Right of Silence and Legal Advice: The Spiralling Costs of 





─ The Rise and Fall of the Right to Silence: Principle, Politics and Policy (Routledge 2017) 
(forthcoming) 
Rakos R and Landsmann S, ‘Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General 
Issues, and Future Directions’ (1992) 76(3) Minnesota Law Review 655 
Raz J, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ in Raz J, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press 
1994) 
Redmayne M, ‘The Law Commission’s Character Convictions’ (2002) 6 International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 71 
Richards D, ‘Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls’ (1996) 16(3) Politics 199 
Ritchie J, ‘The Applications of Qualitative Methods to Social Research’ in Ritchie J and 
Lewis J (eds), Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications Ltd 2003) 
─ Lewis J and Elam G, ‘Designing and Selecting Samples’ in Ritchie J and Lewis J (eds), 
Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications 2003) 
Roach K, ‘Four Models of the Criminal Process’ (1999) 89(2) The Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 671 
Roberts P, ‘Taking the Burden of Proof Seriously’ [1995] Criminal Law Review 783 
─ ‘Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 317 
─ Cooper D and Judge S, ‘Monitoring Success, Accounting for Failure: The Outcome of 
Prosecutors’ Applications for Special Measures Directions under the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999’ (2005) 9 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 269 
─ and Zuckerman A, Criminal Evidence (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2010) 
Rossetti P, Dinisman T and Moroz A, ‘Insight Report: An Easy Target? Risk Factors 
Affecting Victimisation Rates for Violent Crime and Theft’ (Victim Support 2016) 
Royal College of Psychiatrists, Child Defendants (Report no OP56, Royal College of 
Psychiatrists 2006) 
Sanders A and others, Witnesses with Learning Difficulties (Home Office Research and 
Statistics Directorate, Research Findings No. 44 1996) 
─ and others, Victims with Learning Disabilities: Negotiating the Criminal Justice System 
(Occasional Paper No.17, University of Oxford Centre for Criminological Research 1997) 
─ and Jones I, ‘The Victim in Court’ in Walklate S (ed), Handbook of Victims and 
Victimology (Willan Publishing 2007) 
─ and Young R, Criminal Justice (1
st
 edn, Butterworths 1994) 
─ Young R and Burton M, Criminal Justice (4
th
 edn, OUP 2010) 
Sen A, Inequality, Re-examined (OUP 1992) 





Shaw J and others, A National Evaluation of Prison Mental Health In-Reach Services 
(Offender Health Network Research 2009) 
Smith G, ‘A Most Enduring Problem: Police Complaints Reform in England and Wales’ 
(2005) 35(1) Journal of Social Policy 121 
Spencer J, ‘Child Witnesses and Cross-examination at Trial: Must it continue?’ (2011) 3 
Archbold Review 7 
─ and Lamb M (eds), Children and Cross-Examination: Time to Change the Rules? (Hart 
Publishing 2012) 
Stephens N, ‘Collecting Data from Elites and Ultra Elites: Telephone and Face-to-Face 
Interviews with Macroeconomists’ (2007) 7(2) Qualitative Research 203 
Stuckenberg C, ‘Who is Presumed Innocent of What by Whom?’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 301 
Summers H, ‘Rape victims to be spared ordeal of cross-examination in court’ The Guardian 
(19 March 2017) 
Tague P, ‘Guilty Pleas or Trials: Which Does the Barrister Prefer?’ (2008) 23 Melbourne 
University Law Review 242 
Talbot J, ‘Fair Access to Justice? Support for Vulnerable Defendants in the Criminal Courts’ 
(Prison Reform Trust 2012) 
Tata C, ‘In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid, Supply, Demand, and ‘Ethical 
Indeterminacy’ in Criminal Defence Work’ (2007) 34(4) Journal of Law and Society 489 
Taylor C, Review of the Youth Justice System in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice 2016) 
Temkin J, ‘Prosecuting and Defending Rape: Perspectives from the Bar’ (2000) 27(2) 
Journal of Law and Society 219 
The Advocate’s Gateway, ‘Intermediaries: Step by Step’ (Toolkit 16, The Council of the Inns 
of Court 2015) 
─ ‘Using Communication Aids in the Criminal Justice System’ (Toolkit 14, The Council of 
the Inns of Court 2015)  
─ ‘Planning to Question Someone with an Autism Spectrum Disorder including Asperger 
Syndrome’ (Toolkit 3, The Council of the Inns of Court 2016). 
─ ‘Case Management in Criminal Cases when a Witness or Defendant is Vulnerable’ 
(Toolkit 1a, The Council of the Inns of Court 2017) 
─ ‘Effective Participation of Young Defendants’ (Toolkit 8, The Council of the Inns of Court 
2017)  
─ ‘Identifying Vulnerability in Witnesses and Parties and Making Adjustments’ (Toolkit 10, 
The Council Inns of Court 2017) 






The Prosecution Team, The Prosecution Team Manual of Guidance: For the Preparation, 
Processing and Submission of Prosecution Files (Manual of Guidance 2011, incorporating 
National File Standard 2015) 
Thomson K, ‘Disability Among Prisoners’ (2012) 59(3) Probation Journal 282 
Tillyer M and Wright E, ‘Intimate Partner Violence and the Victim-Offender Overlap’ (2014) 
51(1) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 29 
Victim Support, Women rape and the criminal justice system (Victim Support 1996) 
─ Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15 (Victim Support 2015) 
von Leyden W, Aristotle on Equality and Justice: His Political Argument (Palgrave 
Macmillan 1985) 
Walker P, ‘Frances Andrade Killed Herself after Being Accused of Lying, says Husband’ The 
Guardian (10 February 2013) 
Webley L, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Cane P and Kritzer H 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (first published in 2010, OUP 
2012) 
Weigend T, ‘Assuming that the Defendant is not Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the 
German System of Criminal Justice’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 285 
Wheatcroft J, ‘Witness Assistance and Familiarisation in England and Wales: The Right to 
Challenge’ (2017) 21(1/2) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 158 
White A, ‘The Politics of ‘Privatization’: A Multiple Streams Approach’ (2014) Criminology 
and Criminal Justice 1 
Wigzell A, Kirby A and Jacobson J, The Youth Proceedings Advocacy Review: Final Report 
(Institute for Criminal Policy Research 2015) 
Wollheim R and Berlin I, ‘Equality’ (1955-1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
281 
Young R, ‘Will Widgery Do?: Court Clerks, Discretion, and the Determination of Legal Aid 
Applications’ in Young R and Wall D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers 
and The Defence of Liberty (Blackstone Press Limited 1996) 
─ ‘Exploring the Boundaries of the Criminal Courtroom Workgroup’ (2013) 42 Common 
Law World Review 203 
─ and Wall D, ‘Criminal Justice, Legal Aid, and the Defence of Liberty’ in Young R and 
Wall D (eds), Access to Criminal Justice: Legal Aid, Lawyers and The Defence of Liberty 
(Blackstone Press Limited 1996) 
Zander M and Henderson P, Crown Court Study (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 
Study No.19 1993) 
